Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2016, the out-of-state petition circulators challenged Section 2869 of the Pennsylvania Election Code, which requires that any circulator of nomination petitions be “a qualified elector of the Commonwealth, who is duly registered and enrolled as a member of the party designated in said petition.” The district court found that the ban was not facially unconstitutional, but was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs for the 2020 election only. The plaintiffs did not appeal the conclusion that the ban was not facially unconstitutional. The court declined to expand the injunctive relief to cover future elections for the plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals. The Third Circuit held that permanent injunctive relief for all future elections is appropriate for the plaintiff circulators only, not to all similarly situated individuals, and only if the plaintiffs continue to submit to Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction. The request for permanent relief for the plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals goes beyond the specific plaintiffs and circumstances of this litigation and seeks facial relief. A factual record specific to each similarly situated individual circulator will be necessary to determine the appropriate relief in future elections. Each individual circulator will need to demonstrate their willingness to submit to Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction for the purpose of nomination circulation. View "Benezet Consulting LLC v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court entering a declaratory judgment that Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.646 violated public officials' right to free speech and was void for vagueness, holding that the circuit court erred.Section 115.646 prohibits officials from directly using public funds to advocate, support, or oppose a ballot measure or candidate for public office. Plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit seeking a judgment declaring section 115.646 unconstitutional. The circuit court sustained Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring that section 115.646 violated the officials' First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) because section 115.646 regulates the use of public funds, not the officials' speech, it does not implicate the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and (2) the circuit court erred in declaring certain words and phrases in the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. View "City of Maryland Heights v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court allowing certain districting maps to stand, holding that the enacted maps violated several rights guaranteed to the people by the North Carolina Constitution.The General Assembly enacted districting maps for the United States Congress, the North Carolina House of Representatives, and the North Carolina Senate that "subordinated traditional neutral redistricting criteria in favor of significant partisan advantage by diluting the power of certain people's votes." The trial court denied Plaintiffs' claims, concluding as a matter of law that claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering present purely political questions that are nonjusticiable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable under the North Carolina Constitution; and (2) the maps failed strict scrutiny and must be rejected. View "Harper v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declared the congressional-district plan passed by the General Assembly invalid, holding that the General Assembly did not comply with Ohio Const. art. XIX, 1(C)(3)(a) and (b) in passing the plan and that a new congressional-district plan must be passed the complies in full with Article XIX and is not dictated by partisan considerations.At issue was 2021 Sub.S.B. No. 258, which was passed by a simple majority and signed into law by Governor Mike DeWine on November 20, 2021. The bill resulted in districts in which undue political bias was at least, if not more, likely to favor Republican candidates than the 2011 reapportionment that impelled Ohio's constitutional reforms. Petitioners argued that the congressional-district plan violated Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a). The Supreme Court held that the congressional-district plan was invalid in its entirety because it unduly favored the Republican Party and disfavored the Democratic Party and because it unduly split three counties, in violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(b). View "Adams v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Georgia law places restrictions on which prospective candidates for elective office can appear on the general election ballot. The Libertarian Party of Georgia, prospective Libertarian candidates, and affiliated voters ask the court to hold that Georgia's ballot-access laws unconstitutionally burden their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and deny them equal protection.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court incorrectly held that the laws violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court explained that, under the Anderson framework, the laws need only be justified by the State's important regulatory interests. In this case, the interests the Secretary asserts—in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot, in maintaining the orderly administration of elections, and in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election—are compelling. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that Georgia's laws do not cause an equal protection violation. The court concluded that the Secretary's stated interest sufficiently justifies the distinction between candidates. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated the district court's injunction, and remanded. View "Cowen v. Secretary of State of the State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Arizona voters may vote by mail during the last four weeks of an election. The voter must sign an affidavit that is printed on a specially provided, postage-paid envelope. A ballot with a missing signature cannot be counted. On September 10, 2020, weeks before the upcoming presidential election, the district court enjoined the enforcement of Ariz. Stat. 16-548(A), which requires early voters to have signed their ballots by 7:00 PM on Election Day in order to have their votes counted. The Ninth Circuit granted emergency motions and stayed the injunction, pending appeal.In 2021, the Ninth Circuit entered a permanent stay. The state has shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Arizona's signature deadline imposes, at most, a "minimal" burden on those who seek to exercise their right to vote. The state made a strong showing that its deadline reasonably advances important regulatory interests in reducing the burden on poll workers, especially during the days immediately following an election. The public interest is served by preserving Arizona's existing election laws. Although Arizona’s law implicated national interests, at least when the election included presidential candidates, that factor alone did not mean that strict scrutiny must apply. The court noted that the Arizona legislature “laudably amended its election code in 2019 to allow voters an extended period to correct mismatched signatures." Arizona’s decision not to grant the same extension to voters who neglect to sign the affidavit passed constitutional muster. View "Arizona Democratic Party v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Section 3-506 of Maryland's Election Law, which provides that a list of Maryland registered voters (the List) may be given to an applicant who is himself a registered Maryland voter (Access Provision), so long as the applicant attests that he will use the List for purposes that are related to the electoral process (the Use Provision). On remand from the Fourth Circuit, the district court awarded summary judgment to Maryland state officials on plaintiff's Use Provision-based free speech and vagueness claims.The Fourth Circuit applied the Anderson-Burdick balancing test and concluded that plaintiff's claim that — as applied to him — the Use Provision contravenes the Free Speech Clause was without merit. The court explained that, when weighed against the State's interests — that is, safeguarding the List, protecting Maryland's election system, and shielding Maryland registered voters from harassment — the burden imposed on plaintiff is modest. The court also found plaintiff's as-applied vagueness claim unavailing where plaintiff understands the Use Provision's reach. Finally, the court found meritless plaintiff's facial challenges to the Use Provision which argued that the Use Provision facially contravenes the Free Speech Clause and that the phrase "related to the electoral process" is facially vague. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Fusaro v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 1992, Michigan voters, wanting to amend Michigan’s Constitution to establish term limits for state legislators, state executives, and members of Congress, got a petition on the ballot; 58.8% of voters approved the measure. Term limits became part of the Michigan Constitution (six years in Michigan’s House of Representatives; eight years in the Michigan Senate). Some voters sued, arguing that the term limits violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit upheld the term limits. About 20 years later, a bipartisan group of veteran legislators challenged the term-limit provision, making many of the same ballot-access and freedom-of-association claims, and citing two procedural provisions of the Michigan Constitution.The district court granted Michigan summary judgment. After determining that it had jurisdiction because the legislators raise claims under the Federal Constitution, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent bars their claims as voters. Voters have no fundamental right to “vote for a specific candidate or even a particular class of candidates.” As candidates, the legislators hold no greater protection than the voters they wish to represent. Candidates do not have a fundamental right to run for office. Michigan has several legitimate government interests in enacting term limits, including its sovereign interest in structuring its government as it sees fit. View "Kowall v. Benson" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' request to enjoin Harris County's administration of drive-thru voting in the November 2020 election is moot. The court explained that, since plaintiffs' appeal, the November 2020 election has been completed; the results have been certified; and new officeholders have been sworn in. The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to identify any evidence in the record before the district court demonstrating that Harris County will offer drive-thru voting again in the future, let alone that it will offer it in such a way as to evade judicial review.Furthermore, while this appeal was pending, the Legislature passed S.B. 1, which addresses drive-thru voting. The court concluded that the challenge raised in last year's case before the district court is moot as to elections after December 2, 2021. Even if the court considered the argument that candidates have standing and assumed arguendo that candidates do have standing to challenge election procedures, that standing would pertain only to their claim as to the November 2020 election, the only election in which they claimed to be candidates. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief and the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for want of jurisdiction. The court also vacated the district court's advisory discussion of the legality of drive-thru voting without offering any opinion as to the merits of that reasoning. View "Hotze v. Hudspeth" on Justia Law

In 2018, Florida voters approved Amendment 4, a state constitutional amendment that automatically restored voting rights to ex-felons who had completed all of the terms of their sentences. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the "legal financial obligation" (LFO) requirement in Senate Bill 7066, which implemented the Amendment and required payment of all fines, fees, and restitution imposed as part of the sentence. The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the state to allow the named plaintiffs to register and vote if they are able to show that they are genuinely unable to pay their LFOs and would otherwise be eligible to vote under Amendment 4.In 2020, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction with respect to the “wealth discrimination” claims. In 2021, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of an Equal Protection claim based on gender discrimination, on behalf of “low-income women of color who face unemployment, low wages, and difficulty paying off their financial debts at much higher rates than their male and white female counterparts.” The plaintiffs could prevail on their constitutional challenges only if they could “show that gender was a motivating factor in the adoption of the pay-to-vote system,” and they presented no evidence of intentional discrimination. View "McCoy v. Governor of Florida" on Justia Law