Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

During his 2018 Senate reelection campaign, Cruz loaned his campaign committee $260,000. Section 304 of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act restricts the use of post-election campaign contributions, 52 U.S.C. 30116(j). Federal Election Commission regulations establish that a campaign may repay up to $250,000 in candidate loans using contributions made at any time and may use pre-election contributions to repay any portion exceeding $250,000 only within 20 days of the election; after that deadline, any portion above $250,000 is treated as a campaign contribution, precluding repayment. The Committee began repaying Cruz’s loans after the 20-day post-election window, leaving $10,000 unpaid. Cruz and the Committee challenged Section 304.The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had standing. An injury resulting from the application or threatened application of an unlawful enactment remains fairly traceable to such application, even if the injury was "willingly incurred." The present inability of the Committee to repay and Cruz to recover the final $10,000 is traceable to Section 304.The loan-repayment limitation abridges First Amendment rights by burdening candidates who wish to make expenditures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal loans. It increases the risk that such loans will not be repaid in full, which deters candidates from making loans. Debt is a ubiquitous tool for financing electoral campaigns, especially for new candidates and challengers. Section 304 raises a barrier to entry. The only permissible ground for restricting political speech is the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. The government failed to identify a single case of quid pro quo corruption in this context, even though most states do not impose any similar limitations. View "Federal Election Commission v. Cruz" on Justia Law

The 2020 census revealed that Wisconsin’s State Assembly and Senate districts were no longer equally apportioned. The Governor vetoed new maps passed by the legislature. The Wisconsin Supreme Court invited proposed maps and selected the Governor's proposed maps; the Assembly map created seven majority-black districts—one more than the current map. The court stated there were “good reasons” to think that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301 “may” require the additional majority-black district.The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Under the Equal Protection Clause, districting maps that sort voters on the basis of race cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest, such as compliance with the VRA. Preconditions to demonstrating a VRA violation require showings that the minority group is sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district, the minority group is politically cohesive, and a majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate. If the preconditions are established, a court considers the totality of circumstances.The Governor’s main explanation for the seventh majority-black district was that there is now a sufficiently large and compact population of black residents to fill it. Strict scrutiny requires more. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis of the preconditions improperly relied on generalizations and “made virtually no effort” to parse data at the district level or respond to criticisms of expert analysis. The court improperly reduced the totality-of-circumstances analysis to a single factor–proportionality--and failed to address whether a race-neutral alternative that did not add another majority-black district would deny black voters equal political opportunity. View "Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and the United States filed suit against the State of Texas, as well as state and local officials, seeking to enjoin enforcement of some or all of the new provisions in Senate Bill 1, which amended various provisions of the Texas Election Code pertaining to voter registration, voting by mail, poll watchers, and more.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the Committees' motion to intervene as defendants, concluding that the Committees have a right to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The court determined that the Committees made a timely application to intervene by right; they claim interests relating to SB 1 which is the subject of this consolidated suit; their absence from the suit may practically impede their ability to protect their interests; and the existing parties might not adequately represent those interests. Accordingly, the court remanded to allow the Committees to intervene by right in this suit. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Harris County Republican Party" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' action challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of the Texas Election Code regulating mail-in balloting is barred by sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the Secretary does not enforce the challenged provisions and thus the district court erred in finding the Secretary was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. View "Lewis v. Hughs" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs' challenges to Texas's system for verifying the signatures on mail-in ballots. The court concluded that the Secretary does not verify mail-in ballots; rather, that is the job of local election officials. Therefore, the district court erred in finding that the Secretary was the proper defendant under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order enjoining the Secretary, vacated the injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flores v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' constitutional claims challenging Texas's elimination of straight-ticket voting are barred by sovereign immunity because the Secretary of State does not enforce the law that ended straight-ticket voting. The court agreed with the Secretary that he lacks the necessary connection to enforcing House Bill 25's repeal of straight-ticket voting and therefore is not a proper defendant under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order enjoining the Secretary of State, vacated the injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Texas Alliance for Retired Americans v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 2016, the out-of-state petition circulators challenged Section 2869 of the Pennsylvania Election Code, which requires that any circulator of nomination petitions be “a qualified elector of the Commonwealth, who is duly registered and enrolled as a member of the party designated in said petition.” The district court found that the ban was not facially unconstitutional, but was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs for the 2020 election only. The plaintiffs did not appeal the conclusion that the ban was not facially unconstitutional. The court declined to expand the injunctive relief to cover future elections for the plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals. The Third Circuit held that permanent injunctive relief for all future elections is appropriate for the plaintiff circulators only, not to all similarly situated individuals, and only if the plaintiffs continue to submit to Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction. The request for permanent relief for the plaintiffs and all similarly situated individuals goes beyond the specific plaintiffs and circumstances of this litigation and seeks facial relief. A factual record specific to each similarly situated individual circulator will be necessary to determine the appropriate relief in future elections. Each individual circulator will need to demonstrate their willingness to submit to Pennsylvania’s jurisdiction for the purpose of nomination circulation. View "Benezet Consulting LLC v. Secretary Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court entering a declaratory judgment that Mo. Rev. Stat. 115.646 violated public officials' right to free speech and was void for vagueness, holding that the circuit court erred.Section 115.646 prohibits officials from directly using public funds to advocate, support, or oppose a ballot measure or candidate for public office. Plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit seeking a judgment declaring section 115.646 unconstitutional. The circuit court sustained Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring that section 115.646 violated the officials' First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) because section 115.646 regulates the use of public funds, not the officials' speech, it does not implicate the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and (2) the circuit court erred in declaring certain words and phrases in the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. View "City of Maryland Heights v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court allowing certain districting maps to stand, holding that the enacted maps violated several rights guaranteed to the people by the North Carolina Constitution.The General Assembly enacted districting maps for the United States Congress, the North Carolina House of Representatives, and the North Carolina Senate that "subordinated traditional neutral redistricting criteria in favor of significant partisan advantage by diluting the power of certain people's votes." The trial court denied Plaintiffs' claims, concluding as a matter of law that claims of extreme partisan gerrymandering present purely political questions that are nonjusticiable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs' partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable under the North Carolina Constitution; and (2) the maps failed strict scrutiny and must be rejected. View "Harper v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declared the congressional-district plan passed by the General Assembly invalid, holding that the General Assembly did not comply with Ohio Const. art. XIX, 1(C)(3)(a) and (b) in passing the plan and that a new congressional-district plan must be passed the complies in full with Article XIX and is not dictated by partisan considerations.At issue was 2021 Sub.S.B. No. 258, which was passed by a simple majority and signed into law by Governor Mike DeWine on November 20, 2021. The bill resulted in districts in which undue political bias was at least, if not more, likely to favor Republican candidates than the 2011 reapportionment that impelled Ohio's constitutional reforms. Petitioners argued that the congressional-district plan violated Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(a). The Supreme Court held that the congressional-district plan was invalid in its entirety because it unduly favored the Republican Party and disfavored the Democratic Party and because it unduly split three counties, in violation of Article XIX, Section 1(C)(3)(b). View "Adams v. DeWine" on Justia Law