Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Texas applicants may transmit a voter registration form to the county registrar via fax, then deliver or mail a hardcopy of the application within four days, Elec.Code 13.143(d-2). Vote.org, a non-profit, non-membership organization, launched a web application, with which a user would supply the required information and an electronic image of her signature. The application would assemble a completed voter registration application, then transmit it to a third-party vendor, who would transmit the form via fax to the county registrar; another vendor would mail a hardcopy to the registrar. A 2018 pilot program in four counties “was an unmitigated disaster. Because applications submitted using the web application lacked an original, “wet” signature, the Secretary of State advised that those applications were incomplete. In 2021, House Bill 3107 clarified that for “a registration application submitted by [fax] to be effective, a copy of the original registration application containing the voter’s original signature must be submitted by personal delivery or mail” within four days.The district court concluded that the wet-signature requirement violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 52 U.S.C. 10101(a)(2)(B), because an original signature is “not material” to an individual’s qualification to vote and granted a permanent injunction. The Fifth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal, concluding that Vote.org lacks statutory standing and is unlikely to prevail on the merits. The wet-signature rule imposes a very slight burden on the right to vote and helps deter voter registration fraud. View "Vote.Org v. Paxton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court finding the legislative reapportionment in the map colloquially known as "Ad Astra 2" constitutionally deficient as a partisan and racial gerrymander, holding that Plaintiffs did not prevail on any of their claims that Ad Astra 2 violates the Kansas Constitution.The district court held that Sub. SB 355 violates the Kansas Constitution as both a partisan and a racial gerrymander. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court had jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' claims; (2) claims of excessive partisan gerrymandering are nonjusticiable in Kansas; and (3) Plaintiffs did not establish the elements of their race-based claims. View "Rivera v. Schwab" on Justia Law

The Materiality Provision of the Civil Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10101(a)(2)(B), prohibits any “person acting under color of law [from] deny[ing] the right of any individual to vote in any election because of an error or omission … if such error or omission is not material in determining whether such voter is qualified … to vote in such election.” In Pennsylvania, an error or omission is material to a voter’s qualifications to vote if it is pertinent to either the voter’s age, citizenship, residency, or felony status or the timeliness of the ballot. The Lehigh County Board of Elections (LCBE) held an election on November 2, 2021, to fill local vacancies. LCBE set aside 257 out of approximately 22,000 mail-in or absentee ballots that lacked a handwritten date next to the voter declaration signature and ballots with the date in the wrong location on the outer envelope. LCBE convened a public hearing and voted to count the undated and misdated ballots.The Third Circuit held that private plaintiffs have a private right of action to enforce section 10101 under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that the dating provisions contained in 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3146.6(a) and 3150.16 are immaterial to a voter’s qualifications and eligibility under section 10101(a)(2)(B). The court directed that the undated ballots be counted. View "Migliori v. Lehigh County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the General Assembly-district plan adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission on May 5, 2022 was invalid in its entirety and ordered the commission to draft and adopt an entirely new General Assembly-district plan that meets the requirements of the Ohio Constitution, including Article XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B).On May 5, the Commission readopted the plan at issue, purportedly only for use in the 2022 election. The Supreme Court had earlier held the plan to be unconstitutional. Petitioners filed objections to the adoption of the plan. The Supreme Court sustained the objections, holding that the plan at issue was invalid in its entirety. View "League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Commission" on Justia Law

During his 2018 Senate reelection campaign, Cruz loaned his campaign committee $260,000. Section 304 of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act restricts the use of post-election campaign contributions, 52 U.S.C. 30116(j). Federal Election Commission regulations establish that a campaign may repay up to $250,000 in candidate loans using contributions made at any time and may use pre-election contributions to repay any portion exceeding $250,000 only within 20 days of the election; after that deadline, any portion above $250,000 is treated as a campaign contribution, precluding repayment. The Committee began repaying Cruz’s loans after the 20-day post-election window, leaving $10,000 unpaid. Cruz and the Committee challenged Section 304.The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had standing. An injury resulting from the application or threatened application of an unlawful enactment remains fairly traceable to such application, even if the injury was "willingly incurred." The present inability of the Committee to repay and Cruz to recover the final $10,000 is traceable to Section 304.The loan-repayment limitation abridges First Amendment rights by burdening candidates who wish to make expenditures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal loans. It increases the risk that such loans will not be repaid in full, which deters candidates from making loans. Debt is a ubiquitous tool for financing electoral campaigns, especially for new candidates and challengers. Section 304 raises a barrier to entry. The only permissible ground for restricting political speech is the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. The government failed to identify a single case of quid pro quo corruption in this context, even though most states do not impose any similar limitations. View "Federal Election Commission v. Cruz" on Justia Law

The 2020 census revealed that Wisconsin’s State Assembly and Senate districts were no longer equally apportioned. The Governor vetoed new maps passed by the legislature. The Wisconsin Supreme Court invited proposed maps and selected the Governor's proposed maps; the Assembly map created seven majority-black districts—one more than the current map. The court stated there were “good reasons” to think that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301 “may” require the additional majority-black district.The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Under the Equal Protection Clause, districting maps that sort voters on the basis of race cannot be upheld unless they are narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest, such as compliance with the VRA. Preconditions to demonstrating a VRA violation require showings that the minority group is sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district, the minority group is politically cohesive, and a majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate. If the preconditions are established, a court considers the totality of circumstances.The Governor’s main explanation for the seventh majority-black district was that there is now a sufficiently large and compact population of black residents to fill it. Strict scrutiny requires more. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s analysis of the preconditions improperly relied on generalizations and “made virtually no effort” to parse data at the district level or respond to criticisms of expert analysis. The court improperly reduced the totality-of-circumstances analysis to a single factor–proportionality--and failed to address whether a race-neutral alternative that did not add another majority-black district would deny black voters equal political opportunity. View "Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs and the United States filed suit against the State of Texas, as well as state and local officials, seeking to enjoin enforcement of some or all of the new provisions in Senate Bill 1, which amended various provisions of the Texas Election Code pertaining to voter registration, voting by mail, poll watchers, and more.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the Committees' motion to intervene as defendants, concluding that the Committees have a right to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The court determined that the Committees made a timely application to intervene by right; they claim interests relating to SB 1 which is the subject of this consolidated suit; their absence from the suit may practically impede their ability to protect their interests; and the existing parties might not adequately represent those interests. Accordingly, the court remanded to allow the Committees to intervene by right in this suit. View "La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Harris County Republican Party" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' action challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of the Texas Election Code regulating mail-in balloting is barred by sovereign immunity. The court concluded that the Secretary does not enforce the challenged provisions and thus the district court erred in finding the Secretary was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. View "Lewis v. Hughs" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs' challenges to Texas's system for verifying the signatures on mail-in ballots. The court concluded that the Secretary does not verify mail-in ballots; rather, that is the job of local election officials. Therefore, the district court erred in finding that the Secretary was the proper defendant under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order enjoining the Secretary, vacated the injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Flores v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' constitutional claims challenging Texas's elimination of straight-ticket voting are barred by sovereign immunity because the Secretary of State does not enforce the law that ended straight-ticket voting. The court agreed with the Secretary that he lacks the necessary connection to enforcing House Bill 25's repeal of straight-ticket voting and therefore is not a proper defendant under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order enjoining the Secretary of State, vacated the injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Texas Alliance for Retired Americans v. Scott" on Justia Law