Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the appointment of the New Mexico House of Representatives following the 2010 federal census. It was undisputed that the House was unconstitutionally apportioned. The Legislature then passed House Bill 39 to reapportion the House during a 2011 Special Session. The Governor vetoed the bill. Because lawmakers failed to create constitutionally-acceptable districts, the burden fell on the courts to draw a reapportionment map for the House. The Court appointed a retired district judge to oversee the judiciary's process. Petitioners filed petitions for a writ of superintending control to ask the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction over the case, and to reverse the district court to adopt an alternative plan or remand the case with instructions regarding the legal standard that should be applied. After reading the parties' briefs and listening to oral argument, the Court entered an order articulating the legal principles that should govern redistricting litigation in New Mexico and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, the Chief of Police Services for the City of San Clemente, sued defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after plaintiff was placed on administrative leave after he ran for, and lost, the election of Orange County Sheriff-Coroner. Plaintiff claimed that his placement on administrative leave and subsequent demotion were in unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The district court concluded that plaintiff's campaign speech was not protected by the First Amendment because he fell into the narrow "policymaker" exception to the general rule against politically-motivated dismissals. Although the court determined that the district court erred in this conclusion, the court agreed that the district court's alternative holding that Michael Carona, the incumbent Orange County Sheriff who won the election at issue, was entitled to qualified immunity because a government official in his position "reasonably but mistakenly" could have believed that political loyalty was required by someone with plaintiff's job responsibilities at the time he ran against Carona. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff sued the Secretary and several elected officials, alleging that the officials' application of a Georgia statute that governed absentee voting, Ga. Code Ann. 21-2-381(a)(1)(D), denied him the right to have a ballot mailed to him at the jail and prevented him from voting while he was incarcerated in the fall of 2008. The court vacated the summary judgment entered by the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff's alleged injury was not fairly traceable to any actions of the officials where plaintiff would not have received a ballot at the jail regardless of the officials' application of the statute when he provided only his home address on his application for an absentee ballot.

Appellants, members of the U.S. House of Representatives, along with the Florida House of Representatives, appealed from a district court order granting final summary judgment to appellees, the Florida Secretary of State and various intervening parties. At issue was whether a state constitutional provision, Amendment Six, establishing standards for congressional redistricting that was approved by the people by initiative was contrary to the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court held that Florida voters' act of lawmaking according to the state's expressly enumerated lawmaking process was fully consistent with the commands of the Elections Clause, and consonant with the understanding given to the Elections Clause by the Supreme Court in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant and Smiley v. Holm. The court also held that the factors enumerated in Amendment Six have been for many years commonly considered by legislative bodies in congressional redistricting and long accepted by the courts as being lawful and consistent with the powers delegated to the state legislatures by the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The 2010 census showed an enormous increase in Texas' population which required the State to redraw its electoral districts for the United States Congress, the State Senate, and the State House of Representatives, in order to comply with the Constitution's one-person, one-vote rule. The State also had to create new districts for the four additional congressional seats it received. Plaintiffs subsequently brought suit in Texas, claiming that the State's newly enacted electoral plans violated the United States Constitution and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973. The Court held that because it was unclear whether the District Court for the Western District of Texas followed the appropriate standards in drawing interim maps for the 2012 Texas elections, the orders implementing those maps were vacated, and the cases were remanded for further proceedings.

The district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State of Washington from enforcing its limitation on contributions to political committees supporting the recall of a state or county official. The court concluded that plaintiffs satisfied their burden under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., to demonstrate that the contribution limit was likely an unconstitutional and harmful burden on plaintiffs' rights of free speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the injunction and the court affirmed the judgment.

This case concerned the Washington State Grange's proposed People's Choice Initiative of 2004, or Initiative 872. I-872 created a "top two" primary in which the primary served as a means of winnowing the candidates to two rather than selecting party nominees. At issue was whether the State of Washington had designed its election ballots in a manner that eliminated the risk of widespread voter confusion, a question left unresolved in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party. The court held that the state had done so. The ballots, and related informational material, informed voters that, although each candidate for partisan office could specify a political party that he or she preferred, a candidate's preference did not imply that the candidate was nominated or endorsed by the party, or that the party approved of or associated with that candidate. Given the design of the ballot, and in the absence of evidence of actual voter confusion, the court held that Washington's top primary system, as implemented by the state, did not violate the First Amendment associational rights of the state's political parties. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' ballot access and trademark claims. The court reversed the district court's order granting the state's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees paid in accordance with a 2006 stipulation.

Plaintiff brought suit against various officials arising from his name not being placed on the 2010 primary election ballot in Houston, Texas. Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court held that no equitable relief was appropriate either because the relief was moot or because the court determined when examining the claims for damages that no constitutional violation occurred that would support such relief. The court also held that plaintiff lacked an interest protected by procedural due process and affirmed the district court's dismissal of that cause; plaintiff's interpretation of Anderson v. Celebrezze was not applicable; plaintiff's claims were rooted in procedural due process and his substantive due process claim failed; the dismissal of the equal protection claim was reversed and remanded where further proceedings were needed to determine whether plaintiff in fact submitted a proper application and, if he did, whether the Harris County Democratic Party Chairman purposefully discriminated or simply made an error or mistake of judgment; and the challenged election statute was constitutional.

Plaintiffs, Western Tradition Partnership (WTP), Champion Painting, and Montana Shooting Sports Foundation (MSSF), sued the Montana Attorney General and the Commissioner of Political Practices, seeking a declaration that Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-227(1) violated their freedom of speech protected by the state and federal Constitutions by prohibiting political expenditures by corporations on behalf of or opposing candidates for public office. The district court declared the statute unconstitutional, granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, enjoined enforcement of the statute, and denied the motion of Champion and MSSF for an award of attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed and entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants after applying the principles enunciated in Citizens United v. F.E.C., holding that Montana has a compelling interest to impose the challenged rationally-tailored statutory restrictions.

Plaintiff, a continuing political committee, alleged that three provisions of Washington election law violated the First Amendment as applied to ballot measure committees. The court held that Washington's disclosure requirements, Washington Revised Code, 42.17.090, and Washington Administrative Code 390-16-034, which required these committees to disclose the name and address of contributors giving more than $25, and additionally to disclose the employer and occupation of contributors giving more than $100, survived exacting scrutiny because they were substantially related to the important governmental interest in informing the electorate. The court held that Washington Revised Code 42.17.105(8), which prohibited a political committee from accepting from any one person contributions exceeding $5,000 within 21 days of a general election, was not closely drawn to achieve the state's important interest in informing the electorate. Therefore, section 42.17.105(8) was therefore unconstitutional as applied to ballot measure committees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.