Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2008, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Inc. (ACORN) hired voter registration canvassers in Las Vegas. Under an incentive program, ACORN paid canvassers $5 a bonus if the canvasser returned twenty-one or more voter registration applications. The State subsequently charged ACORN and the supervisor of ACORN's field director for Nevada with several counts of violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 293.805, which prohibits providing compensation to voter registration canvassers based upon the total number of voters a canvasser registers. The supervisor entered an Alford plea to two counts of conspiracy to commit the crime of compensation for registration of voters, and was adjudged guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 293.805 triggers a less exacting standard of review than strict scrutiny; (2) the State demonstrated an interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation imposed on canvassing activities, and therefore, section 293.805 does not violate the First Amendment; and (3) section 293.805 is not unconstitutionally vague. View "Busefink v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Ivan Gonzalez-Cancel aspired to run for Governor of Puerto Rico as Partido Nuevo Progresista's ("PNP") candidate in the 2012 general election. When he applied for the job, however, PNP said he was not qualified. Gonzalez-Cancel and Jose Barbosa, a supporter of Gonzalez-Cancel's candidacy, sued PNP and Puerto Rico's Elections Commission in federal court, alleging that the decision violated their constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Appellants' claims did not fall within one of the few narrow exceptions required for a federal court's intervention in state or local electoral disputes. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the exercise of federal jurisdiction over this election dispute was not appropriate. View "Gonzalez-Cancel v. Partido Nuevo Progresista" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a complaint against Appellees, the public school district, members of the district's board of directors, and others, alleging (1) subsequent to the federal decennial census, the district was required to adopt new district lines and the district had failed to do so in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 6-13-631; and (2) the voters were entitled to a new school board pursuant to section 6-13-631. The circuit court found in favor of Appellants. Appellants subsequently filed a motion for payment of prevailing-party attorneys' fees, which was denied. Appellants appealed, arguing that the circuit court' findings were equivalent to a finding that there had been a violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act and that, because the circuit court could have awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to the Act, Appellants were entitled to attorneys fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants did not prevail on anything other than the claim made pursuant to section 6-13-631, and because that statute does not provide for an award of attorneys' fees, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the same. View "Fluker v. Helena-West Helena Pub. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that she broke an unwritten rule and suffered the consequences when she challenged a sitting superior court judge for his seat in a local election while she was serving as a temporary superior court commissioner. The court concluded that, while the timing and targeted effect of the superior court's policy were suspicious, the court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's federal or state law retaliation claims because the judges of the superior court's Executive Committee enjoyed legislative immunity for their decision to alter the minimum qualifications to serve as a temporary commissioner. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Schmidt v. Contra Costa County, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a candidate for the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, including the secretary of state and members of the state election commission, to comply with W. Va. Code 3-12-11(e) and approve the release of matching funds to his campaign. Petitioner, a participant in the Supreme Court Public Campaign Financing Pilot Program, argued that because he complied with the applicable requirements set forth in the Pilot Program, and because one of the privately finances candidates spent a sum sufficient to trigger the matching funds provisions, the election commission was statutorily required to disburse matching funds to his campaign. The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus requested by Petitioner, holding (1) the matching funds provisions set forth in the Pilot Program violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment; and (2) therefore, Petitioner failed to establish a clear legal right to the relief sought. View "State ex rel. Loughry v. Tennant" on Justia Law

On January 27, 2012, the Yuma County Superior Court disqualified Alejandrina Cabrera under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-201(C) from appearing on the ballot as a candidate for the San Luis City Council. Concluding that section 38-201(C)'s language requirement must be read "in the context of the political office at issue," the court found that Cabrera was not sufficiently proficient in English to perform as a city council member for San Luis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, in relevant part, that (1) the trial court correctly interpreted section 38-201(C); and (2) the trial court's interpretation of the statute did not unconstitutionally violate Cabrera's right to participate in government.

After the U.S. Supreme Court declared a campaign finance statute in Arizona to be unconstitutional, the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission sought an opinion from the Nebraska attorney general as to the constitutionality of Nebraska's Campaign Finance Limitation Act (CFLA). Under the CFLA, candidates for certain covered elective offices and other public officials could choose to abide or not to abide by voluntary spending limits. A candidate who abided by the limits and raises and spent qualifying amounts in accordance with the CFLA became eligible for public funds. The attorney general opined that the CFLA would likely be found to be unconstitutional by a court, and the Commission determined it would not enforce the CFLA. The attorney general was then directed to file an action in court to determine the validity of the CFLA. The Supreme Court found that the CFLA substantially burdened the First Amendment rights of Nebraska citizens and that it was, therefore, unconstitutional.

State Attorney-General and county-prosecutor candidates may not accept campaign contributions from Medicaid providers or any person with an ownership interest in a Medicaid provider, Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45. The plaintiff physicians are Medicaid providers who attempted to contribute to Cordray’s 2010 campaign for reelection as Ohio Attorney General. When the campaign learned that the plaintiffs were Medicaid providers, however, it refused to accept their contributions. The plaintiffs challenged the statute. The district court upheld the law as supported by a general interest in “preventing corruption,” stating that the court should not “second guess” the Ohio Legislature’s means of furthering that interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The contribution ban is not closely drawn to “avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” A claim that the law prevents corruption, is “dubious at best.”

This case involved the proper interpretation of a Massachusetts election law that governed the filing of a vacancy, where a candidate nominated for state, city or town office withdraws, dies, or otherwise becomes ineligible prior to an election, G.L.c. 53, section 14(14), and its application to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of a minor political party. The court concluded that this matter was properly before the court where plaintiffs have established an actual controversy; section 14 applied to presidential electors and assumed by extension to the presidential and vice-presidential candidates the electors have pledged to support; although section 14, as written, was not a model of clarity and its meaning not without uncertainty, the court interpreted it in a manner largely consistent with the interpretation proffered by the Secretary; and finally, aligning the court's analysis under art. 9 with that of the equal protection clause, the court perceived no constitutional deficiency in the election law scheme.

This suit arose after Project Vote learned that students at Norfolk State University, a historically African-American college, experienced problems in registering to vote in the November 2008 primary and general elections in Virginia. At issue was whether Section 8(i)(l) of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), which required public disclosure of "all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters," 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(i)(l), applied to completed voter registration applications. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted Section 8(i)(l), concluding that it did not apply to such applications and holding that defendants had violated the NVRA by refusing to disclose the completed applications with voters' Social Security numbers redacted.