Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The California Supreme Court held that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the California Constitution; state voters then passed a ballot initiative, Proposition 8, amending the state constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Same-sex couples who wished to marry filed suit in federal court, challenging Proposition 8. State officials refused to defend the law, so the district court allowed the initiative’s official proponents to intervene, declared Proposition 8 unconstitutional, and enjoined its enforcement. State officials declined to appeal. The intervenors appealed. The Ninth Circuit certified a question, which the California Supreme Court answered: official proponents of a ballot initiative have authority to assert the state’s interest to defend the constitutionality of the initiative when public officials refuse to do so. The Ninth Circuit concluded that petitioners had standing and affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the intervenors did not have standing to appeal. Article III of the Constitution confines the power of federal courts to deciding actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” A litigant must demonstrate a personal and tangible harm throughout all stages of litigation. The intervenors had standing to initiate this case against the California officials responsible for enforcing Proposition 8, but once the district court issued its order, they no longer had any injury to redress and state officials chose not to appeal. The intervenors had not been ordered to do or refrain from doing anything. Their “generalized grievance” is insufficient to confer standing. The fact that a state thinks a private party should have standing to seek relief for a generalized grievance cannot override settled law to the contrary. View "Hollingsworth v. Perry" on Justia Law

IRTL challenged the constitutionality of several Iowa campaign-finance laws, an administrative rule, and two forms. The court concluded, inter alia, that IRTL lacked standing to challenge the definitions of "political committee" and "permanent organization" because it faced no credible threat or present or future prosecution; the first two sentences of Iowa Code subsection 68A.404(3), the second sentence of subsection 68A.404(3)(a), the entirety of subsection 68A.404(4)(a), the first and third sentences of Iowa Administrative Code rule 351-4.9(15), and Form Ind-Exp-O were constitutional as applied to IRTL and groups whose major purpose was not nominating or electing candidates; the first and third sentences of subsection 68A.404(3)(a), the second sentence of Iowa Administrative Code rule 351-4.9(15), the entirety of subsections 68A.404(3)(a)(1) and 68A.402B(3), and Form Dr-3 were unconstitutional as applied to IRTL and groups whose major purpose was not nominating or electing candidates; and Iowa Code section 68A.503 was constitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Iowa Right To Life Committee v. Tooker, et al." on Justia Law

Three federal contractors sought a declaration that 2 U.S.C. 441c abridged their freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment and denied them the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fifth Amendment. FECA prohibited any "person" contracting with the federal government from contributing to "any political party, committee, or candidate for public office or to any person for any political purpose or use" in a federal election. The court sua sponte vacated and remanded to the district court to comply with immediate procedures set forth in section 437h, concluding that FECA's judicial review provision ousted both the district court and the court's jurisdiction to consider the merits of the claims. View "Wagner, et al. v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

The Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices subpoenaed documents and testimony from the National Organization for Marriage (NOM) seeking the names of donors to NOM in order to determine whether NOM had complied with Maine's campaign laws during the 2009 election season. The superior court affirmed the Commission's decision not to vacate or modify the subpoenas. Appellants, including NOM and Stand for Marriage Maine PAC, appealed, contending that the Commission's subpoenas infringed on their right to freedom of association because disclosure would expose NOM's donors to threats, harassment, and reprisal. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, concluding that the record did not support Appellants' constitutional argument. View "Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed the underlying action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the witness residency requirement on nominating petitions impermissibly burdened their rights to free speech and free association under the First Amendment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with the Board's motion premised entirely on its assertion that plaintiffs have not suffered a legally cognizable injury and thus lacked standing. The district court denied the Board's motion as to standing and granted plaintiffs' motion on the merits. The district court declared the witness residency requirement unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. Although the Board's witness residency requirement served the Commonwealth's interest in policing fraud potentially permeating the electoral process and therefore meeting the first part of the strict scrutiny standard, the Board produced no concrete evidence of persuasive force explaining why plaintiffs' proposed solution, manifestly less restrictive of their First Amendment rights, would be unworkable or impractical. Accordingly, the court affirmed in all respects the judgment of the district court. View "Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd" on Justia Law

Under Illinois law, a candidate for the state legislature seeking placement on the general election ballot without having participated in a primary (or having replaced a candidate who did) must submit a nominating petition signed by a certain number of eligible voters. In July 2012, the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners determined that five Republican candidates for the state legislature had not collected the requisite numbers of signatures and denied their petitions to be listed on the ballot in the 2012 general election. In September the candidates and supporters sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the statutory scheme violated their constitutional rights to free speech and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed, holding that the doctrine of laches barred their claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after holding that laches does not apply because the delay in filing suit did not impact the Board’’ ability to fashion prospective relief in future elections. The requirement that candidates seeking ballot access submit nominating petitions is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and serves the important regulatory interests of protecting the integrity of elections from frivolous candidates and preventing voter confusion; it does not unconstitutionally burden the candidates’ and voters’ expressive and associational rights. View "Navarro v. Neal" on Justia Law

NOM, a nonprofit advocacy organization, appealed the district court's dismissal of its amended complaint for lack of subject-matter-jurisdiction. NOM was seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that New York Election Law 14-100.1, which defined the term "political committee" for the purposes of state elections, violated the First Amendment. The court determined that NOM's case presented a live controversy that was ripe for consideration and vacated the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction. Because that conclusion prevented the district court from reaching the merits of NOM's claims, the court declined to comment on the substance of NOM's claims in the first instance. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "National Organization for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Respondent filed a declaration of candidacy to run for the position of Director of Community Fire Protection District (Community Fire). Community Fire accepted Respondent's declaration of candidacy, but Respondent was subsequently disqualified because his financial interest statement had not been timely filed. Fire Chief Charles Coyne filed a petition requesting the circuit court enter an order directing Respondent to show cause why his name should not be stricken from the ballot. The trial court ruled that Respondent was disqualified from running for the position and ordered that his name be removed from the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment, as (1) Chief Coyne had capacity to bring this action on behalf of Community Fire, which had standing to bring the action; (2) Respondent received adequate notice of his obligation to file a financial interest statement; and (3) the statutory financial interest statement notice requirements are constitutionally valid. View "Coyne v. Edwards" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, the California Secretary of State. At issue were the California Elections Code sections 8066 and 8451, which mandated that circulators shall be voters in the district or political subdivision in which the candidate was to be voted on and shall serve only in that district or political subdivision. Plaintiffs alleged that the residency requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought to enjoin its enforcement. The court reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing, holding that plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact to meet constitutional standing requirements. In light of plaintiffs' concrete plan and defendant's specific threat of enforcement, the court concluded that plaintiffs have met the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement. View "Libertarian Party Los Angeles, et al v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, groups interested in electoral and government reform, sued Minnesota, challenging the constitutionality of Minnesota's Election Day Policy and Minn. Stat. 211B.11, subd. 1, which banned the wearing of any political insignia to a polling place. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the dismissal of their First Amendment and Equal Protection claims. The court held that plaintiffs have failed to state a facial claim under the First Amendment under Minn. Stat. 211B1.11, subd. 1. The court reversed and remanded the as-applied First Amendment claim to the district court so that it could properly analyze the motion as a request for summary judgment through application of the standards articulated in Rule 56 and to give the parties sufficient opportunity to create an acceptable record. The court held that plaintiffs have failed to allege that Minnesota caused selective enforcement of the facially neutral statute and Policy and has therefore failed to state an equal protection claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Minnesota Majority, et al v. Mansky, et al" on Justia Law