Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Florida Secretary of State, arguing that Florida was violating the 90 Day Provision of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-6(c)(2)(A), by conducting a program to systematically remove suspected non-citizens from the voter rolls within 90 days of a federal election. The 90 Day Provision requires states to "complete, not later than 90 days prior to the date of primary or general election for Federal office, any program the purpose of which is to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters." Concerned about people who are not citizens casting ballots in Florida elections, the Secretary engaged in two separate programs to identify and remove non-citizens from the Florida voter rolls. Determining that the issue was not moot even if the 2012 elections have passed, the court concluded that the plain meaning of the 90 Day Provision indicates that the Secretary's actions fall under the category of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters." Further, the statutory context and policy of the NVRA supported the court's conclusion that the plain meaning of "any program...to systematically remove the names of ineligible voters" was intended by Congress to include programs like the Secretary's. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Arcia, et al. v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, registered voters seeking to invalidate the Montana Districting and Apportionment Commission’s (Commission) assignment of two “holdover senators” in its final 2013 redistricting plan, filed a complaint against the State and Secretary of State (collectively, "State") seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that (1) the Commission did not violate the public’s “right to know”; (2) the Commission is part of the legislative branch and is not an agency, and that it is therefore exempt from statutes promulgating the right of participation; and (3) Plaintiffs’ argument that the Commission violated Plaintiffs’ right of suffrage was without merit. View "Willems v. State" on Justia Law

Snyder was involved in a fistfight with another town council member. He was convicted of battery. The court imposed a sentence of six months suspended and six months of home detention, but later determined that Snyder had violated probation. Snyder served the remainder of his sentence at the county jail. While Snyder was incarcerated, the County Voter Registration Board informed him that his voter registration had been cancelled under Ind. Code 3-7-46. Snyder knew that Indiana law permits him to reregister to vote at any time following release from jail. Snyder refused to re-register. He was turned away from voting in a special election. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg; the Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. 15301; the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971; and the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. On certification, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the Indiana Constitution authorized temporary disenfranchisement of any incarcerated convict. The district court dismissed the state defendants on sovereign immunity grounds; held that a county cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for acts done under state or federal law; and held that claims to enjoin de-registration or require reinstatement were not justiciable. Despite all parties arguing to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit found the case moot. Snyder waived any challenge to dismissal of the state defendants and failed to state a Monell claim against the county defendants. View "Snyder v. King" on Justia Law

Registered Voter Delilah Gentges sued the Oklahoma State Election Board in the district court of Tulsa County to prevent implementation of SB 692, commonly known as the Voter ID Act. Gentges alleged she had standing as a taxpayer and as a registered voter in Tulsa County. The State Election Board specially appeared in the district court of Tulsa County and asked the court to dismiss this suit. The State Election Board contended Gentges lacked standing and Tulsa County was not the proper venue for a suit against a State agency. The district court of Tulsa County rejected these challenges and the State Election Board asked the Supreme Court to assume original jurisdiction to prohibit the district court of Tulsa County from proceeding further. The Supreme Court granted partial relief by ordering the district court of Tulsa County to transfer the case to the district court of Oklahoma County. Gentges contended the Legislature violated the Oklahoma Constitution by submitting the Voter ID Act to a popular vote without first presenting it to the Governor for veto consideration. She also contended that requiring voters to present certain forms of identification in order to vote would "interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." After review of the parties' summary judgment paperwork, the trial court ruled: (1) the Oklahoma Constitution does not require presentment of a legislative referendum to the Governor before the referendum is placed on the ballot for a vote; and (2) Gentges lacked standing. Gentges appealed. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the trial court was correct in ruling the Voter ID Act was validly enacted, but reversed the trial court on the issue of Gentges' standing. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Gentges v. Oklahoma State Election Board" on Justia Law

In 2010, three individuals ran for the Colorado House of Representatives, House District 61: Kathleen Curry was a write-in candidate; Roger Wilson was the Democratic nominee, and Luke Korkowski was the Republican nominee. Under Colorado law, individual contributions to Ms. Curry were capped at $200, and individual contributions to each of her opponents were capped at $400. Contributors to Ms. Curry’s campaign sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected the claims and granted summary judgment to the state officials. The Tenth Circuit reversed on the equal-protection claim; and in light of this, declined to address the summary-judgment ruling on the First Amendment claims. View "Riddle v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a law providing that citizens who appear in person to vote must present photographic proof of their identity. The statute authorized a photographic identification card issued by the State as a valid form of identification. Plaintiffs were two residents who attempted to vote in the primary election using photographic identification cards issued by the City of Memphis Public Library. The residents and City filed a declaratory judgment action arguing (1) the photographic identification requirement violated constitutional protections, and (2) the City qualified as an entity of the State authorized to issue valid photographic identification cards through its public library. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the photographic identification requirement did not violate constitutional principles, and (2) the photographic identification cards issued by the library complied with the statute for voting purposes. On appeal, the Supreme Court held (1) the issue pertaining to the library cards as photographic identification was moot because a change in the law precluded the use of photographic identification cards issued by municipalities or their libraries for voting purposes; and (2) the photographic identification requirement met constitutional scrutiny. View "City of Memphis v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Appellees in this case were seventeen-year-olds who would have been eighteen by the 2008 general election. After exhausting their administrative remedies, Plaintiffs filed separate complaints in the circuit court against the Maryland State Boar of Elections (MSBE), alleging that the MSBE violated several provisions of the Election Law Article by prohibiting seventeen-year-olds who would be eighteen by the next general election from casting any votes in non-partisan primary elections for county school boards. The circuit court concluded that the voter eligibility requirements of the Maryland Constitution did not apply to non-partisan elections for Boards of Education, municipal elections, and local ballot questions not mandated by the Constitution. The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court and held that seventeen-year-olds who will turn eighteen by close of voter registration before the next general election were constitutionally and statutorily entitled to vote in primary elections, whether partisan or non-partisan, subject to all other provisions of the Constitution and statutory election law. Remanded. View "State Bd. of Elections v. Snyder" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned plaintiff's filing of an administrative complaint with the FEC alleging that various organizations violated election laws during their efforts to keep him off the ballot. The FEC dismissed the complaint and the district court subsequently granted summary judgment against plaintiff, later denying his motion to alter or amend its judgment. Plaintiff appealed. The court rejected plaintiff's claim of competitor standing where he sought to compel FEC enforcement against his opponents years after the campaign had run its course, and claim of informational standing where he asserted an injury that was not sufficiently concrete to confer standing. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit because plaintiff lacked standing. View "Nadar v. FEC" on Justia Law

Voters filed suit against Officials challenging the process by which Officials confirmed the eligibility of voters who register on election day (election day registrants or EDRs). Voters also challenged a provision of the Minnesota Constitution denying the right of persons under guardianship to vote, as well as the sufficiency of notice afforded to such persons under certain Minnesota statutes. The court concluded that Voters could not prevail on their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims based on Officials' failure to verify EDR's voting eligibility before allowing EDRs to cast their votes where Voters raised no allegations of the "aggravating factors" identified in Pettengill v. Putnam County R-1 School District; alleged no discriminatory or other intentional, unlawful misconduct by Officials sufficient to implicate section 1983; and alleged no defects causing Minnesota's voting system to be so "fundamentally unfair" that relief under section 1983 would be appropriate. Further, Voters lacked standing to raise their remaining claims where the amended complaint failed to allege that any plaintiff has been denied the right to vote by a constitutional provision barring persons under guardianship from voting. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Voters claims and denial of their motion for summary judgment as moot. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al. v. Ritchie, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of certain sections of California Senate Bill 6 (SB 6). SB 6, implementing California's Proposition 14 (Prop. 14), fundamentally changes the California election system by eliminating party primaries and general elections with party-nominated candidates, and substituting a nonpartisan primary and a two-candidate runoff. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal; Plaintiff Chamness' case was not moot where his claim was capable of repetition because future election administrators would deny him the ability to use the designation "Independent" on the primary ballot; Plaintiffs Frederick's and Wilson's appeal were moot because they only sought declaratory relief affecting future elections; and Intervenor Galacki's claims regarding his write-in candidacy and the vote he cast for himself in the general election were moot. In Case No. 11-56449, the court held that Chamness failed to establish that SB 6 severely burdened his rights, and upheld the constitutionality of the statute as reasonably related to furthering the state's important interest in efficiently regulating elections. In Case No. 56303, the court held that the trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding that allowing Galacki to intervene would entail substantial delays and inefficiencies resolving the case, and in therefore denying Galacki's motion as untimely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting defendants summary judgment and denying Galacki's motion to intervene. View "Chamness v. Maldonado" on Justia Law