Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After the General Assembly passed Act 595 of 2013, Appellees, registered voters in Pulaski County, filed a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that sections of the Act that allegedly placed an additional qualification and impairment on Arkansas residents before they could exercise their right to vote violated the Arkansas Constitution. The circuit court concluded that Act 595 was unconstitutional, enjoined and restrained Appellants, the Secretary of State and the Commissioners of the State Board of Election Commissioners, from enforcing any proof-of-identity provisions of the Act and from enforcing their rules promulgated as a result of the Act, and granted a preliminary injunction against Appellants from enforcing Act 595’s proof-of-identity requirements in favor of Appellants. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling that Act 595 was unconstitutional on its face, holding that the Act’s requiring proof of identity was unconstitutional on its face and imposed a requirement that fell outside the ambit of Ark. Const. art. III, 1.View "Martin v. Kohls" on Justia Law

Steven Glovsky sought to solicit signatures for his nomination to the second district seat on the Governor’s Council on the sidewalk immediately outside the entrance to a supermarket owned by Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc. Despite believing he had a right under article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to solicit signatures on the property, Glovsky left the property after a store manager informed him Roche Bros. prohibited this activity. Glovsky filed suit, requesting relief under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act for a violation of his rights “by threats, intimidation or coercion.” The superior court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated and set aside the portion of the judgment dismissing Glovsky’s request for declaratory relief under article 9 and affirmed the remainder of the judgment, holding (1) Glovsky adequately alleged a right to solicit nominating signatures outside the supermarket, but (2) Roche Bros. did not violate this right by threats, intimidation or coercion. Remanded for entry of a judgment dismissing the request for declaratory relief as moot.View "Glovsky v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc." on Justia Law

2011 Wis. Act 23 required a photo ID for voting, similar to an Indiana law, which the Supreme Court upheld in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008). After the district court enjoined enforcement of the law, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed two similar injunctions issued by state courts but ordered state officials to make it easier for registered voters to obtain documentation (such as birth certificates) that they may need to obtain photo IDs, or to waive the documentation requirement if obtaining birth certificates proves difficult or expensive. With the state injunctions lifted, the state requested a stay of the federal injunction so that it could use the photo ID requirement in this fall’s election. A divided Seventh Circuit granted a stay and denied reconsideration, noting Wisconsin’s “strong prospect of success on appeal’ and the public interest in using laws enacted through the democratic process, until the laws’ validity has been finally determined. The burden of getting a photo ID in Wisconsin is not materially different from the burden that Crawford deemed acceptable. View "Frank v. Walker" on Justia Law

The district court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting Ohio from enforcing and implementing SB 238’s amendments to section 3509.01 of the Ohio Revised Code reducing the EIP [early in person] voting period from 35 days before an election to the period beginning the day following the close of voter registration. The court ordered that, for purposes of the 2014 general election: the EIP voting period shall consist of the 35 days prior to the election; all Ohio county Boards of Election must set uniform and suitable EIP voting hours, in addition to those currently established on specific dates. In setting such hours, the Secretary of State must, in good faith, take into consideration findings and legal conclusions regarding the impact of a lack of evening voting hours on the protected classes of voters. The Sixth Circuit declined to enter a stay pending appeal. Plaintiffs convincingly argued that informally, the Order’s contents already were disseminated to the public. Staying the Order would add to confusion and adversely affect voter turnout during EIP voting if the Order is ultimately affirmed. View "OH State Conference of the NAACP v. DeWine" on Justia Law

Thomas Brown ran unsuccessfully to become the Democratic nominee for a seat on the Ashtabula County common pleas court in the Democratic Party primary election. Brown subsequently filed nominating petitions to be a judicial candidate on the Ashtabula County Western Area Court in the general election. The Ashtabula County Board of Elections (Board) rejected Brown’s petitions based on the ballot-access restrictions set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 3513.04. Relators, including Brown, subsequently sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Board and its director (collectively, Respondents) to certify Brown’s candidacy for the Western Area Court, asserting that section 3513.04 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that Relators failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality and failed to demonstrate that section 3513.04 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.View "State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

This case centered two policy issues that are often viewed as controversial: (1) racial, ethnic, and gender preferences; and (2) the decennial redistricting process. In 2008 and 2010, the People of California, exercising their reserved initiative powers, changed the way California's State Senate, State Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization voting districts are adjusted after each national census, assigning the corresponding duties to the California Citizens Redistricting Commission. Plaintiffs Ward Connerly and the American Civil Rights Foundation (collectively, Connerly) sued defendants State of California (State), the State Auditor, and the Commission, alleging the method of selecting members of the Commission violated Proposition 209 (Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 31), in that it gave improper preferences based on race, ethnicity, and gender. Connerly then filed an amended complaint, again asserting the selection process for the last six commissioners violated Proposition 209, but adding that the "Applicant Review Panel" also improperly considered race, ethnicity, and gender. These were characterized as “facial” challenges to Government Code section 8252, subdivision (g) based on Proposition 209, for which various remedies were sought. The State and State Auditor demurred in part on the grounds that Proposition 209 did not apply to the selection of public officers, only to public employees. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on this ground. Connerly appealed. Connerly effectively abandoned his amended complaint, and proposed a new legal theory on appeal--but no new facts--in his opening brief, explicitly citing the authority of Code Civ. Proc. section 472c, subdivision (a). Both the State and State Auditor contended it was unfair for Connerly to raise this theory on appeal because they did not get a chance to disprove it factually. They almost entirely ignored section 472c, which allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal. "Connerly has not strayed from his central factual claim that the composition of the Commission was infected by invidious discrimination. There is no reason to deviate from the well-established rule that section 472c allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. [. . .] The fact that the instant complaint was found wanting raises precisely the circumstance section 472c was designed to address--to give the plaintiff a final opportunity to propose new facts or legal theories to establish a cause of action. Thus, from the parties' briefing, it appears Connerly can plead at least a prima facie case of equal protection violations. The answer is to apply section 472c, subdivision (a), allow Connerly to amend the complaint again to clarify his new theories, and give respondents the chance to defend the Commission's selection provisions to try to show they comport with federal equal protection principles." View "Connerly v. California" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, physicians and Medicaid providers, wanted to support candidates in the 2010 election, but were barred from doing so by Ohio Rev. Code 3599.45, which limits campaign contributions from Medicaid providers. They sued , arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court rejected that position on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding unconstitutionality “clear” and “unavoidable.” The district court then entered a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees and costs (42 U.S.C. 1988) of $665,645.68. A magistrate recommended an award of $454,635.53 in fees and $6,442.03 in costs, with a $100,183 reduction for investigatory work performed before plaintiffs signed a fee agreement; a 25 percent reduction on discovery fees; and a 25 percent reduction on appellate fees. The district court awarded only $128,908.74 in fees and $6,315.00 in costs, drastically cutting hourly rates, striking hours spent on third-party discovery and other miscellaneous matters, and reducing appellate hours by 50 percent. After arriving at its lodestar calculation, the district court further reduced the fees by 35 percent under the Johnson factors. The court expressed concern that “taxpayers will ultimately bear the burden … Plaintiffs are medical doctors presumably abundantly capable of paying for representation” and that “counsel was merely scouring through campaign laws hoping to find an old one … to challenge in the hope of raking in overstated fees.” The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for recalculation before a different judge. View "Lavin v. Husted" on Justia Law

Appellants, two Minnesota-based, grassroots advocacy organizations and their leaders, filed suit claiming that a provision of the Minnesota Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), Minn. Stat. 211B.01 et seq., inhibits appellants' ability to speak freely against school-funding ballot initiatives and, thereby, violates their First Amendment rights. The court rejected the county attorney's renewed challenge to standing; because the speech at issue occupies the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment, the court applied strict scrutiny to legislation attempting to regulate it; the county attorneys failed to demonstrate that the interests advanced in support of section 211B.06 - preserving fair and honest elections and preventing fraud on the electorate - is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest where the section is both overbroad and underinclusive and is not the least restrictive means of achieving any stated goal; and the attorney general is immune to suit. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "281 Care Committee, et al. v. Arneson, et al." on Justia Law

The Green Party of Tennessee and the Constitution Party of Tennessee sought to appear on general election ballots as minor political parties. They filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging laws that they claimed have unconstitutionally impeded their access to the ballot. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs; the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, in part because Tennessee had amended the statutes at issue. On remand, the district court again granted the plaintiffs’ motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, first holding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge Tennessee’s election laws, but held that summary judgment was inappropriate. The court remanded the questions of whether the state’s ballot-access scheme for minor political parties unconstitutionally burdens the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights and whether the state’s preferential ballot-ordering statute impermissibly discriminates against minor political parties in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs are a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees, but the court vacated the district court’s fee award and remanded for recalculation. View "Green Party of TN v. Hargett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs - the Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP, Voces de la Frontera, and numerous individuals - challenged several provisions of 2011 Wis. Act 23, Wisconsin’s voter photo identification act, as unconstitutional. Act 23 requires an elector to present one of nine acceptable forms of photo identification in order to vote. The circuit court declared Act 23’s photo identification requirements unconstitutional and granted permanent injunctive relief, finding that the time, inconvenience and costs incurred in obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification impermissibly burden the right to vote. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to prove Act 23 unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, as the burdens of time and inconvenience associated with obtaining Act 23-acceptable photo identification are not undue burdens on the right to vote and do not render the law invalid. View "Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Walker" on Justia Law