Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2011, the Arizona Legislature enacted a new law requiring voter registration forms to list the two largest parties, as well as provide a blank line for “other party preferences.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-152(A)(5). The Arizona Green Party, the Arizona Libertarian Party, and three of their members (together, Plaintiffs) brought this action alleging that the new voter registration form violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because the form failed to “treat equally the four parties with Statewide continuing ballot access.” The district court granted summary judgment for the State. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing that section 16-152(A)(5) is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. View "Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Two associations and two individuals brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging two requirements that the State of California and the City of Chula Vista, California, place on persons who wish to sponsor a local ballot measure: (1) the requirement that official proponents of local ballot initiatives be electors, thereby excluding non-natural persons such as corporations and associations; and (2) the requirement that official initiative proponents identify themselves on the face of the initiative petitions. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The en banc court of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the requirement that the official proponent of an initiative be an elector does not violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association; but (2) the requirement that the name on the official proponent of an initiative be disclosed on the face of the initiative petitions satisfies exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment. View "Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs v. Norris" on Justia Law

In 2012 Alabama redrew the boundaries of its 105 House and 35 Senate districts to minimize each district’s deviation from precisely equal population and avoid retrogression with respect to racial minorities’ “ability to elect their preferred candidates of choice” under the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10304(b), by maintaining roughly the same black population percentage in existing majority-minority districts. The district court rejected an equal protection claim of “racial gerrymander.” The Supreme Court vacated. Analysis of the racial gerrymandering claim as referring to the state “as a whole,” rather than district-by-district, was erroneous. Showing that race-based criteria did not significantly affect the drawing of some districts did not defeat a claim that such criteria predominantly affected the drawing of others. The objectors’ claimed that individual majority-minority districts were racially gerrymandered, and those districts must be reconsidered. There was “strong, perhaps overwhelming, evidence that race did predominate as a factor” with respect to one district. An equal population goal is not a “traditional” factor in determining whether race “predominates,” but is taken as a given. The district court and the Alabama legislature relied upon a mechanically numerical view as to what counts as forbidden retrogression and asked how to maintain the present minority percentages in majority-minority districts. The Act does not require maintenance of a particular numerical minority percentage. It requires the jurisdiction to maintain a minority’s ability to elect a preferred candidate of choice. View "Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama" on Justia Law

In March 2013, Reeder received a letter from Phelon, the press secretary for Illinois Senate President Cullerton, informing Reeder that his request for Senate media credentials as a writer for the Illinois Policy Institute (IPI) was denied because IPI was registered as an Illinois lobbying entity. Phelon explained that Senate rules forbid credentials for anyone associated with a lobbying entity. Reeder tried again in January 2014 to obtain media credentials from the Illinois House of Representatives and Senate, arguing that IPI was no longer registered as a lobbyist. The Senate took the position that IPI was still required to register as a lobbyist given its retention of a lobbying firm that employed the same staff and office space as IPI itself. It again denied Reeder’s application. The Illinois House responded in kind. Reeder and IPI sued Illinois House Speaker Madigan and Cullerton, and their press secretaries under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of the press, and his rights to due process and equal protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, concluding that the denial of credentials qualified as legislative activity and entitled the defendants to immunity. View "Reeder v. Madigan" on Justia Law

In 2013, the General Assembly passed Act 1413 of 2013, which made numerous changes to the portions of the Arkansas Code pertaining to initiatives and referenda. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Mark Martin, in his official capacity as the Secretary of State, alleging that certain sections of the Act violated the Seventh Amendment of the state Constitution. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin Secretary Martin from enforcing the Act. Dustin McDaniel, acting in his official capacity as Attorney General, intervened in the action. The circuit court concluded that certain provisions of Act 1413 violated the Constitution because the provisions would cause citizens to lose their ability to propose legislative measures and laws directly to the people. The court then permanently enjoined Secretary Martin from enforcing those portions of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that some of the sections of the Act declared unconstitutional by the circuit court were, in fact, constitutional. View "McDaniel v. Spencer" on Justia Law

Appellant, a student at Brown University, was suspended for three semesters after a number of students and staff submitted complaints regarding his behavior. Appellant filed an eleven-count complaint in the district court of Rhode Island against the University, numerous individuals associated with the University, and its police department (collectively, Appellees), alleging, among other claims, that Appellees’ conduct during his disciplinary proceeding and during his removal from campus violated his constitutional rights and state law. The district court entered judgment in favor of Appellees. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) finding that the University was not a state actor subject to federal jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 1983; (2) granting Appellees’ motion to amend their answer to include a statute of limitations defense; and (3) disposing of Appellant’s claims on Appellees’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, as the Rhode Island tolling statute did not toll Appellant’s claims. View "Klunder v. Brown University" on Justia Law

Three small political parties and several party members and candidates sought to invalidate California’s electoral system for statewide and legislative offices, contending the system, which consists of an open nonpartisan election followed by a runoff between the top-two candidates, deprives them of equal protection and associational and voting rights secured by the state and federal Constitutions. According to plaintiffs, because “minor” party candidates are typically eliminated in the primary election, they are denied the constitutional right to participate in the general election upon a showing of substantial public support. Plaintiffs also contend their associational rights are violated by the effective limitation of their participation to the primary election, when voter participation is typically less than half that of the general election; that the electoral system denies them equal protection because they are no longer able to regularly participate in the general election, as they were under the prior electoral system; and that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint, without permitting them a hearing on the evidentiary support for their claims. The court of appeal affirmed The dismissal. View "Rubin v. Padilla" on Justia Law

Former county administrators of elections from eight Tennessee counties in Tennessee filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that after the 2008 statewide elections and a shift in the controlling political party in the state assembly, they were ousted from their positions by the defendants, county election commissioners, because of their actual or perceived political party affiliation. The district court held that the statutory position of county administrator of elections in Tennessee is lawfully subject to patronage dismissal under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. All of the identified duties of the administrator that involve policy matters are matters of political concern. Administrators spend a significant portion of time advising the commissioners on how to exercise their statutory policymaking authority, including apprising the commissioners of current laws and changes in the law, assisting in reapportionment matters, preparing the annual budget, and overseeing election operations, and control the lines of communications to the commissioners. View "Peterson v. Dean" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that Fayette County's at-large election system violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301, by effectively guaranteeing that no African-American would be able to participate in the political process through election to the Board of Commissioners (BOC) and the Board of Education (BOE), nor would African-American voters be able to elect representatives of their choice to either entity. The district court granted summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor, finding that the at-large election method used by both the BOC and BOE resulted in impermissible vote dilution. However, the court concluded that the district court failed to notice the BOE that it was considering awarding summary judgment against it; the district court weighed the evidence submitted by the moving parties, accepting the support proffered by plaintiffs and rejecting the contrary evidence presented by the BOC; and, therefore, without opining as to the correctness of the district court's substantive conclusions, the district court erred in its Section 2 determination on summary judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Georgia State Conference of the NAACP v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Alabama's ballot access statute violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Secretary and adopted much of the district court's reasoning contained in its memorandum opinion and order. The court held that plaintiffs' constitutional claims failed where plaintiffs did not present evidence showing that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the State's restrictions on petition-based ballot access unconstitutionally burdens their associational rights. Rather, the burden on plaintiffs was slight, and the State's interests in treating all political parties fairly and in setting a deadline that provides sufficient time to verify the petition signatures outweigh the burden to plaintiffs' associational rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.View "Stein v. AL Secretary of State" on Justia Law