Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

John was a ninth grade special education student. Jane, in eighth grade, believed that she was John's girlfriend. Jane's mother claims that John sexually harassed Jane by shoving her into a locker out of jealousy, requesting oral sex, and making obscene gestures during a basketball game. After confronting John, who became hostile, Jane's stepfather wrote to administration. John's IEP team created a plan requiring constant adult supervision at school for the next 30 days. Seven weeks after the supervision ended, after school, John sexually assaulted Jane on school grounds. John, who had a long disciplinary history, including harassment and assault, and had been arrested twice, was then expelled. A school he previously attended had agreed not to expel John and to purge disciplinary records in exchange for his withdrawal. Jane's mother filed sued the school and officials, alleging violations of Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered judgment for defendants on all counts. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff abandoned her 1983 claim, did not establish animus for a 1985 claim, did not establish deliberate indifference, or a special relationship that would create a duty to protect her daughter, or that Jane was deprived of access to educational opportunities.

Plaintiff, a new teacher, approached the principal to deny rumors that she had a sexual relationship with a minor student, JS. The principal spoke with JS, who denied the allegations. Days later, JS changed his story. The school called the police. JS stated he had consensual sex with plaintiff at her apartment and described her apartment and a tattoo and skin graft on her body. Plaintiff admitted to exchanging sexually inappropriate text messages, but denied having a physical relationship and that he visited her apartment. Photos matched JS's descriptions of plaintiff's tattop and apartment, and a warrant issued. Prior to execution of the warrant, plaintiff's attorney, asked for a polygraph. Plaintiff appeared for the polygraph, but the exam was never administered. At trial , JS significantly changed his testimony and plaintiff was acquitted. The district court dismissed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violations of due process and claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Kentucky law. The state's attorney acted in the course of his prosecutorial duties, entitling him to absolute immunity, and his actions were not in violation of clear constitutional rights, entitling him to qualified immunity.

Plaintiffs challenged the school district practice of giving preference to the boys' Friday and Saturday night basketball games, asserting that non-primetime games result in a loss of audience, conflict with homework, and foster feelings of inferiority. The district court dismissed the claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) and an equal protection claim, 42 U.S.C. 1983 on grounds of sovereign immunity. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Plaintiffs presented a genuine question of fact that such practices violate the statute. Defendants are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983, subject to suit under that statute.

Appellants are the parents of G.J., a child with autism and brain injuries. At issue was whether the ALJ and the district court properly evaluated appellants' claims that the MCSD did not comply with certain provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., with respect to services it was to provide to G.J. The court held that the district court did not err in setting forth reasonable conditions for G.J.'s reevaluation and in determining that appellants were not entitled to either a private or publicly funded independent educational evaluation. The court also held that there was no basis for making a determination that any procedural failures with regard to the August 2008 and 2009 IEP meetings impacted the education received by G.J. to any substantive degree. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff, a teacher, filed this action against defendants, a superintendent and principal, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming that he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. At issue was whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and whether plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims were barred by res judicata. The court held that plaintiff failed to present any precedent, and the court was aware of none, to suggest that a reasonable principal and superintendent armed with the knowledge they possessed, to include the unsatisfactory performance reviews, would know they could not recommend and/or adopt a recommendation to terminate plaintiff. Accordingly, defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and the court need not address the res judicata issue.

Defendant filed a due process hearing complaint with California's Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), alleging that he was being denied the free appropriate public education (FAPE) that he was entitled to under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: Does California Education Code 56041 - which provided generally that for qualifying children ages eighteen to twenty-two, the school district where the child's parent resides is responsible for providing special education services - apply to children who are incarcerated in county jails? The case was withdrawn from submission and further proceedings were stayed pending final action by the Supreme Court of California.

Hosanna-Tabor, a member congregation of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, operated a small school in Michigan offering a "Christian-centered education" to students in kindergarten through eighth grade. The Synod classified its school teachers into two categories: "called" and "lay." "Called" teachers, among other things, were regarded as having been called to their vocation by God. To be eligible to be called from a congregation, a teacher must satisfy certain academic requirements. "Lay" or "contract" teachers, by contrast, were not required to be trained by the Synod or even to be Lutheran. "Called" teacher, Cheryl Perich filed a charge with the EEOC, claiming that her employment had been terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The EEOC brought suit against Hosanna-Tabor, alleging that Perich had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file an ADA lawsuit. Perich intervened. Invoking what was known as the "ministerial exception," Hosanna-Tabor argued that the suit was barred by the First Amendment because the claims concerned the employment relationship between a religious institution and one of its ministers. The Court held that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment barred suits brought on behalf of ministers against their churches, claiming termination in violation of employment discrimination laws. Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the ministerial exception, the First Amendment required dismissal of this employment discrimination suit against her religious employer.

This case involved A.S., a California minor, who was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. At issue was which California agency was responsible for funding A.S.'s educational placement in an out-of-state residential treatment facility. The court held as a matter of California law that the California agency responsible for funding A.S.'s education at an out-of-state residential treatment facility was the school district in which the student's parent, as defined by California Education Code section 56028, resided. The court held that A.S. had no parent under the 2005 version of section 56028 and thus, from July 28, 2006, when A.S. was placed at the out-of-state facility, until October 9, 2007, when an amended version of section 56028 took effect, California law did not designate any educational agency as responsible for A.S.'s education. The California Department of Education (CDE) was therefore responsible by default. The court held that A.S. did have a parent under the 2007 and 2009 versions of section 56028. CDE therefore was not responsible for A.S.'s out-of-state education after October 10, 2007, when the 2007 version of section 56028 took effect. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment.

In consolidated appeals regarding continuing school desegregation efforts in the Little Rock, Arkansas area, NLRSD and PCSSD each appealed the district court's denial of their petitions for a declaration of unitary status. In addition, NLRSD and PCSSD joined with LRSD, several local teachers' unions, and a union member in appealing the district court's decision to terminate certain funding obligations of the State arising from a previous settlement agreement in this case. The court reversed the denial of unitary status for NLRSD in the area of staff recruitment where NLRSD had maintained levels of black teacher employment that exceeded the percentages in the relevant labor market, when viewed in light of NLRSD's good-faith efforts, which suggested that the vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable in the area of recruitment. The court affirmed, however, the denial of unitary status for PCSSD in the area of student assignment, advanced placement, discipline, school facilities, scholarships, special education, staff, student achievement, and monitoring. The court vacated the portion of the district court's order terminating the State's funding obligations under the 1989 Settlement Agreement.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the Dean of the University of Iowa's College of Law. Plaintiff alleged that the Dean discriminated against her in violation of her First Amendment rights of political belief and association when plaintiff was not hired to be a full-time instructor or part-time adjunct instructor. The court held that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence for a fact finder to infer that the Dean's repeated decisions not to hire her were in part motivated by her constitutionally protected First Amendment rights of political belief and association; the facts viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff were sufficient to establish a violation of her First Amendment rights where it was apparent that a dispute existed regarding a material issue of fact, namely whether the Dean would have made the same hiring decisions in the absence of plaintiff's political affiliations and beliefs; the Dean had not shown that a reasonable university dean in her position would have believed that failing to hire plaintiff was lawful in light of clearly established law; and the district court erred in finding that qualified immunity protected the Dean from liability in her individual capacity. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.