Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This case began as a dispute over the results of CM's special education evaluation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. At issue on appeal was: (1) the ALJ's dismissal of several of CM's claims against Lafayette prior to holding a due process hearing; and (2) the district court's dismissal of MM's, CM's parents, separate claims against the California Department of Education (CDE). The court held that the district court correctly dismissed MM's claims against Lafayette challenging the ALJ's statute of limitations ruling as being premature. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the fourth claim as duplicative and correctly held that the CDE had no authority to oversee the individual decisions of OAH's hearing officers. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The Association filed suit, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and the Constitution, challenging the State Authorization, Compensation, and Misrepresentation Regulations the Department of Education initiated under the Higher Education Act (HEA), Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232-54. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court holding that the Compensation Regulations did not exceed the HEA's limits; the court mostly rejected the Association's claim that these regulations were not based on reasoned decisionmaking; the court remanded two aspects of the Compensation Regulations, however, that were lacking for want of adequate explanations. The court also held that the Misrepresentation Regulations exceeded the HEA's limits in three respects: by allowing the Secretary to take enforcement actions against schools sans procedural protections; by proscribing misrepresentations with respect to subjects that were not covered by the HEA, and by proscribing statements that were merely confusing. The court rejected the Association's other challenges to the Misrepresentation Regulations. Finally, with respect to the State Authorization Regulations, the court concluded that the Association had standing to challenge the school authorization regulation, but held that the regulation was valid. However, the court upheld the Association's challenge in the distance education regulation, because that regulation was not a logical outgrowth of the Department's proposed rules.

Plaintiff, a teacher at a small Christian school, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the school on her pregnancy discrimination claim, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., contending that she had established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. After admitting to the school's administrator and assistant administrator that she conceived the child before getting married, the school fired her, purportedly because she had sinned by engaging in premarital sex, and, as the administrator put it, "there are consequences for disobeying the word of God." Because the school did not raise any issue or make any argument in its brief about the ministerial exception, the court would not decide whether that exception might apply. The court found that plaintiff's testimony contradicted the administrator's testimony that he had never heard her say she was sorry for what she had done and that he would not have fired her if she had. For that and other reasons, plaintiff had established a genuine issue of material fact about the reason that the school fired her. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the pregnancy discrimination claim and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, on behalf of her son, sued defendants, including the school district, alleging 20 procedural and substantive violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The district court disposed of almost all of plaintiff's claims and plaintiff and defendants subsequently appealed. The court agreed with the school district that the district court erred by inferring from the IDEA a private right of action for nominal damages. The court also held that Congress has not expressed an intent to create a cause of action for monetary damages based on the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The court reviewed plaintiff's other contentions in her cross-appeal and find them either waived or lacking merit.

In 2010, appellants unsuccessfully sought to enjoin the implementation of the 2011-2012 student assignment plan by the school board. On appeal, appellants argued that the district court committed legal error by failing to apply, and requiring the school board to rebut, a presumption that racial disparities in the 2011-2012 assignment plan resulted from the school board's prior unconstitutional conduct in operating a racially segregated school district. The court agreed and therefore vacated the district court's order and remanded for reconsideration.

Sinan Cingilli, a student at the University of Minnesota, and TCA, a non-profit corporation that provided information about the nation of Turkey and Turkish-Americans, appealed the district court's dismissal of their respective First Amendment claims and TCA's state-law defamation claim for failure to state a claim. Defendant Professor Chaouat directed the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at the university. The Center's website displayed a list of "Unreliable Websites" which included websites that disputed the factuality of the Nazi genocide of Jews during World War II. The first "Unreliable Website" on the list was that of TCA. The court held that, because Cingilli failed to plead facts sufficient to demonstrate an objectively reasonable chilling effect, he had not established standing to pursue a First Amendment claim under these circumstances; TCA had pled a cognizable injury and had standing to pursue its First Amendment claim; in light of the absence of the allegations that the challenged actions posed obstacle to students' access to the materials on TCA's website or made materials substantially unavailable at the university, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of TCA's First Amendment claim was affirmed; and because the challenged statements at issue either were true or could not reasonably be interpreted as stating facts, the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of TCA's defamation claim was also affirmed.

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of Troup's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs' sexual harassment claim brought pursuant to Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681. The facts of this case stemmed from circumstances surrounding the sexual molestation of a 12-year-old boy by his 45-year-old seventh grade homeroom teacher. The court held that the district court combined Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., workplace discrimination standards with Title IX teacher-on-student harassment standards when it articulated plaintiff's burden. However, the district court's reliance on the wrong standard did not necessarily mandate that the court must now reverse its decision and remand the case. After considering the factual record and drawing all justifiable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, the court found that the information of which the school principal had knowledge was not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he had actual notice sufficient to alert him to the possibility of sexual harassment of the 12-year-old by his teacher. Accordingly, although for different reasons than the district court, the court granted summary judgment.

T.B.'s parents, on behalf of their autistic child, appealed the district court's finding that the school district did not violate the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., by failing to provide a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to T.B., making the parents ineligible for reimbursement for the costs of T.B.'s home-based program. Given the parents' decision to ultimately settle the issue of the adequacy of the proposed individualized education program (IEP), the court questioned whether they could claim, much less successfully show, that the school district failed to provide a FAPE to T.B. Nonetheless, based on the record, the court could not say that T.B.'s home-based program was "reasonably calculated to enable [him] to receive educational benefits." The program was therefore not "proper" within the meaning of the IDEA and the parents were not entitled to reimbursement for the costs associated with it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff Carmen Perez-Dickson brought this action claiming that Defendants, the city board of education, the former assistant superintendent of the school district, and the former acting superintendent of the school district, disciplined her for exercising her right to free speech protected by the state and federal Constitutions in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-51q and 17a-101e, discriminated against her on the basis of her race, and intentionally caused her severe emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all counts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendants did not violate section 31-51q because any relevant speech by Plaintiff had been pursuant to her official job duties and such speech is not protected by the First Amendment; (2) Plaintiff failed to prove her claim of racial discrimination; and (3) Plaintiff failed to prove that Defendants had intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress on her. Remanded with direction to render judgment for Defendants.

Plaintiffs, parents of children who were eligible to receive a free and appropriate public education, filed suit to challenge the exclusion of mapping of cochlear implants from the regulatory definition of "related services" under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1401(26)(B). The court concluded that the phrase "audiology services" as used in the IDEA's "related services" definition did not unambiguously encompass mapping of cochlear implants. The court also found that the Mapping Regulations embodied a permissible construction of the IDEA because they were rationally related to the underlying objectives of the IDEA. The court further found that the Mapping Regulations did not substantially lessen the protections afforded by the 1983 regulations. Because the Department's construction of its own regulation was neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, the court owed it deference. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department.