Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Capeheart is a tenured Justice Studies professor at Northeastern Illinois University and an outspoken critic of the university on a number of issues, including its failure to hire more Latino professors and its willingness to host military and CIA recruiters at campus job fairs. She claims that university officials have defamed her, refused to make her department chair, and denied her an award (among other things) because of her speech. In her 42 U.S.C. l983 claim, she sued University President Hahs and Provost Frank, asking for an injunction against future retaliation, and damages under Illinois law. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the federal claims as unripe. The prospect of retaliation by Hahs or Frank is no more than conjecture. The district court incorrectly reached the merits of Capeheart’s federal claim.

The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit in this case was whether the use of a particular desk in special education classrooms was permissible under the United States Constitution. The desks in question wrap around the student on the front and the sides and have a securing bar that runs behind the student’s chair. A student can only remove herself by sliding under or crawling over the desk’s surface when the bar is in place. Ebonie S., a young girl with multiple disabilities, was often required to sit in this type of desk. Ebonie’s mother, Mary S., filed suit on her behalf under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the use of the desk violated the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the constitutional claims, but denied summary judgment on the statutory claims. Plaintiff appealed the grants of summary judgment. "Plaintiff devote[ed] much effort to arguing that the use of the desk was prohibited under Colorado law and was contrary to well-established educational standards. But it is not our office to decide the lawfulness of the desk under state law or the wisdom of using the desk as a matter of pedagogical policy. . . . We hold only that use of the desk under the circumstances presented did not violate the Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendments."

Defendants, an elementary school principal and two teachers, appealed from a denial of summary judgment by the district court on defendants' claims that qualified immunity shielded them from suit for alleged deliberate indifference to kindergarten and first-grade students' racial harassment of a classmate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court affirmed the denial of summary judgment as to claims that the kindergarten teacher and the principal were deliberately indifferent to racial name-calling by kindergarten students because there were questions of disputed fact for which the district court identified sufficient record evidence to support a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The court reversed the denial, however, as to claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to all other allegedly racially motivated physical misbehavior by kindergarten and first-grade students because no clearly established law permitted a finding that defendants had actual knowledge that commonplace physical misbehavior by children of this age was racially motivated in the absence of some objective evidence connecting the physical misbehavior to the earlier racial name-calling. Further, the first-grade teacher was entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because her transmittal of parental complaints of physical misbehavior to the principal for investigation could not be deemed "clearly unreasonable" as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their suit for failure to state a claim and denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs, parents and/or legal guardians of seven children with disabilities, sought equitable relief preventing defendants from enforcing a prohibition on the use of aversive interventions. The court concluded that the State's prohibition of one possible method of reducing the consequences of a child's behavioral disability did not undermine the child's right to a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) or prevent administrators from enacting an individualized plan for the child's education. The court also concluded that New York's law represented a considered judgment by the State of New York regarding the education and safety of its children that was consistent with federal education policy and the United States Constitution.

Per Hovem (Per), a former student of Klein Independent School District (KISD), along with his parents, filed a claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) for reimbursement of private school expenses incurred because KISD allegedly failed to provide Per with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) while Per was a KISD student. The special hearing officer and the district court found in favor of the Hovems. The Fifth Circuit Court reversed, holding (1) the provision of FAPE to a student qualified for special education must be judged by the overall educational benefits received, and not solely by the remediation of the student's disability; and (2) because this student's individualized education program enabled him to excel, with accommodations for his disability, in a mainstream high school curriculum, KISD complied procedurally and substantively with IDEA.

Plaintiff-Appellant Victoria Johnson appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of North Idaho College (NIC) on her claim of discrimination under the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA). Plaintiff alleged one of her instructors sexually harassed her, and that NIC was vicariously liable for that harassment. The district court held that NIC's affirmative defense was factually support, and that she failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed in regard to Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly the Court affirmed the opinion of the district court.

M.P., a student with disabilities, appealed the district court's ruling that the Anchorage School District (ASD) did not deny him a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) because the failure to develop an updated Individualized Education Program (IEP) was mostly attributable to his "parents' litigious approach." The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) mandates that public educational agencies review and revise annually an eligible child's IEP. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the district court relied on an improper basis when it declined to consider whether the ASD complied with the IDEA's substantive requirements; (2) the ASD deprived M.P. of a substantively adequate FAPE by relying on an outdated IEP to measure M.P.'s academic and functional performance and provide educational benefits to M.P.; and (3) M.P.'s parents were entitled to reimbursement for private tutoring expenses incurred in 2008 and review of the propriety of private tutoring expenses incurred in 2009. Remanded.

Samuel Milligan, then a freshman at Southern Illinois University, had uncomfortable encounters with a professor emeritus at, and substantial donor to, SIU, during which Meyers touched Milligan inappropriately and complimented him on what Meyers believed to be his feminine features. SIU banned Meyers from campus pending completion of an investigation and warned that he would be subject to arrest for trespass. Milligan saw Meyers on campus more than times after the ban was imposed. SIU public safety personnel escorted Meyers off campus each time they became aware of his presence but, on instructions from the Director of Public Safety, he was not arrested. Although Milligan lost his campus job, he was able to get another and to gain admission to graduate school. Milligan sued SIU under Title VII 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and Title IX for creating a hostile work and educational environment and also for retaliating against him for complaining about Meyers’ harassment. The district court granted summary judgment to SIU. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the statutes do not set a higher standard for “more vulnerable” student workers and that SIU responded appropriately to the situation.

South Carolina’s Spartanburg County School District Seven adopted a policy allowing public school students to receive two academic credits for off-campus religious instruction offered by private educators. The parents of two students at Spartanburg High School filed suit against the School District, alleging that the policy impermissibly endorses religion and entangles church and State in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The School District filed a motion for summary judgment, contending (1) that plaintiffs lacked standing because they were not injured by the policy, and (2) that the policy was constitutional in that it was neutrally stated and administered and that it had the secular purpose of accommodating students’ desire to receive religious instruction. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that that the purpose and primary effect of the School District’s policy was to promote Christianity. The district court rejected the school district’s standing argument but agreed with it on the merits and, accordingly, granted summary judgment to the School District. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed: "[the Court saw] no evidence that the program has had the effect of establishing religion or that it has entangled the School District in religion. As was the General Assembly and School District’s purpose, the program properly accommodates religion without establishing it, in accordance with the First Amendment."

When Appellant Amanda Tatro was a junior in the mortuary science program at the University of Minnesota, she posted statements on Facebook which she described as "satirical commentary and violent fantasy about her school experience." Following a hearing, the Campus Committee on Student Behavior (CCSB) found Tatro had violated the student conduct code and academic program rules governing the privilege of access to human cadavers, which prohibited "blogging" about cadaver dissection. CCSB imposed sanctions, including a failing grade for an anatomy laboratory course. The University Provost affirmed the sanctions. Tatro appealed, arguing that the University violated her constitutional rights to free speech. The court of appeals upheld the disciplinary sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the University did not violate the free speech rights of Tatro by imposing sanctions for her Facebook posts that violated academic program rules where the academic program rules were narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional conduct standards.