Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellee Elizabeth E. was a student in the Jefferson County, Colorado school system with substantial behavioral and emotional issues for which she required special education under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act ("IDEA"). In November 2008, Elizabeth's parents, Roxanne B. and David E. enrolled her at Innercept, LLC, a residential treatment center in Idaho, and sought reimbursement from Plaintiff-Appellant Jefferson County School District R-1 (the "District"). An Impartial Hearing Officer (IHO) concluded Parents were entitled to reimbursement for the placement under the Act. That decision was affirmed by a state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), whose decision was, in turn, affirmed by the Colorado federal district court. The District appealed, arguing Innercept was not a reimbursable placement under the IDEA and that Parents' conduct precluded reimbursement. Finding that Innercept was indeed a reimbursable placement, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. View "Jefferson County School v. Elizabeth E." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that their autistic son was not provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE) by the school district as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the school district had provided a FAPE for the child and allowed his parents meaningful participation in the development of his behavior and educational plans. View "M.M., et al v. Dist 0001 Lancaster Co. School" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the school district, alleging that she was denied a free appropriate public education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court held that plaintiff satisfied the court's liberal notice of appeal requirements and therefore considered the appeal on the merits. The court found that the district court complied with the IDEA's procedural requirements and, moreover, if any defects existed, they did not rise to the level of denying plaintiff a lost educational opportunity. In regards to plaintiff's substantive claim, the court analyzed the Michael F. factors and concluded that plaintiff received a FAPE. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "R. P. v. Alamo Heights Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a tenured teacher who worked for Defendant, the Memphis City Schools Board of Education. After Plaintiff requested and was granted a substantial amount of sick leave but failed to return from that sick leave, Defendant dismissed Plaintiff without providing her with written charges or an opportunity for a hearing. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that her dismissal violated the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act and her constitutional due process rights. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and awarded Plaintiff's reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages for the actual harm she suffered, and attorney's fees. The court of appeals vacated the grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) although a tenured teacher's failure to return from sick leave may constitute cause for termination, there is no statute authorizing a board of education to deem it a constructive resignation or a forfeiture of tenure; and (2) accordingly, Defendant violated Plaintiff's rights under the Tenure Act and her constitutional due process rights. View "Thompson v. Memphis City Schs. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case included fifteen minor children and their parents who participated in the family court's truancy court diversion calendar program. The diversion program allowed family court magistrates to conduct court sessions at public schools where truancy had become an issue. Plaintiffs brought an action against the judicial officials who were sitting in the truancy court, family court administrators, and five municipalities. Plaintiffs requested that the superior court declare the previous procedures in the truancy court to be unconstitutional and enjoin the family court from enforcing the prior procedures. The superior court denied Defendants' motions to dismiss under Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Supreme Court quashed the superior court's order denying Defendants' motions to dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were moot, as (1) Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges were obviated by an administrative order that reformed the truancy program and by existing law; and (2) there were no ongoing truancy petitions that continued to be affected by the earlier court procedures. View "Boyer v. Bedrosian" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit after he was terminated from his employment at Arkansas State University, asserting procedural due process claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the Vice-Chancellor and Director-of-Instruction in their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff alleged that the officials provided constitutionally inadequate pretermination process and sought damages and injunctive relief. The court concluded that reasonable school officials would not have known that the officials' conduct violated plaintiff's clearly established due-process rights and therefore reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. View "Sutton v. Bailey, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the District, contending that it was deliberately indifferent to his harassment when he attended Stissing Mountain High School. A jury found the District liable for violating Title VI and awarded plaintiff $1.25 million in damages. The district court denied the District's motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b), but granted remittitur of the jury award to $1 million. The District appealed. The court held that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's finding that the District's responses to student harassment of plaintiff amounted to deliberate indifference to discrimination and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law. Given the ongoing and objective offensiveness of the student-on-student harassment here, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the record could support an award of $1 million. View "Zeno v. Pine Plains Central School Dist." on Justia Law

This case concerned an employment discrimination dispute between Portland State University (PSU) and Portland State University Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (the Association). Those entities entered into a collective bargaining agreement that included a dispute resolution process for alleged violations of the agreement. That dispute resolution process included a "Resort to Other Procedures" (ROP) provision that permitted PSU to decline or discontinue a grievance proceeding if an Association member brought a claim regarding the same matter in an agency or court outside of PSU. PSU invoked that provision to halt a grievance proceeding after an Association member filed discrimination complaints with two outside agencies. The Association subsequently filed a complaint with the Oregon Employment Relations Board (ERB), alleging in part that PSU had engaged in an unfair labor practice by discontinuing the contractual grievance proceeding. ERB concluded that PSU's invocation of the ROP clause constituted unlawful discrimination. It therefore declined to enforce the ROP clause and ordered PSU to submit to the grievance process. On PSU's appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that ERB erred by applying the wrong legal standard in ordering PSU to submit to the grievance process, and it therefore reversed and remanded the case for ERB's reconsideration. The Association sought review of that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals's decision, concluding that ERB correctly held that the ROP clause at issue in this case imposed a form of employer retaliation for protected conduct that reasonably would impede or deter an employee from pursuing his or her statutory rights. "The resulting harm is neither theoretical nor trivial, but qualifies as a substantive difference in treatment. The ROP provision is therefore facially discriminatory . . . Accordingly, ERB properly declined to enforce that illegal contract provision. " View "Portland St. Univ. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Portland St. Univ." on Justia Law

The Board challenged the district court's determination affirming the validity of a Department of Education regulation that required state and local agencies to reimburse parents and guardians for an independent educational evaluation (IEE) of their children with disabilities. The court held that the Secretary of Education did not exceed its authority in promulgating 34 C.F.R. 300.502, providing parents the right to a publicly financed IEE and therefore, the district court did not err in requiring the Board to reimburse plaintiffs for the IEE that they obtained for their child. View "Phillip C., et al v. Jefferson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The City of St. Louis appealed the trial court's holding that the prohibition against special laws contained in Mo. Const. art. III, 40 was not violated by Mo. Rev. Stat. 320.097. That statute exempted certain veteran firefighters who lived in areas with unaccredited or provisionally accredited school districts from any local laws requiring them to live in their home district. The State also appealed, alleging (1) the trial court erred in holding that section 320.097 violated what the trial court believed was the "broad measure of complete freedom from State legislative control" given to constitutional charter cities by the Missouri Constitution, and (2) the trial court erred in holding that the statute violated the equal protection clauses of the Missouri and U.S. constitutions because it was not rationally related to any legitimate purpose. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court's holding that the statue was not a special law in violation of the Missouri Constitution; (2) reversed the trial court's holding that the statute violated the state constitution because it interfered with the City's right to set its employees' and officers' powers, duties and compensation; and (3) reversed the trial court's holding that the statute violated equal protection guarantees. View "City of St. Louis v. State" on Justia Law