Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1999, Geraldine Fuhr successfully sued to be instated as varsity boys basketball coach at Hazel Park High School, where she had been employed as varsity girls basketball coach. For five years she coached both teams. In 2006, she was removed from her position coaching varsity girls basketball. She claims that her dismissal as the varsity girls basketball coach and other acts of harassment were a result of her 1999 suit. The district court granted the district summary judgment, rejecting claims of retaliation (42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a)), gender discrimination, and hostile work environment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting a substantial time gap between the suit and the complained-of actions and the district’s complained-of actions were not discriminatory. View "Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of her civil rights action against the District. Plaintiff sought review of her claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, for the District's alleged gross mismanagement of her Individualized Education Program (IEP) and failure to reasonably accommodate her disabilities. Because plaintiff plausibly stated that the District acted with gross misjudgment in failing to further modify her IEP, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Because plaintiff appealed only the dismissal of her Rehabilitation Act claim, the court did not address the district court's rulings as to the other claims. View "Stewart v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Covington, a basketball official in New Jersey and Pennsylvania for more than 10 years, filed suit, alleging gender employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. 10:5-1, because she has been excluded from officiating at boys’ high school varsity basketball games. The district court dismissed all claims against all defendants: the International Association of Approved Basketball Officials, Board 193 (Board 193), which assigns officials to officiate at regular season high school basketball games; the New Jersey State Interscholastic Athletic Association (NJSIAA), which controls and supervises post-season tournament games and assigns officials to referee those games; the International Association of Approved Basketball Officials (IAABO), the Colonial Valley Conference (CVC), the Hamilton Township School District (“Hamilton”), a school at which Covington has officiated, and Dumont, the President of Board 193. The Third Circuit remanded to give Covington an opportunity to provide more facts as to her claim against Hamilton, Board 193, and NJSIAA, but affirmed dismissal of claims against the CVC and IAABO. View "Covington v. Int'l Assoc. of Approved Basketball Officials" on Justia Law

K.A., a fifth-grade student, attempted to distribute, before the start of class, an invitation to a children’s Christmas party at her church. Students were normally allowed to distribute invitations to birthday parties, Halloween parties, and similar events during non-instructional time. The teacher told K.A. that the principal would have to approve the flyer. The principal later notified K.A.’s father that the superintendent had not approved the flyer, based on a policy concerning events not related to the school. Her father filed suit, alleging that the school district had violated K.A.’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court, applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), and finding no evidence that distribution of the invitations would threaten a “substantial disruption‖ of the school environment or interfere with the rights of others,” granted preliminary injunctive relief. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the original policy and subsequent revisions were broader than allowed under Tinker and its progeny, which state that student expression can be regulated only if it causes disruption or interferes with the rights of others, or if it falls into a narrow exception. View "K. A. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on behalf of their son, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Missouri Constitution, alleging that the district, the superintendent, the principal, and the sheriff violated the son's constitutional rights by briefly separating him from his backpack during a drug dog exercise in his high school. The district court granted summary judgment to the district, its officials, and the sheriff. The court concluded that the brief separation of the son and his belongings was reasonable and did not deprive him of a constitutionally protected right and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the district and its officials. The court also held that the sheriff was not liable under section 1983 in his individual or official capacity where he did not participate in the drug procedure at the school, there was no evidence that the sheriff failed to train or supervise the deputies who conducted the drug dog surveys, and there was no evidence that the sheriff's office should have believed that its procedures or actions were likely to result in a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Burlison, et al v. Springfield Public Schools, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed an order and judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Hofstra and dismissing her suit claiming harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2000e-17; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681-88; and corresponding provisions of the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. Law 290-301. Plaintiff claimed that she experienced harassment and retaliation while employed by Hofstra as a team manager for the university's football program. Because defendants took the needed remedial action in this case, the harassment carried out by some players on the football team could not be imputed to the university or its personnel. The district court erred, however, in its analysis of the McDonnell Douglas factors by holding that plaintiff could not prevail on any of her three retaliation claims based on her supposed failure to demonstrate that she had engaged in protected activity and the requisite causation. Therefore, the court held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to withstand a grant of summary judgment with respect to her retaliation claims, but not as to her sexual harassment claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Summa v. Hofstra University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against the University alleging that the University, as her former employer, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12112, 12203, by refusing to accommodate her mental and physical disabilities and by responding to her requests for accommodation with hostile actions that caused her constructive discharge. The court agreed with the district court that the University lacked the capacity to be sued under state law and Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment without reaching the merits of plaintiff's ADA claims. View "Lundquist v. University of SD Sanford" on Justia Law

McArdle was hired as principal of Lindbergh School in 2008 with a two-year contract that allowed termination after one year with payment of severance. Lindbergh’s prior principal, Davis, was McArdle’s superior. McArdle claims that she discovered irregularities, including Davis’ use of school funds for personal purposes; improper payment to a student teacher; and circumvention of rules regarding admission of nonresidents. McArdle alleges that she received evasive responses from Davis. Davis put McArdle on a performance improvement plan in 2009, asserting parental complaints, but refusing to identify complainants. McArdle was told that the board would consider termination of her contract. McArdle consulted an attorney and filed a police report, accusing Davis of theft of school funds. She sent letters to the board, listing improprieties. Davis was excused from the meeting; the board discussed McArdle’s allegations, then voted to terminate McArdle’s contract at the end of the school year. Davis was prosecuted for theft of school funds. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on claims under the First Amendment and of breach and interference with contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. McArdle’s reporting of misconduct was speech as a public employee, not shielded from her employer’s response; defendants’ motives are immaterial. View "McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. 150" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, D.L. and his parents, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the BCBSC and Baltimore City Public Schools, contending that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, compelled BCBSC to provide D.L. education services related to certain disorders even though D.L. was enrolled exclusively in a private religious school. Because plaintiffs retained full discretion over school enrollment and because BCBSC has taken reasonable measures to fulfill its mission, the court found that BCBSC's policies placed no undue burden on plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Because the court did not read Section 504 to apply an affirmative obligation on school districts to provide services to private school students and because plaintiffs retained full educational discretion, the court affirmed the district court's ruling. View "D. L. v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm." on Justia Law

Because Creighton University failed to provide what plaintiff, who had a serious hearing impairment, considered necessary and reasonable accommodations, he brought this action under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12182, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The court concluded that the district court erred by disregarding plaintiff's affidavit, the "independent documentary evidence" offered in its support, and all respects of the record before it; the evidence produced in this case created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Creighton University denied plaintiff an equal opportunity to gain the same benefit from medical school as his non disabled peers by refusing to provide his requested accommodations; and therefore, the district court's grant of summary judgment to Creighton University should be reversed and the case remanded. The court need not consider Creighton University's argument on cross appeal that the district court erred by denying its request for costs without providing a rationale for doing so. View " Argenyi v. Creighton University" on Justia Law