Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Dougherty, the Business Officer for Operations for the Philadelphia School District, was accountable for the Office of Capital Programs (OCP), which developed projects for School Reform Commission (SRC) approval. Dougherty reported to Nunery, who reported to Superintendent Ackerman. Ackerman directed OCP to install security cameras in “persistently dangerous” schools. Due to a short time frame, OCP could not use its bidding process and was required to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty identified SDT as such a contractor, prepared a proposal, and submitted a resolution to Nunery. Under District policy, the Superintendent must approve the resolution before it is presented to the SRC. Dougherty did not receive a response from Nunery or Ackerman, nor was the resolution presented to the SRC. Ackerman allegedly rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation, and directed that IBS, a minority-owned firm, be awarded the contract. IBS was not pre-qualified. SRC ratified the plan. Conflicts arose. Dougherty met with reporters, resulting in articles accusing Ackerman of violating state guidelines, and contacted the FBI, state representatives, and the U.S. Department of Education. Ackerman placed Dougherty on leave pending an investigation, which concluded that there was no unlawful motive in the contract award, but that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics confidentiality section. SRC terminated Dougherty. In his suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed.View "Dougherty v. Philadelphia Sch.Dist." on Justia Law

Meade wrote a letter to the League for Innovation in the Community College about her employer, Moraine Valley Community College. Meade, an adjunct faculty member, alleged that poor treatment of adjuncts harmed students. She signed the letter as president of the adjunct faculty union. Two days later, Moraine Valley fired Meade, sending her written notice explicitly citing Meade’s letter. A few weeks later, the college warned Meade that it would regard her further presence on campus as criminal trespass. Believing that Moraine Valley retaliated against her for exercising her right to freedom of speech and violated her due process rights, Meade sued the college under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, reasoning that Meade’s letter did not address matters of public interest and could not serve as the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim. It rejected Meade’s due process claim for lack of a cognizable property interest in her employment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Meade may not pursue a due process claim based on the deprivation of a liberty interest, but pleaded enough to go forward on the theory that the college deprived her of a protected property interest. She also stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation.View "Meade v. Moraine Valley Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

Frieder joined Morehead State University in 2006 as an assistant professor of art history. During his time in probation, Frieder excelled in professional achievement and service but had difficulty teaching. The reviews of his introductory art history class were consistently abysmal. Frieder’s evaluators suggested improvements, asking Frieder to observe other teachers or visit the “Center for Teaching & Learning,” but after four years of renewing Frieder’s contract, the evaluators voted against tenure and the provost and president agreed. Frieder sued, alleging violation of the First Amendment and a Kentucky statute that prohibits disability-based discrimination, KRS 344.040. Frieder argued that his evaluators retaliated against his “idiosyncratic teaching methods,” which allegedly involved context-appropriate uses of the middle finger and that the tenure decision stemmed from his diagnosis of bipolar disorder, which he admitted his evaluators knew nothing about. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. No evidence showed that anything other than his poor student ratings and disorganization motivated the tenure decision.View "Frieder v. Morehead St. Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the parents of a minor child with Asperger’s Syndrome, filed suit against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico Department of Education under a number of federal and state statutes for alleged retaliation and discrimination against their child. The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the claims against it pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, which the district court granted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead either discrimination or retaliation, and therefore, dismissal of their federal claims was proper; and (2) Plaintiffs’ argument that the Commonwealth waived its sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment was waived for lack of development.View "Lebron v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

In 1989, Wheatley plaintiffs filed suit against the District alleging on-going violations of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971 et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1990, the district court confirmed a settlement between the parties. In 2012, the District filed a motion to modify or terminate the settlement decree, seeking an order permitting the District to relocate the middle school grades from the Wheatley campus to the Palestine campus. The district court granted the motion and the Wheatley plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that the district court properly applied the standards for modifying a consent decree when changed circumstances have caused it to be unjust under Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the modification, which was directly related to the evidence of changed circumstances the District presented. Further, it is apparent from the face of the consent decree that many of its eleven contractual commitments were premised on continued use of two school campuses and, therefore, these provisions were effectively terminated. Other provisions in the decree do not require functioning schools in both communities. The district court did not intend that its order terminate the entire consent decree, and the court so construed its order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order.View "Smith, et al. v. Palestine-Wheatley Sch. Dist, et al." on Justia Law

Anita Cooper, who was employed as principal of the Oark, Arkansas schools, was removed from her duties as principal. The Superintendent of the Jasper School District No. 1 of Newton County listed nine reasons as bases for the termination. The District’s Board of Directors then terminated Cooper’s employment. The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision, reinstated Cooper to her position, and awarded Cooper $64,998 in damages. The Superintendent and District appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Defendants failed to comply with the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act; (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that the contract in the case at bar created a property right in Cooper’s position as principal of the Oark schools; and (3) the circuit court’s award to Cooper was neither excessive nor amounted to an award of “double retirement.” View "Jasper Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Sweetwater, alleging unlawful sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that Sweetwater intentionally discriminated against female student athletes when they failed to provide equal treatment and benefits as compared to male athletes. On appeal, Sweetwater challenged the district court's grant of declaratory and injunctive relief to plaintiffs on their Title IX claims. The court concluded that Sweetwater has not fully and effectively accommodated the interests and abilities of its female athletes; the district court did not err in its award of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their Title IX unequal participation claim; and the court affirmed the grant of injunctive relief to plaintiffs on that issue. The court rejected Sweetwater's claims of evidentiary errors; the district court's ruling that plaintiffs have Article III standing and its decision to deny Sweetwater's motion to strike that claim were not error; plaintiffs stated a prima facie case of Title IX retaliation; the district court correctly could find that a coach was fired in retaliation for plaintiffs' Title IX complaints, not for any of the pretextual, non-retaliatory reasons that Sweetwater has offered; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting permanent injunctive relief to plaintiffs on their claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and rejected Sweetwater's attempt to relitigate the merits of its case.View "Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

“Jane Doe” was born in Russia and came to the U.S. at age two when she was adopted by American parents. During her sixth and seventh grade years, male classmates bullied her, sometimes hurling gendered or ethnic insults. The bullying turned violent. Three boys were charged with criminal battery and were expelled or withdrew from school. Doe sued Elmbrook School District and administrators under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, claiming that the bullying was motivated by her sex and ethnicity, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “Although Doe’s classmates’ actions were inexcusable,” the defendants are not legally responsible for those actions. Knowing how thoughtless and cruel children can be to one another, the Supreme Court has interpreted Title VI and Title IX to impose a demanding standard for holding schools and school officials legally responsible for one student’s mistreatment of another. School officials must have had “actual knowledge” of harassment “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Even assuming Doe’s harassers were motivated by her sex or ethnicity, once the defendants gained actual notice of behavior that could qualify as severe and pervasive, they took action against the wrongdoers. View "Doe v. Galster" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that African American students who were placed in remedial classes after being identified as learning “disabled” in the Lower Merion School District (LMSD) public schools in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, were deprived of appropriate educational services due to racial discrimination and segregation in violation of federal law. The claimed that the disproportionate placement of African American students in remedial classes had a discriminatory purpose and was the result of racial bias The district court rejected, on summary judgment, claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C 12101, 12132; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794(a); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d; 42 U.S.C. 1983; and state law. The Third Circuit affirmed. Looking at the whole record, which included statistical evidence showing that minorities are overrepresented in low achievement classes, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning LMSD’s intent to discriminate against plaintiffs or that LMSD had knowledge of any intentional discrimination on the part of its employees, including deliberate indifference to discriminatory practices against African American students. View "Blunt v. Lower Merion Schs." on Justia Law

Kao earned a Ph.D. in applied mathematics from Princeton, began teaching mathematics at University of San Francisco in 1991, and became a tenured professor in 1997. Kao was concerned about a lack of diversity of the faculty of the math and computer science departments, and submitted a 485-page complaint to the school in 2006 alleging race-based discrimination and harassment. He lodged a 41-page addendum to the complaint in 2007 school’s failure to advertise in professional journals. During meetings concerning the issue, Kao became “very, very upset,” and started “yelling and screaming.” USF directed Kao to have a fitness-for-duty examination after faculty members and school administrators reported that his behavior was frightening them, and the university terminated his employment when he refused to participate in the examination. Kao sued under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, 12900), the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, 51), the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (Civ. Code, 56), and the state constitution’s right to privacy. His defamation claim was dismissed and a jury ruled against him on his other claims. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that USF could not lawfully require an examination.View "Kao v. Univ. of San Francisco" on Justia Law