Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an adjunct professor, filed suit against WCC, alleging violations of her state and federal constitutional rights when WCC terminated her employment for purportedly making offensive comments in class. On appeal, WCC challenged the district court's partial denial of its motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds. The court held that WCC is not an arm of the state entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The court concluded that a finding of sovereign immunity for WCC would not serve the twin aims of the Eleventh Amendment because immunity would not further the state's interest in preserving its treasury, nor would it protect the integrity of the state. View "Leitner v. Westchester Community College" on Justia Law

Carter, an African-American male, holds an MBA and is a CPA. CSU’s College of Business hired him in 1986 as a temporary assistant professor. In 1992, CSU granted Carter tenure and promoted him to associate professor. In 1995-1996, he was department chair until he was removed by the university president. In 2006-2007, Carter was dissatisfied with his teaching assignments. Beginning in January 2007, Carter called in sick every Thursday. Carter blamed CSU’s failure to accommodate his sleep apnea. CSU’s Assistant Vice President recommended that Carter be sanctioned. Carter sued, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and disability. The district court entered partial summary judgment against Carter; the parties settled the remaining claim. On January 22, after the start of the spring 2008 semester, Carter requested FMLA leave to care for his mother. CSU granted the request. When Carter returned on March 20, CSU assigned him non-teaching duties for the remainder of the semester. His supervisor, Simyar was not willing to recommend Carter as Department Chair. The president had previously rejected candidates for other chair positions because they lacked terminal degrees, but at least three other chairs did not have PhDs at the time. Carter sued, alleging retaliation in violation of the FMLA and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal; a reasonable jury could not have concluded that the person chosen as Chair was no more qualified than Carter. View "Carter v. Chicago State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Patrick Novak filed suit against Southern Illinois University and three of its professors, alleging that he had been terminated from the University’s doctoral program in Curriculum and Instruction on the basis of his post-traumatic stress disorder, in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted the University’s motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of disability discrimination and that, in any event, he had not presented sufficient evidence to show that the defendants’ stated reason for terminating him from the program was a pretext for discrimination. After review of plaintiff's arguments on appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that plaintiff could not show that the reason given by the University for his dismissal was pretextual. On that ground, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Novak v. Bd. of Trustees of So. Ill. University" on Justia Law

Daniels is an African-American educator born in 1950. She has a masters degree in elementary education and is certified as a reading specialist. She sued her former employer, the School District of Philadelphia, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, substantively and by retaliating against her because she opposed what she believed was SDP’s discriminatory conduct in violation of the acts. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the district. She appealed only the retaliation claim. The Third Circuit affirmed. Daniels failed to establish a causal link between her protected activities and the adverse actions; she did not show an “unusually suggestive” temporal proximity. View "Daniels v. Philadelphia Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of New York State's requirement that all children be vaccinated in order to attend public school. The statute provides two exemptions from the immunization mandate: a medical exemption and a religious exemption. Rejecting plaintiffs' substantive due process, free exercise of religion, equal protection, and Ninth Amendment challenges, the court concluded that the statute and regulation are a constitutionally permissible exercise of the State's police power and do not infringe on the free exercise of religion. The court further concluded that plaintiff's remaining arguments are either meritless or waived. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss. View "Phillips v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Mrs. Bridgewater, a Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Society, Inc. (FACES) member parent, filed a complaint with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, alleging that FACES refused a reasonable accommodation for her allergic daughter by not serving her beef instead of chicken at a social event, therefore discriminating against her due to her disability. FACES subsequently expelled the Bridgewater family. Mrs. Bridgewater then filed a second complaint with the Commission, alleging that FACES unlawfully retaliated against her family for filing the disability discrimination claim. FACES filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the Commission did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because FACES was a religious organization, not an educational one. The Commission denied the motion to dismiss and awarded judgment in favor of Mrs. Bridgewater on the retaliatory discrimination claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission’s final order, holding that the Commission lacked authority to take any action other than the dismissal of these claims because the incident giving rise to the claims was not related to education and was thus not within the Commission’s prerequisite statutory authority. Remanded to grant FACES’s motion to dismiss as to both claims. View "Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Soc’y, Inc. v. Bridgewater" on Justia Law

After series of problems arising between Dr. Fatemi and other program residents and coworkers at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS), including reported failure to comply with regulatory standards that require a complete history and physical evaluation in the medical record prior to surgery or within 24 hours of admission, the UAMS program terminated Fatemi, a female second-year neurosurgery resident. Fatemi sued UAMS and several of its employees, asserting, among other things, gender discrimination. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Fatemi's arguments concerning pretext. While there was an atmosphere of contentiousness and discord between Fatemi and her coworkers during her residency, there was no evidence that the discord was the product of intentional gender discrimination. A reasonable jury could come to only one conclusion on gender discrimination after considering all the undisputed material facts, and considering the few disputed facts in Fatemi's favor. She lost her place at UAMS because of her many professional shortcomings as a resident, not because she is a woman. View "Fatemi v. White" on Justia Law

Brown, a black female law professor at the University of the District of Columbia School of Law (DCSL), had worked for DCSL in various capacities for more than 20 years when she applied for tenure and promotion. The Faculty Evaluation Committee recommended tenure and transmitted her application to Dean Broderick, who initially recommended that the Committee withdraw its approval due to the sparseness and quality of Brown’s legal scholarship. Once Broderick learned that a law journal agreed to publish another of Brown’s articles, she endorsed the recommendation and forwarded her approval to then–Interim Provost Baxter, who rejected the application. President Sessoms agreed that Brown should not be awarded tenure and did not submit Brown’s application to the Board. Around the same time, the administration considered the tenure application of McLain, a white male. Brown alleges that McLain had “no legal publications” but that Broderick did not insist that he satisfy the three-publication requirement, as Broderick had with Brown’s application. The Board awarded him tenure and a promotion to full professor. Brown sued. The district court dismissed. The D.C. Circuit reversed dismissal of Brown’s D.C. Human Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. 1981 claims and affirmed dismissal of her other claims.View "Brown v. Sessoms" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a high school student and his mother, filed suit against defendants for violation of the student's freedom of speech under the First Amendment and the mother's substantive due process right to parental authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs' complaint stemmed from the student's suspension and transfer to an alternative school for his posting of a rap song on his Facebook page and on YouTube that criticized and named two male athletic coaches at his school for sexually harassing female students. The court concluded that, even assuming arguendo the School Board could invoke Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District in this case, it would not afford the School Board a defense for its violation of the student's First Amendment rights because the evidence does not support a finding, as would be required by Tinker, that the student's song either substantially disrupted the school's work or discipline or that the school officials reasonably could have forecasted such a disruption. In the alternative, the court concluded that the student's song did not gravely and uniquely threaten violence to the school population such to justify discipline pursuant to the court's narrow holding in Ponce v. Socorro Independent School District that student speech that threatened a Columbine-style attack on a school was not protected by the First Amendment. In this case, the student's speech did not constitute a true threat as evidenced by, inter alia, its public broadcast as a rap song, its conditional nature, and the reactions of its listeners. The district court reversed in part and rendered in favor of the student against the School Board on the First Amendment claim; remanded and directed the district court to award the student nominal damages, court costs, appropriate attorneys' fees, and an injunction ordering the School Board to expunge all references to the incident at issue from the student's school records. The court affirmed in all other respects.View "Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Dougherty, the Business Officer for Operations for the Philadelphia School District, was accountable for the Office of Capital Programs (OCP), which developed projects for School Reform Commission (SRC) approval. Dougherty reported to Nunery, who reported to Superintendent Ackerman. Ackerman directed OCP to install security cameras in “persistently dangerous” schools. Due to a short time frame, OCP could not use its bidding process and was required to select a pre-qualified contractor. Dougherty identified SDT as such a contractor, prepared a proposal, and submitted a resolution to Nunery. Under District policy, the Superintendent must approve the resolution before it is presented to the SRC. Dougherty did not receive a response from Nunery or Ackerman, nor was the resolution presented to the SRC. Ackerman allegedly rejected the SDT proposal for lack of minority participation, and directed that IBS, a minority-owned firm, be awarded the contract. IBS was not pre-qualified. SRC ratified the plan. Conflicts arose. Dougherty met with reporters, resulting in articles accusing Ackerman of violating state guidelines, and contacted the FBI, state representatives, and the U.S. Department of Education. Ackerman placed Dougherty on leave pending an investigation, which concluded that there was no unlawful motive in the contract award, but that Dougherty violated the Code of Ethics confidentiality section. SRC terminated Dougherty. In his suit, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, the district court denied motions for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit affirmed.View "Dougherty v. Philadelphia Sch.Dist." on Justia Law