Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, once a standout high school basketball player, sued 942 U.S.C. 1983) Valley View Community School District, and the Illinois High School Association, raising claims of First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, substantive due process, unconstitutional policy, section 1983 conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and indemnification under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. He alleged that the District and IHSA singled him out for residency investigations, which rendered him ineligible to participate in basketball for 10 days, because his mother complained to the District. The district judge determined that plaintiff failed to comply with local Rule 56.1 and deemed admitted all of the defendants’ properly supported facts and disregarded plaintiff’s additional facts that lacked evidentiary support. Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to include with that motion “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law,” organized by numbered paragraphs and referring to supporting materials that substantiate the asserted facts. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants complied; plaintiff, in opposing summary judgment, was required to, but did not comply. View "Friend v. Valley View Cmty Unit Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of a disabled student, filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking reimbursement by the DOE for the costs of attending a private program. The hearing officer denied the request for reimbursement, concluding that it was untimely under Haw. Rev. Stat. 302A-443(a). The district court held, however, that the student's placement by the parents was “bilateral,” not “unilateral,” so that the parents’ request was not untimely, and concluded that the parents were entitled to reimbursement. The court agreed and concluded that the student's family is entitled to reimbursement for the 2010–11 school year because the DOE tacitly consented to his enrollment at the private school program by failing to provide an alternative. The court also affirmed the district court's fee award. View "Sam K. v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ." on Justia Law

In 1970, the district court determined that the City and the Board were operating racially segregated schools and directed them to submit desegregation plans that would establish a nonracial, unitary school district. This appeal stemmed from the district court's two desegregation orders. Plaintiffs moved to enjoin the implementation of the Board's 2011-2012 student assignment plan because it failed to move the school district toward unitary status. The district court denied relief. The court vacated the district court's ruling, holding that the district court erred when it failed to place the burden on the Board to show that the 2011-12 student assignment plan moved the school district toward unitary status. Subsequently, the district court granted the Board's motion requesting that the district court declare the school district unitary and the district court dismissed plaintiffs' request for an injunction as moot. The court affirmed, concluding that the district court acted within its discretion in choosing to address the Board’s motion for declaration of unitary status before ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief. Further, the district court did not clearly err in determining that the school district is unitary. View "Everett v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking an order requiring DCPS to provide her son with compensatory education. The district court dismissed the suit as moot because the school system responded to the complaint by offering an individualized education plan that is adequate to keep the child on track going forward. The court concluded, however, that the district court failed to address whether the child was entitled to compensatory education, which is a remedy that remains available. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Boose v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Due to his behavioral problems, Appellant, then a minor, signed a “behavior contract,” under which he consented to random searches of his person and property in order to attend public high school. During a subsequent search of Appellant, a teacher found marijuana on Appellant’s person. Appellant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. Appellant objected to the admission of evidence resulting from the search. The hearing master declined to suppress on the grounds that Appellant had consented to the search under the behavior contract. The district court then formally adjudicated Appellant a delinquent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State failed to demonstrate that Appellant’s consent to search was voluntary, as there was no evidence on the record that additional public education options were available to Appellant, and the State could not constitutionally condition Appellant’s access to a public education on his waiver of his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) therefore, the district court should have suppressed the fruits of the administration’s search of Appellant. View "In re L.A.W." on Justia Law

The Wenks have a 17-year-old daughter, M, who has an IQ of 70 or below, and requires special education services. M attended high school in Grandview Heights, under an Individualized Education Program (IEP), as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400. In 2011, teachers expressed “concerns” about M’s father’s treatment of M. An administrator’s report to Franklin County Children Services (FCCS) included statements and behaviors by M that were thought to indicate sexual abuse and many comments about father’s physical appearance and demeanor. FCCS concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated; the police department dropped its criminal investigation. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Wenks claimed that the report was filed in retaliation for their advocacy to change M’s educational plan, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The district court denied the school administrator qualified immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, but denied the Wenks‘s motion for fees and costs for defending the appeal. The right to be free from retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights was clearly established at the time of the report and a reasonable official would have understood that filing a child abuse report in bad faith violated those rights. View "Wenk v. O'Reilly" on Justia Law

A panel of the Ninth Circuit filed an amended opinion in this dispute regarding attorney’s fees. In the amended opinion, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs to Capristrano Unified School District as the prevailing defendant in an action brought by the mother of a special education student alleging violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The panel (1) agreed with the district court that the ADA and section 1983 claims were frivolous and affirmed the award of attorney’s fees and costs for representation relating to those claims; and (2) disagreed with the district court that the IDEA and Rehabilitation Act claims were frivolous and/or brought for an improper purpose and reversed the district court to the extent that it awarded attorney’s fees and costs related to the litigation of those claims. The cause was remanded. The panel also filed an order amending the opinion, denying a petition for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing en banc, and directing the mandate to issue forthwith. View "C.W. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Professional Massage Training Center (PMTC) filed suit against the Accreditation Alliance of Career Schools and Colleges (ACCSC) after ACCSC denied PMTC’s application for re-accreditation. The district court entered judgment in favor of PMTC, finding that ACCSC had violated the school’s due process rights. The court awarded the school more than $400,000 in damages and ordered ACCSC to fully reinstate its accreditation. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in conducting a de novo approach to the accreditation process; (2) judged by the correct standard of review, the accreditation decision was well supported and not arbitrary or capricious; and (3) the district court correctly dismissed PMTC’s state law claims for breach of contract, negligence, and tortious interference. Remanded. View "Prof’l Massage Training v. Accreditation Alliance of Career Schs." on Justia Law

Lyons, a part-time lecturer at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, gave a student athlete a grade of “F” in the Fall 2010 semester. The student appealed. Lyons’s supervisor determined the student should be allowed to submit a second paper. Lyons complained to Dean Vaught, who referred the appeal to the Academic Standards Committee, which also determined the student should be allowed to write a second paper. Vaught upheld the ruling. The student submitted a second paper. An appointed committee gave it a 75% grade; Vaught instructed the registrar to change the student’s course grade to D. Lyons then met with Chancellor Morton, claiming preferential academic treatment for student athletes. Morton did not take action. Lyons continued to pursue the matter. He received no advance notice that his course would be eliminated for the Spring 2012 semester. Lyons sued for First Amendment retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The defendant-administrators unsuccessfully moved to dismiss, alleging that Lyons failed to state a claim and they were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Lyons failed to allege plausibly that his only constitutionally protected speech could have been a substantial or motivating factor in defendants’ alleged adverse employment action. View "Lyons v. Vaught" on Justia Law

Wesley, an elementary school counselor and behavioral specialist, was accused of sexual abuse of a seven-year-old boy. The child had a history of psychiatric problems. A social worker contacted her friend, Rigney, a Covington Police Officer, rather than going through normal channels. They extensively interviewed other children, but none corroborated the allegations; a medical examination did not corroborate the allegations. Wesley was terminated. Wesley had unsuccessfully attempted to talk with Rigney. Nor was he interviewed by the social worker, who decided that the allegations had been substantiated and sent that finding to the school and the teacher licensing board. Wesley appealed; 84 days after the initial allegations and 10 days after learning of the negative medical examination, Rigney sought a warrant. Deputies arrested Wesley. The child and his mother refused to cooperate. Charges were dismissed. A hearing officer reversed the finding of substantiated abuse. Wesley filed a civil rights lawsuit against Rigney. The district court dismissed false arrest, outrage, and negligent investigation claims, finding that probable cause supported the arrest and that Rigney was qualifiedly immune, and granted Rigney summary judgment on Wesley’s retaliatory arrest claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Rigney waited almost three months before seeking a warrant and omitted from her application material facts demonstrating the unreliability of the allegations, undermining the existence of probable cause. View "Wesley v. Campbell" on Justia Law