Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In a first appeal, the court reversed summary judgment in favor of the Board, holding that material fact issues surrounded the discriminatory purpose and effect of the Board’s adoption of a redistricting plan that concentrated economically disadvantaged students in a majority-nonwhite school district. On remand, the district court entered judgment for the Board. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court did not err in concluding that Option 2f does not make express racial classifications and so is not subject to strict scrutiny on that basis. Option 2f employed several means to shift the student population among the east bank schools. The court rejected plaintiff's alternative theory that, despite Option 2f’s facial neutrality, the redistricting plan’s funneling feature is nevertheless subject to strict scrutiny because it had both a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory effect. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that rational basis review is satisfied as to the equal protection claim and the court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Board. View "Lewis, Sr. v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

California Education Code 56346(f) requires school districts to initiate a due process hearing if the school district determines that a portion of an Individualized Education Program (IEP) to which a parent does not consent is necessary to provide a child with a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1450. The ALJ concluded that the district offered an appropriate placement but Mother's refusal to consent prevented the district from implementing and providing a FAPE. I.R. appealed, but the district court affirmed. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that the district could not initiate a due process hearing to address Mother's refusal to the IEP's recommended placement. In this case, the district waited a year and a half before initiating a hearing, which the court determined was too long a period of time. Therefore, to the extent that I.R. lost an educational opportunity and was deprived of educational benefits for an unreasonably prolonged period, the district can be held responsible for denying her a FAPE for that unreasonably prolonged period. The court reversed and remanded. View "I.R. v. L.A. U.S.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff collapsed with exertional heatstroke while practicing as a member of the Towson University football team. Plaintiff was in a coma for nine days, almost died, and suffered multi-organ failure, requiring a liver a transplant and numerous additional surgeries. Plaintiff subsequently recovered and pursued his plan to return to playing football. However, the Team Physician, a board-certified sports medicine doctor, concluded that allowing plaintiff to participate in the football program at the University presented an unacceptable risk of serious reinjury or death. Plaintiff filed suit against the University, alleging that its decision to exclude him from the football program amounted to a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The district court entered judgment against the University. The court reversed, concluding that plaintiff was not “otherwise qualified” to participate fully in the University’s football program because the University reasonably applied its Return-to-Play Policy. The court was required to give deference to the University's judgment. The court did not reach the University's challenge to the district court's evidentiary rulings. View "Class v. Towson Univ." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of allegations that AKC, a child with autism, suffered abuse at school by her special-education teacher, Vickie Cantrell. AKC’s parents, Ted and Bella Carroll, filed suit in federal district court against Cantrell, the school district, and others, seeking damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and a variety of state-law theories. The district court dismissed the Carrolls’ federal claims, concluding the Carrolls had not exhausted their administrative remedies before filing suit as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the IDEA). The district court then dismissed the Carrolls’ complaint, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. The Carrolls appealed. The single issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court erred in determining the Carrolls’ federal claims were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Because the Court concluded the Carrolls’ complaint alleged educational injuries that could have been redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative remedies, it agreed with the district court that exhaustion of those remedies was required before the Carrolls could file suit. View "Carroll v. Lawton Independent School" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., seeking attorneys' fees after she proved in an administrative hearing that a school district had violated her child’s right to a free appropriate public education by repeatedly placing him in isolation during school hours. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying section 1415(i)(2)(B)’s limitations period to this action for attorneys’ fees under the IDEA by a party that prevailed at the administrative level. Because the statute contains no limitations period for such actions, the district court should have borrowed one from state law. The court held that the limitations period for such an action does not begin to run until the time for seeking judicial review of the underlying administrative decision passes, and that plaintiff’s action was timely under any limitations period that could be borrowed. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "D.G. v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether settlement agreements between a public school and the parents of a public school student who requires special education are public records subject to disclosure. Plaintiff requested from Defendant school district copies of such agreements where Defendant “limited its contribution to education funding or attached conditions for it for out of district placements” for certain school years. The school district denied the request. The superior court declared that the agreements were public records and were not exempt from disclosure. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded, holding (1) the settlement agreements regarding placement of students in out-of-district private educational institutions are not “public records” under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, 7; but (2) the settlement agreements may be redacted to remove personally identifiable information, after which they become subject to disclosure under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 66, 10, the Massachusetts public records law. View "Champa v. Weston Public Schools" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the school district and its employees, alleging claims related to the sexual molestation of A.W. by her teacher. The district court dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) as time-barred. At issue is the Texas statute of limitations that applies to Title IX of the Education Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims involving sexual abuse. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiffs’ Title IX and section 1983 claims are time-barred because plaintiffs' claims accrued more than two years prior to their filing suit and the equitable tolling principles they have identified do not apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and did not reach the remaining issues raised on appeal. View "King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Rahn, a white male who earned a PhD in Industrial Engineering from the University of Illinois, was hired as a visiting professor at NIU. His wife, Regina, was hired as a tenure-track assistant professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering for that same school year. During that year, a tenure-track assistant professor position opened up in the Department. Rahn applied. Despite her husband’s status as an applicant, Regina was a voting member of the search committee. She claims that one committee member stated that he would not hire a white man into the department if qualified minority candidates were available. After another applicant was hired, the Rahns alleged reverse discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 701 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and copyright infringement, based on use of teaching notes and slides. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. That testimony did not support indicate that an evaluation metric was a subterfuge for eliminating Rahn on racial grounds. A university employer may properly preference academic experience; Rahn did not present evidence that such a preference was inconsistent with the initial description of the position and the preferred qualifications. View "Rahn v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ." on Justia Law

Christine B., the mother of student "A.F.," filed suit claiming that the Espanola Public Schools failed to address appropriately her daughter's disabilities in the educational program it formulated for her. Before any hearing could be held, Christine sought to mediate her dispute. In the end, the parties signed a settlement agreement. As a result of the settlement, Christine B. asked the administrative agency to dismiss her Individuals with Disability Education Act (IDEA) claims with prejudice. Despite the satisfactory result she received through mediation, Christine B. filed suit again, though not pursuant to IDEA, but under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The allegations in her federal court complaint and those in her original IDEA administrative complaint were nearly identical: both alleged that A.F. suffered from the same disabilities and both contended that the school district failed to take her disabilities into account in her educational program. Agreeing with the school district that Christine B. failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the district court dismissed her lawsuit. Christine B. appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. View "A.F. v. Espanola Public Schools" on Justia Law

Munroe was an English teacher, generally considered to be effective and competent. The District granted Munroe tenure in 2010. In 2009, Munroe began a blog, using the name “Natalie M.” She did not expressly identify where she worked or lived, the name of the school or the names of her students. According to Munroe, her blog was meant to be viewed by friends that she had asked to subscribe. There were fewer than 10 subscribed readers, but no password was required for access. Most of the blog posts were unrelated to her school or work. Some postings included complaints about students, her working conditions, and related matters. The District administration first learned of Munroe’s blog in February 2011 when a reporter from a local newspaper began to ask questions; students apparently were commenting on social media.” Munroe was placed on paid suspension and, later, fired. The District had no regulation specifically prohibiting a teacher from blogging on his or her own time. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of Munroe’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit; under the Pickering balancing test, Munroe’s speech, in both effect and tone, was sufficiently disruptive so as to diminish any legitimate interest in its expression, and did not rise to the level of constitutionally protected expression. View "Munroe v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist." on Justia Law