Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

C.R. challenged his suspension, for sexually harassing two younger students, in district court under the First Amendment. C.R. argued that because the harassment occurred off-campus, in a public park, the school lacked the authority to discipline him. C.R. also challenged his suspension on due process grounds. The district court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment. The court upholds a school’s disciplinary determinations so long as the school’s interpretation of its rules and policies is reasonable, and there is evidence to support the charge. In this case, the school administration’s investigation uncovered at least some evidence that C.R. participated in sexually suggestive joking directed at the younger students. The court concluded that the school district's characterization of this behavior as sexual harassment in its Student Handbook is reasonable. Thus, the court deferred to the school district’s determination that C.R. participated in sexual harassment. The court concluded that the school district had the authority to discipline C.R. for his off-campus, sexually harassing speech where the speech occurred exclusively between students, in close temporal and physical proximity to the school, on property that is not obviously demarcated from the campus itself. The court concluded that a school may act to ensure students are able to leave the school safely without implicating the rights of students to speak freely in the broader community. The court also concluded that the school district's decision to suspend C.R. for two days for sexual harassment was permissible under Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. because sexually harassing speech, by definition, interferes with the victims' ability to feel safe and secure at school. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the school district on C.R.'s First Amendment claims. Finally, the district court correctly concluded that the school district afforded C.R. all the process that he was due and that C.R. failed to raise any viable substantive due process claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's order granting the District's motion to approve the closure of Wilmot Elementary School and to modify the gifted and talented (GT) requirements for the District. In 1988, plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging race discrimination and other claims. The parties negotiated a settlement and, in 1991, the district court entered a Consent Order disposing of issues remaining in the complaint. In this case, the district court approved closure of Wilmot and modification of the GT program as the proper modification of the Consent Order due to the significant changed circumstances. The court concluded that such modification is suitably tailored where the modifications sought by the school district in light of the (1) demographic changes, (2) decrease in enrollment, (3) cost savings, and (4) educational considerations are in line with the initial Consent Order. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the District's motion to approve closure of Wilmot and to modify the GT requirements. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Mays v. Hamburg Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

After the school districts sought termination of the Garland County School Desegregation Case Comprehensive Settlement Agreement and relief from the district court’s 1992 order enforcing it, the district court denied the school districts' Rule 60(b)(5) motion. The district court rejected the school districts' argument that the Agreement is no longer just or equitable to give the 1992 order or the Agreement prospective application in light of the repeal of the Arkansas School Choice Act of 1989 (School Choice Act), Ark. Code Ann. 6-18-206 (repealed 2013). The court concluded that the school districts have presented no evidence that they have either fully complied or that there have been changed circumstances in those other areas of the Agreement. Therefore, termination of the entire Agreement would be supported by nothing more than the notion that it is no longer convenient to live with. The court affirmed the judgment. View "W.T. Davis v. Cutter Morning Star Sch." on Justia Law

S.D. suffers from “multiple medical problems including chronic sinusitis with frequent acute exacerbations, allergic rhinitis, and intermittent asthma” that allegedly “substantially limit him in . . . the life activity of learning.”. S.D.’s doctor concluded that these medical problems “make it likely that he will have frequent school absence[s] due to acute [and] underlying chronic illness,” and suggested that S.D. “should qualify for [Section] 504 plan modifications for school” under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a). Dissatisfied with the school’s plan, which involved Saturday sessions and a summer course, his parents sued, citing the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213, the First and Fourteenth Amendments (42 U.S.C. 1983), and New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust the administrative process provided for by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400–1482. The Third Circuit affirmed. While the claims alleged discrimination and retaliation for enforcement of the child’s rights under a non-IDEA statute, the alleged injuries are educational in nature and implicate services within the purview of the IDEA, so administrative remedies must be exhausted. View "S. D. v. Haddon Heights Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants violated her constitutional rights when she was required to participate in a mock performance of the Mexican Pledge of Allegiance. The district court entered summary judgment on some of plaintiff's claims and, after trial, entered judgment as a matter of law for defendants. The court concluded that, because plaintiff has graduated from high school, her only surviving claim is for nominal damages arising from the alleged violation of her rights; plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of an official policy or that the District had knowledge of the assignment, and thus judgment as a matter of law was proper for the District on municipal liability for any constitutional violation that may have arisen from the assignment or subsequent actions; the court's ruling also applies to the claims against the District for retaliation and violation of Equal Protection; qualified immunity was properly granted to Defendants Santos and Cavazos on the claim they violated plaintiff's First Amendment rights when they removed plaintiff from class; and, likewise, plaintiff's equal protection claim fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Brinsdon v. McAllen I.S.D." on Justia Law

In 1956, the New Kensington Eagles donated to Valley High School a six-foot granite monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments, an eagle, an American flag, the Star of David, the Chi-Rho symbol, a Masonic eye, and Hebrew and Phoenician lettering. It is near the gymnasium entrance, which is accessible from the student parking area. In 2012, FFRF, an organization dedicated to promoting separation of church and state, unsuccessfully requested the monument's removal. Schaub saw a story on television and contacted FFRF. Schaub had visited Valley and seen the monument while taking her daughter to a karate event, picking the girl up from the swimming pool, and dropping off her sister, whose child attends Valley. Schaub’s daughter was to attend Valley beginning in August 2014. Schaub views the monument as “commanding” students and visitors to worship “thy God,” brands her as “an outsider because [she] do[es] not follow the particular religion or god that the monument endorses,” and makes her “stomach turn.” She wishes to raise her daughter without religion. While a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was pending, Schaub’s daughter began attending a different high school. The district court granted the District summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed. Schaub has standing to seek nominal damages and injunctive relief, and her request for injunctive relief was not moot. With respect to FFRF’s claims, the court remanded for consideration of whether Schaub was an FFRF member when the complaint was filed. View "Freedom From Religion Found. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Columbia University student, appealed the dismissal of his amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff alleged that the University violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., and state law, by acting with sex bias in investigating him and suspending him for an alleged sexual assault. The court concluded that the complaint meets the low standard described in Littlejohn v. City of New York, by alleging facts giving rise to a plausible minimal inference of bias sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, which the court held applies to Title IX cases. In this case, the complaint alleged that both the investigator and the panel declined to seek out potential witnesses plaintiff had identified as sources of information favorable to him; the investigator and the panel failed to act in accordance with University procedures designed to protect accused students; and the investigator, the panel, and the reviewing Dean reached conclusions that were incorrect and contrary to the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Doe v. Columbia University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of her minor son D.H., filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against school officials, including Assistant Principal Tyrus McDowell, and others, alleging that defendants deprived D.H. of his rights to privacy, to be secure in his person, and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. On appeal, McDowell challenged the district court’s interlocutory order denying his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court found that McDowell’s strip search of D.H., a minor student, violated clearly established constitutional law. The court concluded that McDowell violated D.H.'s constitutional rights. Furthermore, a reasonable official in McDowell’s position would not have believed that requiring D.H. to strip down to his fully naked body in front of several of his peers was lawful in light of the clearly established principle that a student strip search, even if justified in its inception, must be “reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of McDowell’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "D. H. v. McDowell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that defendants violated students' constitutional rights when they detained the students for breathalyzer tests prior to entering their Junior/Senior Prom. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The court concluded that plaintiffs have not established an actual or reasonable expectation of privacy in the party bus, which they had abandoned once they had exited for the Prom; the bus driver had apparent authority to consent to search the party bus; and therefore, the search of the party bus did not violate plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. The court also concluded that the initial waiting period for the breathalyzer mouthpieces and a trained individual to administer the breathalyzer tests was reasonable, because it was necessary for the testing; detaining a student after he or she was found to be alcohol free was not “reasonably related” to the reason for the detention “in the first place” of determining if the student passengers on the party bus had been drinking; the individual school defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there was no binding clearly established law at the time; and claims against the remaining defendants have been abandoned or have no merit. The court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims. Because plaintiffs have not established that they should succeed on any of their allegations concerning their Fourth, First, and Fourteenth Amendment claims, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ziegler v. Martin Cnty. Sch. Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant, National Heritage Academies, Inc., was a company that owned and operated a number of public, independently operated schools, including Linden Charter Academy (LCA) located in Flint, Michigan. Plaintiff, Craig Hecht, was a white teacher who had been employed by defendant at LCA for approximately eight years, most recently serving as a third-grade teacher. The student body at LCA was predominantly black. This race discrimination case came about over the color of a computer table: an aide returned a brown table to plaintiff's classroom. Upon noticing her mistake, the aide asked plaintiff whether he'd prefer to have the brown table she brought, or the white table that had previously been in the room. Whether or not plaintiff's next statement in response to the computer table question was a "tasteless joke" with no racial animas ultimately lead to plaintiff's termination with defendant. Plaintiff sued under Michigan's Civil Rights Act (CRA), claiming that the employer's reason for firing him was racially motivated. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). After review, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err by affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for JNOV on plaintiff’s claim of discrimination under the Civil Rights Act (CRA), "[t]his case turned on circumstantial evidence, on the credibility of plaintiff’s proofs that suggested there were racial reasons for his treatment and on the credibility of defendant’s nonracial justifications for firing him." The Court concluded based on the evidence presented and all the inferences that could be reasonably drawn from that evidence in favor of the jury’s liability verdict, that a reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant violated the CRA. The Court found error in the calculation of future damages and reversed the trial court on that ground. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hecht v. National Heritage Academies, Inc." on Justia Law