Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, on behalf of her minor son J.M., filed suit against the School District, alleging unlawful use of isolation and physical restraints, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12182; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq.; and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), RSMo 213.010 et seq. The district court dismissed the federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the MHRA claim. In this case, plaintiff did not file an Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., due process complaint, request a due process hearing, or engage in the exhaustion procedures under the IDEA. The court concluded that because the complaint sought relief available under the IDEA, denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE), the claims were subject to exhaustion, barring an applicable exception. The court rejected plaintiff's futility and inadequate remedy arguments and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "J.M. v. Francis Howell School District" on Justia Law

The court filed (1) an order amending its opinion and denying a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc, and (2) an amended opinion reversing the district court's summary judgment in favor of the school district. Plaintiff filed suit to require the district court to provide her son L.J. with an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Although the district court found that L.J. was disabled under three categories defined by the IDEA, it concluded that an IEP for specialized services was not necessary because of L.J.'s satisfactory performance in general education classes. The court concluded that the district court clearly erred because L.J. was receiving special services, including mental health counseling and assistance from a one-on-one paraeducator. The court pointed out the important distinction that these are not services offered to general education students. The court explained that the problem with the district court's analysis is that many of the services the district court viewed as general education services were in fact special education services tailored to L.J.'s situation. Because L.J. is eligible for special education, the school district must formulate an IEP. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for the district court to provide that remedy. The court also concluded that the school district clearly violated important procedural safeguards set forth in the IDEA when it failed to disclose assessments, treatment plans, and progress notes, which deprived L.J.'s mother of her right to informed consent. The school district failed to conduct a health assessment, which rendered the school district and IEP team unable to evaluate and address L.J.'s medication and treatment related needs. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "L. J. v. Pittsburg Unified School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, T.M.'s mother, filed suit against the County and others after T.M., a middle school student, was arrested for a fight on school property, taken to a juvenile detention center, and subjected to a strip and cavity search. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the strip and cavity search violated T.M.'s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the County on the Fourth Amendment claim. The court applied the deferential test in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders because the deference given to correctional officials in the adult context applies to correctional officials in the juvenile context as well. Applying Florence, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to make a substantial showing that the Center's search policy is an exaggerated or otherwise irrational response to the problem of Center security. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mabry v. Lee County" on Justia Law

A student was dismissed from a Ph.D. program at the University of Alaska Fairbanks after several years of poor performance and negative feedback. She claimed that her advisors discriminated and retaliated against her, that she was dismissed in violation of due process, and that the University breached duties owed to her under an implied contract. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision to uphold the University's action because the student was dismissed based on her poor research performance and the dismissal was conducted under adequate procedures and within accepted academic norms. View "Horner-Neufeld v. University of Alaska Fairbanks" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney employed as a hearing officer for the Rhode Island Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (RIDE), filed a complaint alleging that RIDE and the Rhode Island Board Counsel on Elementary and Secondary Education (collectively, Defendants) violated the Open Meetings Act (OMA) by failing to provide adequate notice of a September 2014 council meeting and by failing to provide any notice of meetings held by the Compensation Review Committee (CRC). The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) Defendants violated the OMA by failing to provide adequate notice of the September 2014 meeting; and (2) the CRC is not a public body and, therefore, is not subject to the OMA. View "Pontarelli v. Rhode Island Board Council on Elementary and Secondary Education" on Justia Law

A preliminary injunction required the Highland School District Board to treat an 11-year old transgender special-needs student as a female and permit her to use the girls’ restroom. Highland moved to stay the injunction pending appeal and to file an appendix under seal. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion to file under seal only with respect to four exhibits that were filed under seal in the trial court. In denying a stay, the court noted the girl’s personal circumstances—her young age, mental health history, and unique vulnerabilities—and that her use of the girls’ restroom for over six weeks has greatly alleviated her distress. Maintaining the status quo in this case will protect the girl from the harm that would befall her if the injunction is stayed. Public interest weights strongly against a stay of the injunction; the protection of constitutional and civil rights is always in the public interest. View "Board of Education of Highland School v. Doe" on Justia Law

After a teacher at Carver Middle School submitted an application for the approval of the Carver Gay-Straight Alliance, the superintendent denied the application on the ground that the application failed to identify an allowed purpose for the club. Plaintiffs filed suit, alleging violations of their constitutional rights and the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. 4071-72. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of their complaint alleging that the Board violated the Act. The court concluded that the complaint is ripe because the Board made a final decision when it rejected the application of the Alliance to form a club, and the complaint is not moot because the district court can still fashion relief for a violation of the Act. The court also concluded that the Act applies to Carver Middle School because it provides courses for high school credit and, under Florida law, these courses constitute “secondary education.” Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carver Middle School Gay-Straight Alliance v. School Board of Lake County, Florida" on Justia Law

Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. (the Tribune-Eagle) submitted a public records request to Laramie County School District Number One (the School District) asking to inspect certain school board member email communications. The School District, in response, downloaded the emails to a compact disc and made the compact disc available to the Tribune-Eagle subject to a fee for the time the School District staff spent retrieving the records. Thereafter, the Tribune-Eagle filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that the Wyoming Public Records Act does not allow the School District to charge for access to electronic records when the request is for inspection of the records and not for a copy of the records. The district court concluded, as a matter of law, that the School District was entitled to the fees it charged the Tribune-Eagle for access to the requested emails. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 16-4-202(d)(i) allows a public record custodian to charge for inspection of an electronic record if the inspect request requires production of a copy of the record, and reasonableness is the limitation on the costs that may be charged a public records applicant under the statute. View "Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., v. Board of Trustees of Laramie County School District Number One" on Justia Law

Graviss has worked in education since 1978. In 2008, she became a pre-school special needs teacher at Kingsolver Elementary, part of Fort Knox Schools. Kingsolver’s principal, McClain, issued Graviss a reprimand based on an “inappropriate interaction with a student” and “failure to follow directives,” asserting that Graviss and her aide had physically carried a misbehaving pre-school student and Graviss had emailed concerns to the director of special education, although McClain had directed Graviss to “bring all issues directly to [her].” The union filed a grievance. Subsequently, one of Graviss’s students had an episode, repeatedly flailing his arms, kicking, and screaming. While the other students were out at recess, Graviss employed physical restraint to subdue the child. After an investigation, McClain submitted a Family Advocacy Program Department of Defense Education Activity Serious Incident Report and Alleged Child Abuse Report to the Family Advocacy Program (child protective services for the military). McClain forwarded the Report to her direct supervisor, who was later the decision-maker in Graviss’s termination. An arbitrator concluded that that Graviss's termination promoted the efficiency of the service and was reasonable. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that Graviss’s due process rights were violated by improper ex parte communication between a supervisor and the deciding official. That communication contained new information that the supervisor wanted Graviss terminated for insubordination. View "Federal Education Association v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of a child with a disability, sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction requiring the Seattle School District (the district) to place their child in a general education class pending the outcome of the due process challenge. In May 2015, the Bellevue School District produced an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for the child that encompassed two stages: The first stage would begin immediately and the second would begin at the start of the 2015–16 school year. Plaintiffs allowed the child to finish the school year in accordance with the first stage of the IEP but did not agree to the second stage. Over the summer, the family moved to Seattle. Just before the start of the 2015–16 school year, the district proposed a class setting for the child that was similar to the second stage of the May 2015 IEP. Plaintiffs objected and sought a “stay-put” placement. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion on the ground that they had not established a likelihood of success on the merits. The court agreed with the district that a partially implemented, multi-stage IEP, as a whole, is a student’s then-current educational placement. In this case, stage two of the May 2015 IEP was the child's stay-put placement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "N. E. v. Seattle School District" on Justia Law