Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a school resource officer in an action brought by an elementary school student under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and several state laws. The officer decided to handcuff the student for fighting with another student three days prior. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer's actions were not objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances where the student was a ten year old girl who was sitting calmly and compliantly in a closed office surrounded by three adults and was answering questions about the incident at issue. Although the officer used excessive force, the student's right not to be handcuffed under the circumstances was not clearly established at the time of her seizure. Therefore, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that there was insufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to conclude that the officer acted maliciously or with gross negligence when she handcuffed the student. View "E.W. v. Dolgos" on Justia Law

John attended a party, drank six beers, then proceeded to a bar and drank more beer and alcohol. He left the bar in the early morning, sufficiently intoxicated that he cannot remember what happened for the remainder of the night. Based on text messages he later found on his cellphone, John knows that he called Jane. The two had engaged in several prior physical encounters. Jane, who had also been drinking, joined John in his bed. According to Jane’s subsequent statement, the two engaged in some consensual sexual acts, but Jane stopped consenting and John continued to engage in non-consensual sexual acts. John was found responsible for violating Miami University’s sexual assault policy and was suspended for four months. John sued Jane, Miami University, and individual University employees. John and Jane reached a settlement. The court dismissed John’s remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of John’s Title IX hostile-environment claim, Title IX deliberate-indifference claim, and 42 U.S.C. 1983 substantive-due-process claim. The court reversed, in part, finding that John sufficiently pleaded procedural-due-process and equal protection claims against one employee based on the claims that she was not an impartial adjudicator and did not fully disclose the evidence against him. The court also reversed a finding of qualified immunity as to that employee and held that John sufficiently pled his Title IX erroneous-outcome claim. View "Doe v. Miami University" on Justia Law

John attended a party, drank six beers, then proceeded to a bar and drank more beer and alcohol. He left the bar in the early morning, sufficiently intoxicated that he cannot remember what happened for the remainder of the night. Based on text messages he later found on his cellphone, John knows that he called Jane. The two had engaged in several prior physical encounters. Jane, who had also been drinking, joined John in his bed. According to Jane’s subsequent statement, the two engaged in some consensual sexual acts, but Jane stopped consenting and John continued to engage in non-consensual sexual acts. John was found responsible for violating Miami University’s sexual assault policy and was suspended for four months. John sued Jane, Miami University, and individual University employees. John and Jane reached a settlement. The court dismissed John’s remaining claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of John’s Title IX hostile-environment claim, Title IX deliberate-indifference claim, and 42 U.S.C. 1983 substantive-due-process claim. The court reversed, in part, finding that John sufficiently pleaded procedural-due-process and equal protection claims against one employee based on the claims that she was not an impartial adjudicator and did not fully disclose the evidence against him. The court also reversed a finding of qualified immunity as to that employee and held that John sufficiently pled his Title IX erroneous-outcome claim. View "Doe v. Miami University" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of unitary status in the area of faculty and staff employment per a consent decree to monitor the school district's efforts to desegregate its school system. The court held that the school district complied with the consent decree in good faith and intervenors failed to show otherwise. The court also agreed with the district court that the school district has eliminated the vestiges of de jure discrimination in employment. View "United States v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and attorney's fees in favor of plaintiffs in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action challenging a public school's policies. The policies prohibited, among other things, picketing on school district property, and prohibited strikers from coming onto school grounds, even for reasons unrelated to an anticipated teachers' strike. Plaintiffs also filed state law claims. The panel held that the government speech doctrine did not authorize the government's suppression of contrary views. In this case, no reasonable observer would have misperceived the speech which the school district sought to suppress—speech favoring the teachers' side in the strike—as a position taken by the school district itself. The panel also held that, because the school district's policies were neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral, they failed even the non-public forum test and thus violated the First Amendment rights of Union members. Furthermore, the policies violated rights of Union members under the Oregon Constitution, and the school district was properly held liable for the actions of its security officer in barring Plaintiff Boyer from the school parking lot because she had a sign on the back windshield of her car supporting the teachers. View "Eagle Point Education Association v. Jackson County School District No. 9" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the superintendent of the school district under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, after their son committed suicide, alleging that the school had discriminated against their son on the basis of disability by failing to adequately protect him from being bullied by other students. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant, holding that there was nothing in the record to establish that school officials knew of any specific instance of bullying before the son's death, aside from an October 7 altercation, which the school district responded to immediately and there were no further issues. Even crediting the evidence discovered after the son's death that he was being harassed at school, there was no evidence that the school district knew or even should have known about it. The court further held that, even under the deliberate indifference standard, plaintiffs failed to meet the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). Finally, there was no authority for plaintiffs' claim that a school district can discriminate against a disabled student in violation of Section 504 after his death by failing to investigate harassment that might have occurred before he died. View "Barnwell v. Watson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400–1482, alleging that the School Board's refusal to include the desired therapy in their children's Individual Education Plan (IEP) reflected its predetermined policy of never including any Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA)-based method or strategy in a child's IEP. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the policy because it was not applied to them. The court explained that, although plaintiffs could claim to suffer injury because the School Board did not adopt the specific ABA services they were requesting, such a claim was not a cognizable injury in fact under the procedural prong of Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982), because the children's IEPs included an ABA-based service. View "L.M.P. v. School Board of Broward County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of first-degree murder and sentencing him to life imprisonment.On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court (1) violated his Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination by refusing to admit evidence that Defendant passed a polygraph examination for the purpose of impeaching another witness’s testimony; and (2) improperly admitted character evidence used against him. The Supreme Court held (1) South Dakota’s per se rule against admitting polygraph-test results does not violate the Sixth Amendment, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Defendant’s polygraph evidence; and (2) the circuit court did not err by admitting evidence of Defendant’s sexual liaisons with three other women in the days leading up to the victim’s death. View "State v. Bertram" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, challenging on First Amendment grounds, a school uniform policy that required their two minor children to wear shirts or sweatshirts with a logo consisting of the name of the school, a stylized picture of a gopher (the school mascot), and the motto "Tomorrow’s Leaders." Given the failure of the Ninth Circuit's en banc call, the panel held that the uniform policy—both the motto requirement and the exemption—violated the First Amendment. The panel reasoned that there can hardly be interests more compelling than fostering children's educational achievement and providing a safe and supportive educational environment. However, requiring students to display the motto "Tomorrow's Leaders" on their uniforms was not narrowly tailored to serve those interests. The panel held that the Individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the applicable law was not sufficiently clear to put them on notice that the uniform policy would violate the First Amendment. However, because the Institutional Defendants were not individuals, they were not protected by qualified immunity. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Frudden v. Pilling" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants in an action alleging that plaintiff's suspension, investigation, and recommendation of dismissal from his job as a high school teacher were in retaliation for his political speech. The court held that the school board was not subject to municipal liability and defendant was unable to present a prima facie case against the remaining defendants. In this case, the school and its administrators were investigating and taking disciplinary action for the legitimately inappropriate behavior to which plaintiff has admitted. View "Penley v. McDowell County Board of Education" on Justia Law