Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Health Department issued a resolution closing every school in the county—public, private, and parochial—for grades 7-12, effective December 4, to slow the spread of COVID-19. In the same county, gyms, tanning salons, office buildings, and a large casino remained open. Christian schools filed suit, arguing that the closure of their schools amounts to a prohibition of religious exercise in violation of the First Amendment.The Sixth Circuit, applying strict scrutiny, enjoined enforcement pending appeal, concluding that the closure burdens the plaintiffs' religious practices. The court noted that the schools employed “strict social distancing and hygiene standards” and that “little in-school transmission has been documented.” The court acknowledged that the resolution allowed schools to open for religious education classes or religious ceremonies and that the Department has not targeted the plaintiffs or acted with animus toward religion. The plaintiffs argued that the exercise of their faith is not compartmentalized and pervades each day of in-person schooling so that “a communal in-person environment” is critical to the exercise of their faith. The resolution treats the schools less favorably than it does “comparable secular facilities.” The court rejected an argument that it could consider only the secular actors (other schools) regulated by the resolution. The relevant inquiry is whether the “government, in pursuit of legitimate interests,” has imposed greater burdens on religious conduct than on analogous secular conduct, including gyms, salons, offices, and the Hollywood Casino, which remain open. View "Monclova Christian Academy v. Toledo-Lucas County. Health Department" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an elementary school student who has attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and severe, disability-related behavioral issues, filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) alleging that the school district denied him equal access to a public education because of his disability. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim through the administrative procedures prescribed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), as required when a plaintiff seeks relief under other federal statutes for the denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE).The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and held that a close review of plaintiff's allegations reveals that the gravamen of his ADA claim is discrimination separate from his right to a FAPE. Therefore, the panel concluded that plaintiff's ADA claim is not subject to IDEA exhaustion. Finally, the panel concluded that there is nothing untoward—or inconsistent with Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017)—in plaintiff's having followed resolution of his IDEA claims with a lawsuit alleging non-FAPE-based violations of another statute. View "D. D. v. Los Angeles Unified School District" on Justia Law

After the school districts sought modification of existing desegregation consent decrees to allow their exemption from Arkansas's Public School Choice Act, Ark. Code. Ann. 6–18–1906, the district court granted the motions and modified the consent decrees to explicitly limit the transfer of students between school districts. The Department appealed, alleging that the modification imposed an impermissible interdistrict remedy.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was a substantial change in Arkansas law after the consent decrees were enacted and the district court's modification was not an impermissible interdistrict remedy. The court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering and crediting evidence of white flight when it determined that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred warranting modification of the consent decrees. Furthermore, based on the court's review of the record and the large degree of deference given to the district court, the court could not find that the district court abused its discretion in modifying the consent decrees. View "United States v. Arkansas Department of Education" on Justia Law

Gabriel Taye, an eight-year-old Carson Elementary student, tied a necktie to his bunk bed and hung himself. Two days earlier, another Carson student attacked Taye in a school bathroom, knocking Taye unconscious for more than seven minutes. The incident was one of 12 "bullying" incidents spanning from Taye’s first-grade year at Carson until his death. The Plaintiffs allege that the then-principal and assistant principal (Jackson and McKenzie) misrepresented the severity of and outright concealed several bullying incidents involving Taye. The Plaintiffs uncovered information about these incidents after Taye’s death. The Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, also alleging state law tort claims of wrongful death, intentional infliction of serious emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium, failure to report child abuse, and spoliation.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Jackson and McKenzie’s motion to dismiss. The Plaintiffs’ amended complaint sufficiently alleges that Jackson and McKenzie behaved recklessly; they are not entitled to governmental immunity under Ohio law. Jackson and McKenzie knew the full extent to which Taye was subjected to aggression and violence by his classmates. They had video footage of several of the violent incidents Taye experienced at school. Carson's behavior logs also document other routine aggressive and violent behavior among the student population. View "Meyers v. Cincinnati Board of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of Plaintiffs on their Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against a school district for student-on-student harassment and remanded for further findings on the Title IX claim, holding that the district court erred by concluding that Plaintiffs established each of the elements on the section 1983 claim.Plaintiffs, two students and their parents, brought these claims for harassment after two sixth-graders targeted the students with sexual slurs, other insults, and physical assaults. After a bench trial, the district court found for Plaintiffs on both their Title IX and section 1983 claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Title IX's protections against sex-based discrimination extend to prohibit discrimination against homosexual and transgender individuals and discrimination based on perceived sexual orientation; (2) the district court properly found that the harassment in this case was "on the basis of sex for purposes of Title IX; (3) remand was required for further findings on the Title IX claim; and (4) the district court erred in relying solely on the violation of state law to satisfy "deliberate indifference," an essential element of both the Title IX and section 1983 claims. View "Clark County School District v. Bryan" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District and three individual school officials in an action brought by a student, alleging claims of sexual abuse and harassment by a teacher and coach, Johnna Feazell.Where, as here, a complaint involves allegations against school officials brought under both Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983, this court has held that an official in these circumstances must have actual notice of the alleged sexual harassment or sexual abuse by a school employee to meet the standard for liability. In this case, a searching review of the summary judgment record reveals no evidence to indicate school officials had actual notice of sexual harassment or abuse by Feazell prior to the events at issue. Rather, when plaintiff's mother met with the school principal with the cell phone containing text messages evidencing a sexual relationship between plaintiff and Feazell, school officials took immediate action by contacting law enforcement and placing Feazell on administrative leave. Therefore, the district court did not improperly weigh the evidence and the summary judgment record established that no genuine dispute exists as to whether the District or any school official had actual notice of sexual abuse or harassment prior to October 13, 2014. View "KC v. Mayo" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was found to have violated the University's policies prohibiting sexual harassment and stalking on the basis of sex, and was suspended for two years, he filed suit against the Curators of the University and four individual Title IX investigators.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to compel and the district court's discovery ruling did not prevent plaintiff from adequately opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment; summary judgment on the Title VI claim was appropriate because plaintiff failed to present evidence that his proffered comparators, including the two white students mentioned, were graduate students and thus similarly situated to him in all relevant respects; summary judgment on plaintiff's void for vagueness claim was appropriate because the University's policies provide adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited and the individual defendant's inability to agree on the exact scope of prohibited conduct or the definition of words in the policies does not mean the policies are subject to arbitrary enforcement; summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim was appropriate in its entirety; dismissal of the substantial overbreadth claim was appropriate where plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the University's policies against sexual harassment and stalking have a real and substantial effect on protected speech; dismissal of the sex discrimination under Title IX claim was appropriate where the complaint fails to plausibly allege that the investigation reached an outcome against the weight of the evidence or allege any additional facts suggesting bias based on his sex; and dismissal of the discrimination claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) were appropriate where plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for sex discrimination for reasons similar to his Title IX claims. Finally, although the court believed that it was error for the district court to dismiss the state law race discrimination claim, the error was harmless in light of the court's conclusion. View "Rowles v. Curators of the University of Missouri" on Justia Law

Williams, a Chicago school social worker, suffers from depression, anxiety, and chronic sinusitis. For the 2013–14 school year, Williams received an evaluation score that placed him in the “developing” category, and was given a Professional Development Plan. Social workers' hours depend on the school they are serving on a particular day. The Board denied Williams's first accommodation request, for consistent work hours. During the 2014–15 school year, Williams was cited for interrupting a teacher, failing to read a student’s individual educational plan before a meeting, speaking inappropriately about his personal life, making personal calls during school hours, and failing to report to work. Williams was twice denied titles that may be awarded to “proficient” social workers. Williams filed a discrimination charge and another accommodation request, seeking a consistent start time, a reduced caseload, and assignment to a single school. The Board denied these requests but assigned him to schools with 7:45 a.m. start times. Williams's third accommodation request sought a private office, dedicated equipment, and exemption from evaluations. The Board supplied Williams with HEPA filters, computer monitors, and access to a private meeting space; it denied his other requests. Williams was not selected for special assessment teams because he did not have the “proficient” rating and was not bilingual. He filed his second charge of discrimination.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, rejecting claims that the Board discriminated against Williams because of his disability and gender, failed to accommodate his disability, and retaliated against him for filing discrimination claims. View "Williams v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

On November 18, 2020, in response to a surge in COVID-19 cases, Kentucky Governor Beshear issued Executive Order 2020-969, prohibiting in-person instruction at all public and private elementary and secondary schools; elementary schools may, under certain circumstances, reopen for in-person instruction between December 7 and January 4, 2021; middle and high schools may reopen for in-person instruction no sooner than January 4, 2021. The order exempts “small group in-person targeted services” and “private schools conducted in a home solely for members of that household,” and exempts, by omission, preschools and colleges or universities. Kentucky “leads the nation in children living with relatives other than their parents – including grandparents and great-grandparents, who are especially vulnerable” and have high rates of comorbidities that can lead to severe cases of COVID-19, including heart and lung conditions.”In a challenge under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and the Kentucky Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the district court enjoined the Governor from enforcing the order against any private, religious school that otherwise adheres to Kentucky public health measures. The Sixth Circuit granted the Governor’s motion to stay the order pending appeal, stating that the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise claim. The order is neutral and of general applicability. The court distinguished recent Supreme Court rulings concerning religious institutions. View "Danville Christian Academy Inc. v. Beshear" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without prejudice of T.B.'s discrimination claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The court held, on the record before it, that T.B. seeks redress for denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and thus, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), he was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this claim to the district court. Because he has failed to do so, his complaint was properly dismissed. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying T.B.'s motion to reconsider or request to amend. View "T. B. v. Northwest Independent School District" on Justia Law