Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a Professor of Psychology at the University of Oregon, filed suit against the University, alleging claims under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, Title IX, and Oregon law. Plaintiff claims that there is a gender disparity in pay that is department wide and is caused by the University's practice of granting "retention raises" to faculty as an incentive to remain at the University when they are being courted by other academic institutions. Plaintiff also alleges that female professors at the University are less likely to engage in retention negotiations than male professors, and when they do, they are less likely to successfully obtain a raise. The district court granted summary judgment for the University on all counts.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Equal Pay Act claim because a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff and her comparators did substantially equal work. Furthermore, plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact under Oregon Revised Statute 652.220 for the same reasons she has done so under the Equal Pay Act. The panel also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Title VII disparate impact claim where there is at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate impact. However, plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment because equity raises and retention raises are not comparable and the panel could not say that plaintiff's comparators were treated "more favorably" than was plaintiff in this context. Consequently, summary judgment was also proper on plaintiff's claim under Oregon Revised Statute 659A.030. The panel also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's Title IX claim and state constitutional claim. View "Freyd v. University of Oregon" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint challenging Missouri's form to claim a religious exemption from mandatory immunizations for school children, as violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs, children enrolled or seeking to reenroll in Missouri public schools, have sincere religious objections to immunization. After plaintiffs refused to fill out Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services Form 11, plaintiffs were disenrolled from school until they filed the form. Plaintiffs claimed that the form and the text of the form regarding "vaccine education" violated their rights to free speech, free religious exercise, and equal protection.The court held that Form II does not compel speech, restrict speech, or incidentally burden speech, and thus does not violate plaintiffs' free speech rights; does not require plaintiffs to engage in conduct against their religious beliefs; and does not make plaintiffs morally complicit in the production or use of vaccinations. Rather, Form 11 communicates neutrally to anyone considering opting out on religious grounds that the government discourages it, but the ultimate decision belongs to the parents. The panel explained that the form states the government's neutral and generally applicable position that immunization prevents childhood diseases, and thus should be required for school attendance. The court also held that plaintiffs failed to plead specific facts about forced immunization education, and that Form 11 does not target religious believers or violate their right to equal protection. Finally, the court held that plaintiffs have not stated a hybrid rights claim that requires strict scrutiny. View "B.W.C. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit on behalf of herself and her minor child, alleging that Principal Foster infringed on the child's First Amendment right to free speech when Foster determined that the child's fourth grade essay regarding the topic of LGBTQ equality was not age-appropriate and should not be included in the class's essay booklet.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that Foster's conduct was a proper exercise of the authority possessed by school officials to regulate school-sponsored student speech, and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The court explained that the allegations underlying appellant's amended complaint, even if true, do not substantiate a violation of the child's constitutional rights. Applying Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), the court concluded that Foster's regulation of the child's speech was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns because Foster's refusal to include the child's essay in the fourth grade class's essay booklet was actuated at least in part by her concern that the essay's topic was "not age-appropriate" for fourth graders. Furthermore, even assuming, without deciding, that school officials' restrictions on school-sponsored student speech must be viewpoint neutral, the court concluded that appellant has not plausibly alleged that Foster's restriction on the child's speech violated that principle. Finally, although the district court did not comply with procedural requirements before sua sponte dismissing appellant's constitutional claim against the school district, the court concluded that the district court's failure to give appellant these procedural protections does not necessitate reversal because she was not prejudiced by the result. In this case, appellant cannot plausibly demonstrate that a constitutional violation occurred. View "Robertson v. Anderson Mill Elementary School" on Justia Law

John Doe was expelled from the Michigan State University College of Human Medicine (CHM) for allegedly sexually assaulting two women, Roe 1 and Roe 2, on the night of the school’s formal dance. An outside consultant had determined that the evidence supported a finding that Doe had sexually assaulted the women. CHM convened a panel, which affirmed those findings without an in-person hearing. While this process was ongoing, the Sixth Circuit held that universities must offer an in-person hearing with cross-examination in cases where the fact-finder’s determination depends on witness credibility.CHM then gave Doe an in-person hearing, conducted over the course of three days before a Resolution Officer selected by the university. Doe was permitted to testify and, through his attorney, to cross-examine Roe 1 and Roe 2. The Resolution Officer did not require Roe 1 to answer every question that Doe’s attorney posed. Both Doe and his attorney were present throughout the entire hearing. After considering the credibility of the witnesses, the Resolution Officer again found that the evidence supported a finding that Doe had sexually assaulted the women.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s suit alleging violations of the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title IX. Doe received ample due process throughout the course of his three-day hearing. View "Doe v. Michigan State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota alleging retaliation and sex discrimination under Title IX. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the University violated Title IX by (1) retaliating against her for supporting a former coach in a sexual harassment investigation by not allowing her to redshirt; and (2) discriminating against her on the basis of sex.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the University's motion to dismiss because plaintiff did not have an actionable claim for retaliation under Title IX and she failed to show that she was treated differently because of her sex. In this case, plaintiff failed to allege that she engaged in a protected activity, and no part of Title IX designates participation in a sexual harassment investigation on the side of the accused as protected activity. In regard to plaintiff's claim that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex when she was denied the right to redshirt, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to support a claim of sex discrimination in violation of Title IX. View "Du Bois v. The Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota" on Justia Law

On September 28, 2018, Cheli, a computer system administrative assistant for the District, since 2014, was taken into a meeting with about 25 minutes’ notice. The District’s superintendent and Director of Computer Services terminated Cheli because a female student had alleged that Cheli had sexually harassed her three weeks prior. Cheli denied the allegations. The Board retroactively memorialized Cheli’s termination on October 9, 2018. Cheli never received notice of the Board meeting and did not receive written notice of the charges or the evidence against him but received a notice of termination via certified mail stating that “[t]he basis or grounds for discharge include incompetence.” That notice informed Cheli that he could request the written report. The District did not provide the report upon Cheli’s request.A collective bargaining agreement governed Cheli’s employment and provides for discipline for reasonable cause. An employee is entitled to a conference, attended by a representative of his choice, and a written explanation for the discipline. The District’s Policy Manual, however, contains a provision titled “Employment At-Will.”Cheli sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the defendants violated his procedural due process rights. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. The collective bargaining agreement established that Cheli could not be terminated except “for reasonable cause,” which created a protected property interest for which he was entitled to due process View "Cheli v. Taylorville Community School District" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that plaintiffs will likely succeed in showing that, as applied, the Dual Enrollment Program's "publicly funded" requirement violated their rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. In this case, A.H., her parents, and the Diocese filed suit against the Agency of Education after A.H.'s application for public funding to the program was denied solely because of her school's religious status.The court concluded that, in these circumstances, the State's reliance on the "publicly funded" requirement as a condition for program eligibility imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion, because it forced Rice Memorial High School, a ministry of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Burlington, to chose whether to participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain a religious institution. At the same time, the requirement puts A.H.'s family to a choice between sending their child to a religious school or receiving benefits. In light of Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017), the court explained that the denial of a generally available benefit solely on account of religious identity can be justified only by a state interest of the highest order. In this case, the Agency has not identified any compelling interest that could survive strict scrutiny. The court also concluded that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favor a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment and granted the motion for a preliminary injunction. View "A.H. v. French" on Justia Law

After the University terminated her employment as the head coach of the women's basketball team, plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as well as state-law claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and invasion of privacy.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment as to the breach of contract and Title IX claims. The court concluded that judgment in favor of plaintiff on the breach of contract claim was proper where a reasonable jury could have concluded that plaintiff's management of funds did not give the University cause to terminate her employment. Furthermore, the University was not entitled to a new trial on plaintiff's breach of contract claim. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to provide the requested jury instruction and any error on the district court's part was harmless. In regard to the Title IX claim, the court concluded that denial of plaintiff's jury instruction was not an abuse of discretion or grounds for a new trial. However, the court reversed the district court's judgment as to the privacy claim and concluded that it failed as a matter of law. The court explained that the facts disclosed by the University were of legitimate concern to the public and the district court clearly erred in concluding otherwise. View "Taylor-Travis v. Jackson State University" on Justia Law

The Rockland County, New York school district is 65.7% white, 19.1% black, 10.7% Latino, and 3.3% Asian. In 2017-2018, 8,843 students attended public schools, while 29,279 students attended private schools, primarily Jewish yeshivas; 92% of public school students are black or Latino, while 98% of private-school students are white. School board candidates run for a specific seat in at-large elections; all eligible district voters vote in each race. Influential members of the private-school community have an informal slating process by which Board candidates are selected and promoted. An Orthodox Rabbi controls a slating organization that has secured victory for the white community’s preferred candidate in each contested election. Although the Organization has slated some successful minority candidates, minority voters did not prefer these candidates. Only those with connections to the Organization have been selected. When vetted, candidates were not asked about their policy views.The Second Circuit affirmed that the election system resulted in dilution of black and Latino votes, violating the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. 10301. The Act does not require a finding that racial motivations caused election results. The court properly relied on expert findings, that used data derived through Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding rather than the traditional Citizen Voting Age Population data. The totality of the circumstances supports a finding of impermissible vote dilution, given the near-perfect correlation between race and school-type; the scant evidence that policy preferences caused election results; the blatant neglect of minority needs; the lack of minority-preferred election success; the white-dominated slating organization; and the District's bad faith throughout the litigation. View "Clerveaux v. East Ramapo Central School District" on Justia Law

Kellogg testified that when the Indiana Academy hired her as a teacher in 2006, its director, Dr. Williams, told her that she “didn’t need any more [starting salary, $32,000], because he knew [her] husband worked.” In 2017, Kellogg complained to the Dean of Ball State’s Teacher’s College, which oversees the Academy, that she received less pay than her similarly-situated male colleagues. The Dean responded that “[t]he issue [wa]s salary compression, which means those who [we]re hired after [Kellogg] began at a higher salary.” The Dean also noted that Kellogg’s salary increased by 36.45% during her time at the Academy while her colleagues’ salaries increased by less. In Kellogg’s 2018 lawsuit, the district court granted the Academy summary judgment, reasoning that there were undisputed gender-neutral explanations for Kellogg’s pay.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Williams’s statement contradicts the Academy’s explanations for Kellogg’s pay and puts them in dispute. It does not matter that Williams uttered the statement long ago, outside the statute of limitations period. Under the paycheck accrual rule, Williams’s statement can establish liability because it affected paychecks that Kellogg received within the limitations window. Kellogg can rely on Williams’s statement to put the Academy’s explanations in dispute. View "Kellogg v. Ball State University" on Justia Law