Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, ten former University of Minnesota football players, appealed the dismissal of their Amended Complaint against the University and two University officials, asserting a variety of claims arising out of the University’s investigation of a complaint of sexual assault and harassment by another student, Jane Doe. Plaintiffs are African-American males who alleged that the University targeted them on the basis of their sex and race and unfairly punished them in response to Jane's accusations. The district court dismissed all claims.The Eighth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' complaint alleged a number of circumstances which, taken together, are sufficient to support a plausible claim that the University discriminated against plaintiffs on the basis of sex. In this case, plaintiffs alleged that the University was biased against them because of external pressures from the campus community and the federal government, and plaintiffs alleged historical facts that reinforce the inference of bias in this specific proceeding. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' Title IX discrimination claims.The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Title IX claims for retaliation where plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that their request for a Student Sexual Misconduct Subcommittee hearing was tantamount to a complaint of sex discrimination, and even if a request for a hearing made by a person accused of sexual misconduct could amount to protected activity, the Amended Complaint did not plausibly plead prima facie retaliation claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the race discrimination claims where the Amended Complaint did not plausibly allege a comparator similarly situated to plaintiffs in all relevant aspects; affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' due process claims where plaintiffs failed to exhaust the existing procedures for appealing the University's disciplinary decision and failed to allege prehearing deprivations or deprivation of protected property or liberty interests in violation of due process; and affirmed the dismissal of the contract and negligence claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds. View "John Does 1-2 v. Regents of the University of Minnesota" on Justia Law

Doe became a TCNJ tenure-track Assistant Professor in 2016, after giving birth to her third child. She alleges that the Dean and the Department Chair suggested that they were relieved that she would not need pregnancy-related accommodations in the future. Doe received positive reviews for 2017. Doe claims that after she became pregnant again, she was reassigned to a less desirable class. After Doe had her fourth child, the Dean, the Chair, and others, repeatedly asked whether she was done having children. She notified TCNJ that she was pregnant again. In 2018, a TCNJ professor attended the same class that the professor had positively reviewed in 2017 but entered a negative review; Doe claims there were no material changes. The Chair reported “non-material deficiencies” after having given her a positive review in 2017. Doe complained to the Provost, who allegedly “placed a record of discipline” in Doe’s personnel file for the Reappointment Committee. She claims she “suffered emotional trauma, became depressed, and had a miscarriage,” and that she was falsely accused of canceling classes, supported by “doctored” student comments. Doe was not reappointed.She filed suit, alleging gender, national origin, and pregnancy discrimination, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of her motion to proceed anonymously. Doe’s case does not merit appellate review under the collateral order doctrine. Nothing indicated that Doe’s interest in anonymity outweighs the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings. View "Doe v. The College of New Jersey" on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Plaintiff's motion for an injunction preventing the implementation of a plan promulgated by the Boston Public Schools for admitting students to Boston Latin School, Boston Latin Academy, and John D. O'Bryant School of Mathematics and Science for the 2021-2022 school year, holding that Plaintiff did not show it was not entitled to the injunction.Plaintiff, a corporation acting on behalf of fourteen parents and children residing in Boston, asserted that the 2021-2022 admissions plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 76, 5. The district court entered judgment in Defendants' favor. Plaintiff appealed and moved for an order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d) enjoining Defendants from implementing the plan during the pendency of this appeal. The First Circuit denied the motion, holding that Plaintiff failed to show a strong likelihood that it would prevail on the merits. View "Boston Parent Coalition for Academic Excellence Corp. v. School Committee of City of Boston" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title IX claim against the Visitors of Virginia State University and his Fourteenth Amendment claims against a university administrator. Plaintiff's claims arose from an altercation with a former girlfriend in a VSU dormitory.The court adopted the Seventh Circuit's approach, which closely tracks the text of Title IX, asking merely "do the alleged facts, if true, raise a plausible inference that the university discriminated against [the student] on the basis of sex?" By adopting this approach, the court merely emphasized that the text of Title IX prohibits all discrimination on the basis of sex. The court clarified that inherent in this approach is a requirement that a Title IX plaintiff adequately plead causation—that is, a causal link between the student’s sex and the university’s challenged disciplinary proceeding. The court concluded that plaintiff's Title IX claim was properly dismissed where there is no plausible inference that plaintiff's gender was the but-for cause of his treatment under VSU's disciplinary proceedings. Likewise, plaintiff's equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 fails for largely the same reasons. In regard to plaintiff's due process claim under section 1983, the court concluded that the administrator is entitled to qualified immunity because there was no clearly established right to continued enrollment in higher education. View "Sheppard v. Visitors of Virginia State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the college, alleging that it mishandled the sexual misconduct disciplinary process and committed other acts of deliberate indifference in the wake of the first of two assaults. Plaintiff seeks relief under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Minnesota common law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the college on all of plaintiff's claims. In regard to the Title IX claim, the court concluded that, on the record, it cannot say that a reasonable jury would conclude that the college's response to the sexual assault by Student One amounted to deliberate indifference. Although the court noted that the college could have been more inclusive during the sexual assault complaint and more attentive to plaintiff in the aftermath, the court agreed with the district court that permitting a meeting between plaintiff and Student One to take place, after the sexual assault proceedings had concluded, was not an act of deliberate indifference. Even if it was, it is far from clear that requiring plaintiff to attend the meeting would have violated Title IX. The court also concluded that, even assuming that track posters of Student One on campus qualify as sexual harassment for purposes of Title IX liability, the record evidence fails to support a finding that not removing the posters amounted to deliberate indifference. Finally, the evidence does not show that the college's conduct in the wake of plaintiff's complaint concerning Student Two was clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. In regard to the ADA and Section 504 claims, the court concluded that nothing in the record suggests that the college denied plaintiff reasonable accommodations as she endeavored to finish her degree while struggling with challenges to her mental health brought on by the sexual assaults. View "Shank v. Carleton College" on Justia Law

Meriwether, a Shawnee State University professor, is a devout Christian. In 2016, Shawnee told faculty to refer to students by their preferred pronouns. Meriwether’s department chair was dismissive of Meriwether’s concerns and religious beliefs. In 2018, Meriwether called on “Doe,” saying "Yes, sir." According to Meriwether, “no one . . . would have assumed that [Doe] was female.” Doe demanded that Meriwether “refer to [Doe] as a woman.” Meriwether believed that his sincerely-held religious beliefs prevented him from communicating messages about gender identity that he believes to be false. Doe became threatening. Meriwether reported the incident. Meriwether was advised to “eliminate all sex-based references.” Meriwether later accidentally referred to Doe as “Mr.” before immediately correcting himself. Doe again complained. Meriwether subsequently used only Doe’s last name, and awarded Doe a high grade. Meriwether continued to seek accommodation of his religious views; Shawnee would not compromise. The Title IX office concluded that Meriwether created a hostile environment without mentioning Meriwether’s religious beliefs. Shawnee placed a warning in Meriwether’s file. The faculty union filed an unsuccessful grievance.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Meriwether’s suit. Meriwether has plausibly alleged that Shawnee violated his First Amendment rights by compelling his speech or silence and casting a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. Meriwether was speaking on a matter of public concern; Shawnee’s interest in punishing Meriwether’s speech is comparatively weak. Shawnee exhibited hostility to his religious beliefs and irregularities in its adjudication and investigation processes permit a plausible inference of non-neutrality. View "Meriwether v. Hartop" on Justia Law

Business Leaders in Christ filed suit against the University and others, alleging that the University defendants violated its First Amendment rights through the application of the University's Policy on Human Rights. This action arose from the University's investigation of Business Leaders' refusal to allow a gay member to become an officer in the religious organization. The district court held that the University defendants violated Business Leaders' First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion; granted Business Leaders permanent injunctive relief and thus prohibited the University defendants from enforcing the Policy against Business Leaders under certain conditions; but granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' money damages claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' free-speech and expressive-association claims. In this case, the law was clearly established at the time the individual defendants acted that the University's recognition of registered student organizations constituted a limited public forum, that the university may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in a limited public forum, and that Business Leaders had a right not to be subjected to viewpoint discrimination while speaking in the University's limited public forum. However, the district court correctly granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' free-exercise claim, because the law was not clearly established at the time that the individual defendants' violated Business Leaders' free-exercise rights. View "Business Leaders In Christ v. The University of Iowa" on Justia Law

More than two years after being denied tenure at Columbia College of Chicago, Monroe sued the College, citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, for being subject to race discrimination in a federally-funded program or activity. The statute does not specify a limitations period.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the suit as untimely. Monroe argued that the correct period is the Illinois five-year catch-all limitations period for civil claims, while the College cited the two-year period for personal injuries. The court noted that other Circuits have emphasized that a Title VI claim, although aimed at the discriminatory use of federal funds, is one that ultimately seeks to vindicate personal rights, “closely analogous to [42 U.S.C.] sections 1983 and 1981.” Title VI specifically refers to discrimination against a “person” and should be governed by the limitations period that a state has specified for personal injury claims. View "Monroe v. Columbia College Chicago" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the school district in an action brought by plaintiff, a former high school football coach, alleging violation of his rights under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when the school district prohibited him from praying at the end of football games while kneeling on the fifty-yard line, surrounded by players and occasionally community members.The panel held that the school district's allowance of plaintiff's conduct would violate the Establishment Clause and thus the school district's efforts to prevent the conduct did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights nor his rights under Title VII. The panel rejected plaintiff's free speech and free exercise claims, concluding that the record before it and binding Supreme Court precedent compel the conclusion that the school district would have violated the Establishment Clause by allowing plaintiff to pray at the conclusion of football games, in the center of the field, with students who felt pressured to join him. Furthermore, plaintiff's attempts to draw nationwide attention to his challenge to the school district compels the conclusion that he was not engaging in private prayer, but was instead engaging in public speech of an overtly religious nature while performing his job duties. In this case, the school district tried to reach an accommodation for plaintiff, but that was spurned by his insisting that he be allowed to pray immediately after the conclusion of each game, likely surrounded by students who felt pressured to join him.The panel also concluded that plaintiff's Title VII claims alleging failure to rehire, disparate treatment, failure to accommodate and retaliation failed. The panel explained that plaintiff did not show that he was adequately performing his job; plaintiff's conduct is clearly dissimilar to the other personal activities of assistant coaches he cites and thus he cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate treatment; the school district could not reasonably accommodate plaintiff's practice without undue hardship; and the school district had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment actions. View "Kennedy v. Bremerton School District" on Justia Law

After police officers interrogated L.G. at her high school, she filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the school resource officer had unconstitutionally seized her by escorting her to the office for questioning. Once L.G. was in the office, defendant left her alone with the officers and closed the door.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order rejecting defendant's request for qualified immunity and remanded with directions to dismiss the section 1983 claim against defendants. The court respectfully disagreed with the district court that it was clearly established that the school setting makes no difference for Fourth Amendment purposes when the seizure occurs at the behest of police. In this case, defendant's involvement in the alleged seizure was minimal and ministerial. Furthermore, the incident occurred in a public school setting where it would not necessarily be clear at what point a student has been unreasonably seized for constitutional purposes. Therefore, the court did not think existing circuit precedent, such as Stoner v. Watlingten, 735 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 2013), and Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987), would have alerted every reasonable officer in defendant's position that she was violating L.G.'s constitutional rights. The court also concluded that L.G. has not successfully demonstrated a robust consensus of persuasive authority that created a clearly established right, and this is not the rare case where a general constitutional rule applies with "obvious clarity." View "L.G. v. Edwards" on Justia Law