Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

UT instructor Tyger subjected Wamer, a UT student, to inappropriate touching, comments, and text messages and made inappropriate comments in class. Wamer contacted a UT faculty member; each submitted a complaint to UT’s Title IX Office. Wamer alleges that she was afraid of seeing Tyger on campus and of retribution and that UT stated it would pursue the investigation even if she did not come in for an interview. Three weeks later, UT closed its investigation, taking no action. About five months after the harassment began, a more senior faculty member reported Wamer’s allegations. UT then placed Tyger on paid leave and banned him from campus. Wamer alleges that Tyger then attempted to smear Wamer’s reputation. UT investigators found that Tyger had engaged in sexual misconduct.Wamer sued under Title IX, claiming that UT was deliberately indifferent to the initial reports of sexual harassment, which “unreasonably interfered with Wamer’s participation in and enjoyment of the benefits of UT’s educational programs and activities.” The district court dismissed, applying the elements of a deliberate-indifference claim used in cases of student-on-student harassment and finding Wamer did not allege that UT’s actions post-notice resulted in harassment or made her more vulnerable to further harassment.The Sixth Circuit reversed. A plaintiff can satisfy the causation requirement by showing that following the school’s unreasonable response, the plaintiff experienced an additional instance of harassment or that objectively reasonable fear of further harassment caused the plaintiff to take specific reasonable actions to avoid harassment, which deprived the plaintiff of educational opportunities available to other students. View "Wamer v. University of Toledo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981, alleging that the school board discriminated against him on the basis of race in refusing to hire another teacher in the drama department to assist him with tech work in connection with his staging of student performances or, alternatively, in refusing to provide him with additional compensation for the tech work that he performs. Plaintiff also alleged that the school board discriminated against him on the basis of race when compensating him for his "extra-duty" work in connection with other events at the high school.The Fourth Circuit concluded that plaintiff failed to allege plausibly that the school board's failure to pay him a Theater Technical Director Supplement constituted race-based employment discrimination. While the court agreed that it was error for the district court to consult the School of the Arts' website in determining whether the complaint properly alleged that the School of the Arts was an appropriate comparator, the court concluded that the error was harmless. The court also concluded that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict for plaintiff on his discrimination claim based on the denial of assistance. Finally, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff did not provide a valid comparator for purposes of supporting this racial discrimination claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of a portion of the complaint for failing to state a claim. In regard to the remaining claims, the court granted the school board's motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff's failure to present sufficient evidence to support his claims. View "Tabb v. Board of Education of the Durham Public Schools" on Justia Law

A teacher smelled marijuana burning in the classroom and alerted Principal Stamps and Assistant Principal Byars, who searched the belongings of every student in the class. They found marijuana stems and seeds, rolling paper, lighters, and assorted pills in T.R.’s backpack. T.R. denied smoking marijuana in the classroom that day. T.R. contends that during a first search, in a room with only Stamps and Counselor Dean, she removed her clothing, lifted her breasts, and bent over for an inspection while a window in the office, leading to a public hallway, remained uncovered. School officials did not find any drugs on T.R.’s person. T.R. alleges that school officials later again directed her to remove her clothing and she submitted. T.R. stated that she was on her menstrual cycle, which made her feel “humiliated.” T.R.’s teacher found the remains of the marijuana cigarette under T.R.’s desk the next day.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court found that the school officials were entitled to qualified immunity and the Defendants’ conduct was not extreme and outrageous. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. To grant qualified immunity on these facts "would severely diminish the protections afforded students from strip searches" set out in Supreme Court precedent. Considering the degree of intrusiveness of the search and that school officials searched her twice, T.R.’s claim for outrage creates a sufficient question for the jury. View "T.R. v. Lamar County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Metropolitan State University of Denver (MSU) student Rowan Thompson had a classroom dispute with her chemistry professor that ultimately prompted Thompson to drop the professor’s class. But when Thompson emailed her former classmates to express her displeasure with the professor and to suggest that her classmates leave “honest” end-of-term evaluations. Thomas Ragland, MSU’s Associate Director for Student Conduct, allegedly prohibited Thompson from further contacting the professor or even discussing the professor with any students taking any of the professor’s classes. Thompson sued Ragland under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that he violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Ragland had not violated clearly established law and therefore was entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit disagreed and reversed. "Because one can infer from the allegations in the complaint that there was no proper justification for Ragland’s actions, the complaint states a violation of clearly established law governing the regulation of student speech." View "Thompson v. Ragland" on Justia Law

Nine parents of students with disabilities who attend South Carolina public schools and two disability advocacy organizations filed suit challenging a South Carolina provision in the South Carolina state budget that prohibits school districts from using appropriated funds to impose mask mandates. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the law's enforcement.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the parents and the disability advocacy organizations lack standing to sue the governor and the attorney general, and thus vacated the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction as to those defendants. In this case, although plaintiffs have alleged a nexus between their claimed injuries and the Proviso, they have not established that such injuries are fairly traceable to defendants' conduct or would be redressed by a favorable ruling against defendants. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss defendants from this case. View "Disability Rights South Carolina v. McMaster" on Justia Law

Brown, who suffered physical abuse at the hands of her former boyfriend and fellow University of Arizona student at his off-campus residence, brought a Title IX action, 20 U.S.C. 1681, against the University.The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the University. Title IX liability exists for student-on-student harassment when an educational institution exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs. The control-over-context requirement was not met based on Brown’s theory that the university had substantial control over the context of Brown’s former boyfriend’s abuse of other victims and failed to take proper action. The court rejected a theory that the boyfriend, a university football player, had to have university approval to live off-campus and his housing was paid for with scholarship funds that he received from the university. View "Brown v. State of Arizona" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the Arc of Iowa and Iowa parents whose children have serious disabilities that place them at heightened risk of severe injury or death from COVID-19, filed suit to enjoin enforcement of Iowa's law prohibiting mask requirements in schools. The district court concluded that the law violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, granting a preliminary injunction completely enjoining the law.After determining that it has jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit held that plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction because mask requirements are reasonable accommodations required by federal disability law to protect the rights of plaintiffs' children. However, the court concluded that the injunction imposed by the district court sweeps more broadly than necessary to remedy plaintiffs' injuries. Accordingly, the court vacated in part and remanded to allow the district court to enter a tailored injunction prohibiting defendants from preventing or delaying reasonable accommodations and ensures that plaintiffs' schools may provide such reasonable accommodations. View "The Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Doe, a Chinese national graduate student, alleged that UCLA violated Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), when it discriminated against him on the basis of sex in the course of a Title IX disciplinary proceeding instituted after a former student accused him of misconduct. Doe was just months away from completing his Ph.D. in chemistry/biochemistry when he was suspended for two years after a finding that he violated the University’s dating violence policy by placing Jane Roe “in fear of bodily injury.” Doe lost his housing, his job as a teaching assistant, and his student visa. The Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal of Doe’s suit. Doe stated a Title IX claim because the facts he alleged, if true, raised a plausible inference that the university discriminated against him on the basis of sex. Doe’s allegations of external pressures impacting how the university handled sexual misconduct complaints, an internal pattern and practice of bias in the University of California and at UCLA in particular, and specific instances of bias in Doe’s particular disciplinary case, when combined, raised a plausible inference of discrimination on the basis of sex sufficient to withstand dismissal. At "some point an accumulation of procedural irregularities all disfavoring a male respondent begins to look like a biased proceeding." View "Doe v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The Halls sued Millersville University under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, after their daughter, Karlie, was murdered in her dorm room by her boyfriend, Orrostieta. Orrostieta had previously been removed from campus at Karlie’s request and, on the night of the murder, a resident assistant heard Karlie scream but did not follow up. Despite finding genuine issues of material fact, the district court granted Millersville summary judgment, holding that Millersville lacked notice it could face liability under Title IX for the actions of a non-student guest.The Third Circuit reversed. Millersville had adequate notice it could be liable under Title IX for its deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment perpetrated by a non-student guest. Title IX’s plain terms notify federal funding recipients that they may face monetary liability for intentional violations of the statute; it is an intentional violation of Title IX’s terms for a funding recipient to act with deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment where the recipient exercises substantial control over the context in which the harassment occurs and the harasser, even if they are a third party. Millersville’s own Title IX policy thus contemplated Title IX liability could result from the actions of third parties such as “visitors” like Orrostieta. The court agreed that factual disputes preclude summary judgment. View "Hall v. Millersville University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Camille Sturdivant sued her former coach on a high school dance team, Carley Fine, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, and alleging race discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Fine moved for summary judgment, urging qualified immunity based on the absence of: (1) an act under color of state law; and (2) a denial of equal protection. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a reasonable factfinder could infer that Fine had acted as head coach and “intentionally deprived [Camille] of educational benefits based on [her] race.” Fine appealed, presenting two alternative arguments for qualified immunity: (1) She did not act under color of state law because she was no longer employed as the head coach when she allegedly violated Camille’s rights; and (2) She did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. The Tenth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider Fines first argument; the Court's jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal did not extend to the applicability of section 1983. Thus, this portion of the appeal was dismissed. The Court did have jurisdiction on Fine's section argument, and found that a reasonable factfinder could find the violation of a clearly established right to equal protection. So the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "Sturdivant v. Fine, et al." on Justia Law