Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

N.J., in seventh grade, went to school wearing a T-shirt displaying a Smith & Wesson logo, with an image of a revolver. A.L., a high school student, went to school wearing a T-shirt bearing the logo of a gun-rights group, incorporating an image of a handgun. Administrators at both schools barred the boys from wearing the shirts. Neither school’s dress code expressly bans clothing with images of firearms; the dress codes prohibit “inappropriate” attire, which the administrators interpreted to bar any clothing with an image of a firearm. The students brought separate lawsuits alleging violations of their free-speech rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court consolidated the cases and granted the school administrators summary judgment, declining to apply the Supreme Court’s “Tinker” precedent, which established the legal standard for student-speech cases. The court applied the standard for speech restrictions in a nonpublic forum—the most lenient test— and upheld the administrators’ actions as viewpoint neutral and reasonable.The Seventh Circuit remanded. This is not a speech-forum case. Tinker provides the legal standard: restrictions on student speech are constitutionally permissible if school officials reasonably forecast that the speech “would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school” or invade the rights of others. Although this test is deferential to school officials and is “applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,” it is stricter than the test for speech restrictions in a nonpublic forum. View "N.J. v. Sonnabend" on Justia Law

Defendants dismissed Plaintiff from two graduate nursing studies programs. She sued, claiming that her dismissal violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due Process Clause. The district court refused to dismiss some of her claims. The Defendants appealed part of that order, contending that they have sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s ADA claims and that she failed to state Fourteenth Amendment claims.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Defendants' appeal in part finding that the court lacks appellate jurisdiction over the Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court affirmed the order in part and reversed the order in part, concluding that Plaintiff stated some Title II claims but not all of the claims that the district court refused to dismiss. Defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity at this stage of the litigation because Plaintiff’s allegations did not permit the court to assume that Defendants did not violate her due-process rights. The court explained that it has appellate jurisdiction over only the denial of sovereign immunity from Plaintiff’s ADA claims. The court wrote it must assume that Plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. The state may or may not be correct that its rebuttal evidence vitiates any inference that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability. But the pleading stage was not the right time to raise those contentions. Although the court has done so in the past, Plaintiff’s allegations do not permit the court to assume that the Due Process Clause was not violated. View "Pickett v. Texas Tech Univ" on Justia Law

The en banc Ninth Circuit court dismissed as moot an appeal from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of California Governor Newsom and state officials in an action brought by a group of parents and a student alleging Defendants violated federal law when they ordered schools to suspend in-person instruction in 2020 and early 2021, at a time when California was taking its first steps of navigating the Covid-19 pandemic.   The en banc court held that this was a classic case in which, due to intervening events, there was no longer a live controversy necessary for Article III jurisdiction. Nor was there any effective relief that could be granted by the court. The parents had not brought a claim for damages; they sought a declaratory judgment that Governor Newsom’s executive orders, to the extent they incorporated guidance on school reopening, were unconstitutional. Relatedly, they sought an injunction against the 2020-21 Reopening Framework. But Governor Newsom has rescinded the challenged executive orders, and the 2020-21 Reopening Framework has been revoked. Schools now operate under the 2021-22 Guidance, which declares that all schools may reopen for in-person learning. And the parents conceded that, since April 2021, there has been no “state-imposed barrier to reopening for in-person instruction.” The actual controversy has evaporated.The en banc court rejected Plaintiffs’ assertion that the case survived under two exceptions to mootness: the voluntary cessation exception and the capable of repetition yet evading review exception. Neither exception applied. View "MATTHEW BRACH V. GAVIN NEWSOM" on Justia Law

Charter Day School (“CDS”) a public charter school in North Carolina, requires female students to wear skirts to school based on the view that girls are “fragile vessels” deserving of “gentle” treatment by boys. Plaintiffs argued that this sex-based classification grounded on gender stereotypes violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and subjects them to discrimination and denial of the full benefits of their education in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq. (“Title IX”).  In response, despite CDS’ status as a public school under North Carolina law, CDS denied accountability under the Equal Protection Clause by maintaining that they are not state actors.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Plaintiffs on their Equal Protection claim against CDS. The court also vacated the district court’s summary judgment award in favor of all Defendants on Plaintiffs’ Title IX claim and remanded for further proceedings on that claim.   The court held that CDS is a state actor for purposes of Section 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause. By implementing the skirts requirement based on blatant gender stereotypes about the “proper place” for girls and women in society, CDS has acted in clear violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court further held that sex-based dress codes like the skirts requirement, when imposed by covered entities, are subject to review under the anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX. View "Bonnie Peltier v. Charter Day School, Inc." on Justia Law

Charlton-Perkins, a male research scientist, applied for a professorship at the University of Cincinnati (UC) in late 2017. He alleges that UC determined him the most qualified candidate for the position but refused to hire him on account of his gender, then canceled the job search itself, ensuring that Charlton-Perkins could never fill the position.The district court dismissed his complaint under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681 and 42 U.S.C. 1983, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because nobody ever filled the canceled position, it reasoned, Charlton-Perkins’s claims never ripened into an adverse employment action, and thus he suffered no concrete injury cognizable in federal court. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Charlton-Perkins plausibly alleged a ripe employment discrimination claim, so his suit may proceed. No matter whether somebody else ever got the spot, it has always been the case that Charlton-Perkins was denied the spot. He has always had that de facto injury, no matter whether someone else got the position instead. Charlton-Perkins claims that the defendants not only failed to hire him because of his gender, but they then canceled the search itself as a pretext to conceal the discriminatory reason for the failure to hire. View "Charlton-Perkins v. University of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Illinois State University charges tuition and multiple fees; the Mandatory Fee covers the cost of on-campus facilities and programs. In 2020, after the Governor declared an emergency because of COVID-19 and issued an order forbidding many in-person gatherings, ISU shifted to distance learning over a video system. ISU remitted some but not all of the Mandatory Fee, telling students that the remainder includes the expense of facilities that must be supported no matter how educational services are provided. Two students filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the Takings Clause and the Due Process Clause.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The Constitution does not ensure that states keep all of their promises, any more than it ensures that states observe all of their laws. A violation of a state law or a state contract is a violation of a state entitlement, for which the remedy lies under state law. . ISU lacked authority to violate the Governor’s orders. There was no due process violation because the students were not entitled to hearings. What the students want is substantive–a full refund. A breach of contract does not violate the Constitution. Suing ISU officials in their individual capacities makes no difference; there is no vicarious liability under section 1983. “Plaintiffs’ counsel should count themselves lucky that [those officials] did not seek sanctions for frivolous litigation. View "Thiele v. Board of Trustees of Illinois State University" on Justia Law

Two female students at Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools (MNPS), were videoed by other students engaging in sexual activity with male students at school. One student told school officials that the incident was forcible rape; afraid to remain at the school, she enrolled in a new school. When the other girl’s mother asked that something be done about the circulation of the video, school officials stated that it was a criminal matter and to contact Metro Police; the girl was called names in the hallway and threatened. She finished the school year at home.In a suit alleging violations of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted MNPS summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded. Disciplinary records established that MNPS was aware of issues with sexual harassment in the school system before the two students reported their incidents. Many of these incidents involved photos or videos. To hold MNPS is immune from liability as long as no student is assaulted twice, would defeat Title IX’s purpose. With respect to one girl’s treatment after notifying the school of her harassment, a reasonable jury could conclude that, rather than take steps to remedy the violation, MNPS opted to avoid the problem, resulting in her having to homeschool or endure further misconduct. View "Doe v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

Hasanaj, a teacher certified in Michigan, was employed by the Detroit Public Schools as a teacher for 10 years under a series of contracts. After about seven years, the District stopped sending him contract renewal notices. Hasanaj received “ineffective” ratings in the three years that followed. The District dismissed him as required by Mich. Comp. Laws 380.1249(2)(j).Hasanaj sued, alleging procedural due process violations because he and defendants “acted with the understanding that he had tenure,” the evaluation ratings violated Michigan’s statutory evaluation system, and now he cannot use his certificate to teach in Michigan. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit. Hasanaj has not satisfied Michigan’s Teachers’ Tenure Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 38.71-.191, and has no protected property interest in continued employment. Hasanaj has not alleged that he satisfied the statutory probation requirements to acquire tenure. A contract or a tacit understanding cannot override the statutory requirements. It is irrelevant that Hasanaj stopped receiving contract renewal notices, that the three-strikes provision was invoked for firing him, that he was notified that he could appeal to the Tenure Commission, and that the parties stipulated before the Tenure Commission that Hasanaj obtained tenure. Nor was he deprived of his liberty to pursue his profession because he still holds a valid certificate to teach. View "Hasanaj v. Detroit Public Schools Community District" on Justia Law

Student is an elementary school pupil at the School District (“SD”). The SD moved her from general education into an essential academics program after they determined that despite the accommodations it offered her, Student was not making appropriate progress. Student’s mother objected to the SD’s decision and sought a due process hearing under the IDEA. A hearing officer concluded that the SD’s proposal was: (1) Student’s least restrictive environment; and (2) appropriate in light of her circumstances. Student’s mother appealed to the district court which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision.   The court held that It is Student’s burden to establish that the SD’s decision violates IDEA and she has not carried that burden. The court reasoned that the proposed blended placement IEP is Student’s least restrictive environment. The court found that the SD took steps to accommodate Student by reviewing her overall record and found that she was not making appropriate progress in light of her circumstances. Further, the court considered what effect Student had on the general education classroom.   Finally, the court reasoned that to comply with the IDEA, a student’s plan must provide for exposure to nonhandicapped students to the maximum extent appropriate. Here, although Student occasionally saw glimpses of progress, the bottom line was one of minimal improvement and even regression. The proposed blended placement IEP was the next logical step when the SD found that Student was still not improving. View "H.W. v. Comal Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law

Indiana University hired Palmer, who is Black, as a lecturer in Business Marketing in 2010. In 2013, Palmer inquired about his potential for early promotion to senior lecturer. His Department Chair said that it was rare for lecturers to apply for senior lecturer prior to their sixth year and suggested that Palmer wait. Palmer did not apply for early promotion. In 2016, IU promoted Palmer to senior lecturer. Palmer also served as Diversity Coach in the MBA program, for an additional $25,000 per year and a reduced course load; he resigned as Diversity Coach after the 2016–2017 school year. . In 2016, the Marketing Department hired Gildea, who is white, as a new lecturer and as Director of the Business Marketing Academy (BMA). Palmer complained that Gildea’s base salary nearly matched Palmer’s base salary. Palmer earned $98,750; Gildea earned $94,000, with no other lecturer or senior lecturer in their department earning over $90,000. Palmer also complained of discrimination.Palmer filed an EEOC charge, alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), and subsequently filed suit. Palmer’s failure-to-promote claim is time-barred. His unequal pay claim fails on the merits. Palmer enjoyed higher pay than all of his colleagues, except Gildea, who is not a proper comparator. View "Palmer v. Indiana University" on Justia Law