Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In the fall of 2015, D.T. enrolled as a freshman at Cherokee Trail High School in Aurora, Colorado. During his time at Cherokee Trail, he suffered from depression and a general decline in academic performance. His mother regularly communicated with school officials regarding his well-being and coordinated in-school support. During the first semester of his junior year, D.T. was reported for making a school shooting threat. As a result, he was expelled from Cherokee Trail and the Cherry Creek School District (“the District”) initiated a special education assessment. In December 2017, the District concluded D.T. suffered from a Serious Emotional Disability and approved an individualized education program (“IEP”) to assist his learning. D.T. appealed a district court's judgment finding the District did not deny him access to a free and appropriate public education as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). D.T. asked the Tenth Circuit to conclude the District violated its obligation to identify, or “child find,” students with disabilities who required supplementary academic supports. The Tenth Circuit declined D.T.'s request, finding the District acted reasonably to preserve his access to the benefit of general education. "The District’s duty to assess and provide D.T. with special education services did not begin until his emotional dysfunction manifested in the school environment by way of his shooting threat." View "D.T. v. Cherry Creek School" on Justia Law

The parents believe their son, D.R., should spend most of the school day being educated in a regular classroom with his non-disabled peers. School officials believed D.R. would be better served spending more of his school day in a special education classroom receiving instruction with other disabled students. As permitted under the IDEA, D.R.’s parents requested a due process hearing before the California Office of Administrative Hearings. The district agreed with the ALJ’s analysis and affirmed the decision denying relief.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment affirming an administrative law judge’s decision denying relief. Reversing in part, the panel held that, given the IDEA’s strong preference for educating children with disabilities alongside their non-disabled peers, the law supported the parents’ position. The panel held that D.R.’s parents met their burden of proving that the school district’s proposed individualized education program (IEP) failed to comply with the IDEA’s requirement that children with disabilities be educated in the “least restrictive environment,” alongside their non-disabled peers to the maximum extent appropriate.   Affirming in part, the panel held that D.R.’s parents were not entitled to reimbursement for the expenses they incurred after unilaterally removing their son from school and hiring a private instructor to educate him in a one-on-one setting. The panel concluded that D.R.’s parents showed that the IEP offered by the school district violated the IDEA, but they did not show that the alternative private placement they chose was proper under the Act. View "D. R. V. RBUSD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs L.E., B.B., A.Z., and C.S., are students who have respiratory disabilities (“Students”). They appealed the denial of their motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Students sued Defendants, the Superintendent of the Cobb County School District, individual members of the Cobb County School Board, and the Cobb County School District (collectively, “CCSD”), in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Students claim that CCSD’s refusal to provide reasonable accommodations for access to in-person schooling constitutes a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”).   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for analysis under the correct scope: access to the benefits provided by in-person schooling. The court held this claim presents a live controversy that survives mootness and the district court erred in its review of the Students’ discrimination claims. The Students argue that CCSD ignored those recommendations and continues to disregard CDC guidance in this respect. Therefore, this remains a live controversy. A judgment in their favor would grant the Students meaningful relief by requiring CCSD to follow the guidance on accommodating students with disabilities under the ADA and Section 504 as it is updated—a practice the Students claim CCSD refuses to do. Thus, this claim remains a live controversy. Further, the court wrote that the district court erred in holding the Students must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on a disparate treatment claim. View "L.E., et al v. Superintendent of Cobb County School District, et al" on Justia Law

Defendants, Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference (the "CIAC") and its member high schools (together, "Defendants"), have followed the "Transgender Participation" Policy (the "Policy"), which permits high school students to compete on gender specific athletic teams consistent with their gender identity if that is different from "the gender listed on their official birth certificates."   Plaintiffs are four cisgender female students who allege that the policy disproportionally disadvantages cisgender girls as compared to boys. Plaintiffs allege that the Policy violates Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq. ("Title IX"), because the participation of transgender females in girls' high school athletic events results in "students who are born female" having materially fewer opportunities for victory, public recognition, athletic scholarships, and future employment "than students who are born male."   The district court dismissed the claims on grounds that (1) Plaintiffs' request to enjoin future enforcement of the Policy was moot; (2) Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claim for an injunction to change the record books; and (3) Plaintiffs' claims for monetary damages were barred under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman.   The Second Circuit affirmed writing that it was unpersuaded, with respect to the claim for an injunction to alter the records, that Plaintiffs have established the injury in fact and redressability requirements for standing; both fail for reasons of speculation. And because the court concluded that the CIAC and its member schools did not have adequate notice that the Policy violates Title IX Plaintiffs' claims for damages must be dismissed. View "Selina Soule et al. v. Connecticut Association of Schools et al." on Justia Law

In 2014, Plaintiff, then a women’s soccer player at the University of Connecticut (“UConn”) and recipient of a one-year athletic scholarship, raised her middle finger to a television camera during her team’s post-game celebration after winning a tournament championship. Although she initially was suspended from further tournament games for that gesture, Plaintiff was ultimately also punished by UConn with a mid-year termination of her athletic scholarship. She brought this lawsuit against UConn (through its Board of Trustees) and several university officials alleging, inter alia, violations of her First Amendment and procedural due process rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as well as a violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title IX”), in connection with the termination of her scholarship. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges the decision of the district court granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on those claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiff's procedural due process and First Amendment claims and vacated the district court’s judgment to the extent it granted summary judgment to UConn on the Title IX claim. The court explained Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence, including a detailed comparison of her punishment to those issued by UConn for male student-athletes found to have engaged in misconduct, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she was subjected to a more serious disciplinary sanction, i.e., termination of her athletic scholarship, because of her gender. View "Radwan v. Manuel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges that when she was fourteen years old, she was brutally sexually assaulted by another student in a stairwell at Cypress Creek High School, following an abusive relationship with the same student. After suffering severe injuries and weathering subsequent harassment, Plaintiff says that instead of investigating her assault and providing her with academic or other appropriate support, Cypress Creek recommended that she drop out of school. After doing so—and never returning to any high school—Plaintiff sued the school district under Title IX, arguing that it was deliberately indifferent both to the risk of her sexual assault and in response to her abusive relationship, sexual assault, and subsequent related harassment and bullying on school property.   The district granted Cypress Creek’s motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that because the district court correctly concluded that the District was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s risk of sexual assault, the court affirmed that portion of the judgment.   However, the totality of the circumstances, including the District’s lack of investigation, awareness of the pre-assault abusive relationship, failure to prevent in-person and cyberattacks from the assailant and other students post-assault, and failure to provide any academic or other appropriate support to Plaintiff culminated in exactly what Title IX is designed to prevent—the tragedy of Plaintiff dropping out of school. A reasonable jury could find that the District violated Title IX based on these facts. Accordingly, the court reversed that portion of the judgment. View "Roe v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep" on Justia Law

From August 2018 through January 2019, plaintiffs were six-year-old first grade students who attended Maple Elementary School (Maple) within the Hesperia Unified School District (the District). Pedro Martinez worked at Maple as a janitor. Martinez’s position as a janitor did not require him to have any one-on-one contact with the students. Martinez engaged in a variety of activities with the students that plaintiffs characterized as “‘grooming’ activities” that were “designed to lure minor students, including [p]laintiffs, into a false sense of security around him.” Plaintiffs alleged that numerous District employees who were mandated reporters under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA), witnessed Martinez’s behavior and did not report it to school officials or to law enforcement, in violation of the District’s policies. In January 2019, the State charged Martinez with numerous felonies involving his alleged sexual abuse of minors. In February 2019, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the District and Martinez, alleging numerous claims arising from Martinez’s alleged sexual abuse of plaintiffs. The trial court was persuaded by the District's argument, concluding that plaintiffs did not adequately plead a negligence cause of action against the District, because they failed to state any facts “establishing that [the] District knew of any prior acts of sexual abuse by Martinez and/or that the District had actual or constructive knowledge that Martinez was abusing [p]laintiffs so as to impose liability upon [the] District.” One month after plaintiffs sought reconsideration, the trial court entered judgment against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that they were not required to plead facts demonstrating that the District had actual knowledge of past sexual abuse by Martinez, and that they otherwise pled sufficient facts to state negligence causes of action against the District. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiffs on all of those points. The Court disagreed with plaintiffs' contention that the trial court erred by dismissing their sex discrimination claims under Title IX and California Education Code section 220: plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to constitute actual notice of a violation of Title IX or Education Code section 220. The judgment of dismissal was reversed, the order sustaining the demurrer to the third amended complaint was vacated, and the trial court was directed to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend as to the causes of action under Title IX, Education Code section 220, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act but otherwise overruling the demurrer. View "Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

After East Carolina University (“ECU”) dismissed Plaintiff from its School of Social Work’s Master’s Degree program, Neal sued the university alleging that its decision discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment to ECU based on its conclusion that Plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact to support two elements of a prima facie case of discrimination. It determined that the record did not show that (1) she was “otherwise qualified to participate in ECU’s” program or (2) ECU dismissed her “on the basis of” her disability. Plaintiff challenged both grounds on appeal.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that for purposes of assessing ADA compliance, universities have a responsibility to the entire academic community and to the public to ensure that a student is qualified to meet the lawful requirements of their program, especially where, as here, conferral of a degree is a prerequisite to state licensure requirements. ECU properly exercised its discretion in that regard and assisted Plaintiff during her enrollment in the MSW Program. It gave her a second chance with the out-of-order readmission in the Spring 2014 semester. She received a third chance in the Fall 2014 semester following the A&R Committee proceeding. And MSW Program faculty gave her a fourth chance as they tried to work with her thereafter. Now, Plaintiff wants to force ECU to provide a fifth chance. The ADA contains no such requirement given an absence of evidence supporting her claim of discriminatory dismissal. View "Olivia Neal v. East Carolina University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court exercised is constitutional power to address constitutional violations through equitable remedies by affirming and reinstating the trial court's directive instructing certain State officials to transfer the funds necessary to comply with years two and three of the State's comprehensive remedial plan (CRP), holding that this Court has an obligation to safeguard the constitutional rights of North Carolina's schoolchildren.In November 2021, the trial court issued the order before the Supreme Court for review. In the order, the trial court declared that the State had failed to fulfill its constitutional obligations to provide school children, especially those at risk and socioeconomically disadvantaged, their constitutional right to a sound basic education. The trial court ordered the State to transfer the total amount of funds necessary to effectuate years two and three of the CRP. The State Controller sought an order preventing her from being required to comply with the trial court's order. The court of appeals issued a writ of prohibition restraining the trial court from proceeding in the matter. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order removing that transfer directive. The Supreme Court stayed the writ of prohibition and reinstated the trial court's November 2021 directive, holding that the judiciary must fulfill its obligation to protect the fundamental rights of the State's individuals. View "Hoke County Bd. of Education v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants, two police officers, arrested Plaintiff, a student, at a school basketball game. The district court denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding a dispute of material fact regarding the events surrounding Plaintiff's arrest. The officers filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court’s decision.The Fifth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The issues raised by Plaintiff create factual disputes that meet the required threshold to overcome Appellant's qualified immunity defense at this stage. View "Byrd v. Cornelius" on Justia Law