Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff acting on behalf of her son, a student who qualifies for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), appealed an order of the district court denying her motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction pursuant to the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision. The stay-put provision provides that “during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree,” a student “shall remain” in the student’s “then-current educational placement.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Community Services for Autistic Adults and Children, a private residential treatment center in Maryland, and its affiliated school, the Community School of Maryland’s (together, CSAAC) unilateral decision to discharge Plaintiff’s son did not trigger the IDEA’s stay-put mandate because the District did not refuse to provide a similar available placement. Neither the text of Section 1415(j) nor the court’s previous decisions applying the provision impose an affirmative duty on the District to provide an alternative residential environment when a student’s then-current placement becomes unavailable for reasons outside the District’s control. The court explained that Plaintiff’s attempt to bring a substantive challenge on behalf of her son by invoking the stay-put mandate is procedurally improper because Section 1415(j) is not intended to afford parties affirmative relief, on the merits, in the form of an automatic injunction. View "Anne Davis v. DC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs placed their child AMS at a private academy after the Chamberlain School District did not meet AMS’s needs. A state hearing examiner decided that Chamberlain violated federal law and awarded Plaintiffs costs associated with AMS’s placement at the academy. The district court affirmed.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Chamberlain argued that Plaintiffs weren’t eligible to remove the case from state court to federal court because they weren’t “defendants” under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a). The court explained that while Plaintiffs initially sought to recover from Chamberlain, their status changed when Chamberlain sought the state court’s review of the hearing examiner’s decision. At that point, Chamberlain became the plaintiff for removal purposes. Thus, because Plaintiffs were defendants, they were allowed to remove, so the district court didn’t err in denying remand. Further, the court explained that giving due weight to the outcome of the administrative proceedings, it concludes that Chamberlain denied AMS a FAPE. View "Judith Steckelberg v. Chamberlain School District" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Forro children attended St. Augustine, a self-identified Catholic school in Hartford, Wisconsin. Wisconsin provides transportation benefits for parents who send their children to private sectarian schools, Wis.Stat. 121.54. The school district and the state superintendent of public instruction denied the Forros' request because transportation was being provided to St. Gabriel, another Catholic school in the area. The law stipulates that only one school from a single organizational entity in each “attendance area” may qualify for benefits. While both claim an affiliation with Catholicism, the two schools are not affiliated with one another in other significant ways. St. Augustine and the Forros sued. Several years of litigation ensued, including a trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, two published Seventh Circuit opinions, and a Supreme Court of Wisconsin opinion, after which the Seventh Circuit concluded that the denial of transportation benefits violated Wisconsin law because it rested on an improper methodology for determining affiliation between two schools of similar faith.After noting that certain state law claims had been waived and that the federal constitutional issues did not require resolution, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that a declaratory judgment remains in effect against the Superintendent and the School District. The district court may decide what attorneys’ fees the plaintiffs should be awarded, if any, given that they have prevailed only in obtaining declaratory relief under state law. View "St. Augustine School v. Underly" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that the closure of in-person education due to the COVID-19 pandemic deprived children of the free appropriate public education to which they were entitled and deprived and parents of their right to participate in their children's education, holding that none of Plaintiffs' claims were cognizable in federal court.Plaintiffs, three children with disabilities and their parents on behalf of a putative class, sued the Governor of Massachusetts, the Commissioner of Schools for Massachusetts, the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, and several school districts and their superintendents, claiming that the closure of in-person education during the COVID-19 pandemic violated Plaintiffs' rights under the IDEA and that Defendants illegally discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of disability in violation the Americans with Disabilities Act and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed in full either because Plaintiffs lacked standing to request the relief they sought, because the claims were moot, and/or because Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Roe v. Healey" on Justia Law

Churches, private religious schools, affiliated pastors, and the parents of students (on behalf of themselves and their minor children) sued Kentucky Governor Beshear in his individual capacity for alleged violations of their free-exercise rights, their rights to private-school education, and their rights to assemble peacefully and associate freely, based on Beshear’s Executive Order 2020-969, which temporarily barred in-person learning at all private and public elementary and secondary schools in Kentucky in response to a surge in COVID-19 transmission in the winter of 2020.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit on the basis of qualified immunity. Previous orders in cases involving challenges to pandemic-related executive orders did not make “sufficiently clear t[o] a reasonable official” that temporarily mandating remote learning for all elementary and secondary schools— religious and secular alike—ran afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. An “active and vibrant debate on the constitutional question existed at the time.” EO 2020-969 deprived the parent plaintiffs of neither a choice to send their children to private school over public school nor input in their children’s curriculum. The Governor did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights to assemble peacefully or associate freely. View "Pleasant View Baptist Church v. Beshear" on Justia Law

Following an investigation, Rollins determined that Plaintiff- John Doe violated its sexual misconduct policy. Doe was able to graduate and receive his undergraduate degree but was not allowed to participate in commencement/graduation ceremonies. Rollins imposed a sanction of dismissal, resulting in permanent separation of Doe without the opportunity for readmission; privilege restrictions, including a prohibition on participating in alumni reunion events on or off campus; and a contact restriction as to Roe. Doe sued Rollins in federal court, asserting two claims under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681—one for selective enforcement and one for erroneous outcome—and a third claim under Florida law for breach of contract. Following discovery, the district court excluded the opinions proffered by Doe’s expert as to Rollins’ purported gender bias. Then, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court (a) entered summary judgment in favor of Rollins on the Title IX claims and (b) entered partial summary judgment in favor of Doe on the breach of contract claim.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Doe’s expert from presenting opinions about Rollins’ purported gender bias and that it correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Rollins on Doe’s two Title IX claims. On the breach of contract claim, the court wrote that it cannot review Doe’s challenge to the district court’s partial denial of summary judgment because materiality is not a purely legal issue under Florida law and was later resolved by the jury. View "John Doe v. Rollins College" on Justia Law

The Montgomery County Board of Education adopted Guidelines for Gender Identity for 2020–2021 that permit schools to develop gender support plans for students. The Guidelines allow implementation of these plans without the knowledge or consent of the students’ parents. They even authorize the schools to withhold information about the plans from parents if the school deems the parents to be unsupportive. In response, three parents with children attending Montgomery County public schools challenged the portion of the Guidelines that permit school officials to develop gender support plans and then withhold information about a child’s gender support plan from their parents. Terming it the “Parental Preclusion Policy,” the parents alleged the policy unconstitutionally usurps the parents’ fundamental right to raise their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for the case to be dismissed. The court explained that the parents have not alleged that their children have gender support plans, are transgender or are even struggling with issues of gender identity. As a result, they have not alleged facts that the Montgomery County public schools have any information about their children that is currently being withheld or that there is a substantial risk information will be withheld in the future. Thus, under the Constitution, they have not alleged the type of injury required to show standing. Absent an injury that creates standing, federal courts lack the power to address the parents’ objections to the Guidelines. Thus, the court remanded to the district court to dismiss the case for lack of standing. View "John and Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Columbia Basin College officials terminated R.W. from the nursing program after learning that he had sought medical treatment for homicidal thoughts about three instructors. R.W. filed suit seeking damages, reinstatement in the nursing program, and expungement of his failing grades.   On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit  (1) affirmed the district court’s order determining that Plaintiff’s suit for injunctive relief against Columbia Basin College officials in their official capacity could proceed under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; and (2) dismissed in part defendants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction in plaintiff R.W.’s action alleging First Amendment violations and other claims arising from his termination from a nursing program at Columbia Basin College.   The panel held that R.W.’s complaint alleged an ongoing violation of his constitutional rights given the uncertainty as to whether he could reenroll in the nursing program or qualify for financial aid; his claim for prospective relief was not moot; and the Dean of Student Conduct was a proper defendant because he was directly involved with the alleged constitutional violations and there was a question of fact as to whether he had authority to implement injunctive relief if so ordered.   the panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s order declining to reconsider its prior partial summary judgment for R.W. on his 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim for violation of the First Amendment. The merits of R.W.’s First Amendment claim were severable from, and neither necessary to nor necessarily resolved by, the district court’s ruling on the Ex parte Young issue and were reviewable upon entry of final judgment. View "R. W. V. COLUMBIA BASIN COLLEGE, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Church of St. Theresa (St. Theresa’s) owned and operated the St. Theresa School. St. Theresa’s terminated art teacher and toddler room caregiver Victoria Crisitello for violating the terms of her employment agreement. That agreement required employees to abide by the teachings of the Catholic Church and forbade employees from engaging in premarital sex; Crisitello, who was unmarried, had become pregnant. In response to her firing, Crisitello filed a complaint against St. Theresa’s alleging employment discrimination in violation of the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), based on pregnancy and marital status. St. Theresa’s countered that its decision to terminate Crisitello was protected by both the First Amendment and the LAD. The New Jersey Supreme Court held: (1) the “religious tenets” exception of N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) was an affirmative defense available to a religious entity when confronted with a claim of employment discrimination; and (2) the uncontroverted fact was that St. Theresa’s followed the religious tenets of the Catholic Church in terminating Crisitello. The Court thus concluded St. Theresa’s was entitled to summary judgment and that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint with prejudice. View "Crisitello v. St. Theresa School" on Justia Law

Malhotra subleased a room in a fraternity house while attending the University of Illinois in 2021. The University prohibited students from permitting underage drinking in their residences. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the University then restricted the number of people who could attend social gatherings. According to Malhotra, days after he moved in, the other residents threw a party. Malhotra was not involved in planning or hosting the party. During the event, Malhotra was wearing noise-canceling headphones and studying in his room when his roommate alerted him to loud noises. Malhotra discovered a large group of people partying, including a young woman who was visibly intoxicated. The party ended when officers arrived at the house.The University charged Malhotra and the other residents with violating the University’s code of conduct. Malhotra met with the University’s Assistant Dean of Students and subsequently appeared at a hearing before the “Subcommittee on Undergraduate Student Conduct,” which found Malhotra guilty and suspended him for two semesters. Dean Die explained that Malhotra had been held responsible because he was a signatory on the fraternity house’s lease. Malhotra, however, had not signed the lease; he had merely subleased a room. He appealed, attaching the lease as evidence. The suspension was upheld. Malhotra filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. Malhotra did not allege a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest as required under the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Malhotra v. University of Illinois at Urbana" on Justia Law