Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Education Law
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Grace Smith, a high school junior, was repeatedly suspended from Laramie High School for refusing to comply with a COVID-19 indoor-mask mandate imposed by the Albany County School District No. 1 Board of Trustees. After her suspensions, she was arrested for trespassing on school grounds. Grace and her parents, Andy and Erin Smith, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming against the Board members, the superintendent, and the principal, alleging violations of Grace’s constitutional rights and state law claims.The district court dismissed the federal claims for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that Grace did not suffer an injury in fact necessary for standing. The court reasoned that her injuries were hypothetical because the mask mandate had expired and she was no longer a student at LHS, and that her injuries were self-inflicted. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that Grace had standing to bring her claims because she suffered concrete and particularized injuries from the enforcement of the mask mandate, including suspensions and arrest. The court found that her injuries were directly inflicted by the defendants’ actions and were not self-inflicted. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "Smith v. Albany County School District No. 1" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Hawai‘i Disability Rights Center (HDRC), which represents individuals with developmental disabilities, including children with autism. HDRC alleges that the Hawai‘i Departments of Education (DOE) and Human Services (DHS) unlawfully deny students with autism access to Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) therapy during school hours, even when medically necessary. DOE provides ABA services only if deemed educationally relevant, and DHS does not provide ABA services during school hours, even if medically necessary and covered by Medicaid or private insurance.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment in favor of DOE and DHS, holding that HDRC's failure to exhaust administrative procedures under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was fatal to all its claims, including those under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Medicaid Act. The court concluded that HDRC, as a protection and advocacy organization, must ensure that parents of its constituents exhaust the IDEA’s administrative process.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that HDRC, as Hawai‘i’s designated protection and advocacy system, can pursue administrative remedies under the IDEA and is therefore bound by the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement for its own claim. However, HDRC need not ensure that parents of individual children with autism exhaust their individual IDEA claims. The court found that HDRC did not exhaust its administrative remedies, and no exceptions to IDEA exhaustion applied.The Ninth Circuit also held that HDRC was not required to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures before bringing its claims under the ADA, Section 504, and the Medicaid Act. The court concluded that HDRC’s non-IDEA claims do not allege the denial of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) and therefore do not require exhaustion under the IDEA. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case. View "HAWAI'I DISABILITY RIGHTS CRT. V. KISHIMOTO" on Justia Law

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In August 2021, New York City’s Department of Education mandated COVID-19 vaccinations for all staff and contractors working in school settings. This mandate was updated over time, including a religious exemption process. The plaintiffs, New York City public sector employees, challenged the constitutionality of the mandate and the exemption process, both facially and as applied.The Southern District of New York denied a preliminary injunction and dismissed the consolidated amended complaint on the merits. The Eastern District of New York also denied a similar preliminary injunction motion. The plaintiffs appealed these decisions, leading to a consolidated review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.The Second Circuit affirmed in part and dismissed in part the denials of preliminary injunctions, affirmed the dismissal of the facial challenges, and affirmed in part while vacating and remanding in part the dismissal of the as-applied challenges. The court found that the request to rescind the vaccine mandate was moot due to its official rescission and denied the request for reinstatement and backpay, as the plaintiffs could not show irreparable harm post-termination. The court upheld the dismissal of the facial challenges, finding no evidence that the Citywide Panel process preferred certain religions or was infected with religious animus. However, the court vacated and remanded the as-applied challenges for plaintiffs Natasha Solon and Heather Clark, who plausibly alleged that their religious accommodation requests were improperly denied. View "New Yorkers for Religious Liberty v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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Keith Schiebel, a veteran agriculture educator, brought an educational program called the "Mobile Maple Experience" to the Schoharie Central School District (SCSD) campus. Following the event, a student's mother reported that Schiebel made her daughter feel uncomfortable, leading to a Title IX investigation. Schiebel was accused of reaching around the student and touching her breast and buttocks while retrieving supplies. Schiebel denied recalling the incident but speculated that he might have reached around a student to get something. The Title IX coordinator, Kristin DuGuay, found the allegations credible and determined that Schiebel had committed sexual harassment, resulting in a five-year ban of the Mobile Maple Experience from the SCSD campus.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed Schiebel's Title IX claim, stating that while he plausibly alleged an erroneous finding, he did not plausibly allege that sex-based bias was a motivating factor. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Schiebel's state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Schiebel plausibly alleged that SCSD violated Title IX. The court found that the investigation was so deficient as to constitute a sham and that the decision was inexplicable. Additionally, the court noted that the Title IX coordinator exhibited sex-based bias against Schiebel. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Schiebel v. Schoharie Cent. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

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The State of New York, through its Attorney General, sued the Niagara-Wheatfield Central School District, alleging that school officials failed to address repeated complaints of student-on-student sexual assault, harassment, and gender-based violence and bullying. The complaint detailed incidents involving four students who suffered from such misconduct and claimed that the school district ignored at least thirty similar incidents. The State argued that the school district's inaction affected not only the victims but also the broader school community, creating an unsafe environment.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed the case, concluding that the State lacked parens patriae standing. The court reasoned that the incidents were factually distinct and did not demonstrate a broader policy or practice of discrimination by the school district. Without such a policy or practice, the court held that the State could not show that the school district's conduct affected a substantial segment of the population, which is required for parens patriae standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that showing an injurious policy or practice is not necessary to satisfy the substantial-segment prong of the parens patriae standard. The court concluded that the State of New York had met its burden of pleading parens patriae standing at this stage of the litigation. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "New York v. Niagara-Wheatfield Central School District" on Justia Law

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A former public school principal in Brooklyn, New York, brought a lawsuit against the New York City Department of Education (DOE) and its former chancellor, alleging retaliation after she complained about racially segregated sports teams at her school. The principal claimed that the DOE's investigation into her was a retaliatory action for her complaints about race discrimination affecting her students.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the principal's Title VI claim, reasoning that her challenge was related to an employment practice and that the primary objective of the federal funds received by the DOE was not to provide employment. The court also denied her motion for leave to amend her complaint, even after reconsidering its initial decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and held that the principal's retaliation claim was not an action "with respect to any employment practice" under Title VI because her underlying protected activity was unrelated to the DOE’s employment practices. The court concluded that Title VI does provide a private right of action for retaliation claims when the retaliation is for opposing non-employment-related race discrimination. The court affirmed the dismissal of the claim against the former chancellor but vacated the dismissal of the Title VI claim against the DOE and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bloomberg v. N.Y.C. Department of Education" on Justia Law

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A coalition of organizations and individuals, led by the Chinese American Citizens Alliance of Greater New York, filed a lawsuit against New York City's Mayor and Department of Education Chancellor. They challenged the revised admissions policy for the Discovery Program in the Specialized High Schools (SHSs), alleging it was intended to discriminate against Asian-American applicants by reducing their admission rates. The plaintiffs argued that the new policy, which included an Economic Need Index (ENI) criterion, negatively impacted Asian-American students.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of the City. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an aggregate disparate impact on Asian-American students, as required under Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. The court held that without showing a group-wide effect, the plaintiffs could not establish the necessary discriminatory effect for an equal protection claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed, for the purpose of the appeal, that the plaintiffs could prove the policy changes were made with discriminatory intent. The court concluded that the district court erred in requiring an aggregate disparate impact to establish discriminatory effect. Instead, the court held that if discriminatory intent is proven, a negative effect on individual Asian-American students would suffice to trigger strict scrutiny review. The court found that the exclusion of economically disadvantaged Asian-American students from certain middle schools due to the new ENI criterion constituted a sufficient discriminatory effect. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chinese Am. Citizens All. of Greater N.Y. v. Adams" on Justia Law

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The case involves two transgender girls, Jane Doe and Megan Roe, who wish to participate in girls' sports at their respective schools in Arizona. Both girls have not undergone male puberty due to puberty-blocking medication and hormone therapy. Arizona enacted the Save Women’s Sports Act, which prohibits "students of the male sex," including transgender women and girls, from participating in women’s and girls’ sports. The plaintiffs argue that this Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona reviewed the case and granted a preliminary injunction, preventing the enforcement of the Act against the plaintiffs. The court found that the Act was adopted with the purpose of excluding transgender girls from girls' sports teams and concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their equal protection and Title IX claims. The court determined that before puberty, there are no significant differences in athletic performance between boys and girls and that transgender girls who receive puberty-blocking medication do not have an athletic advantage over other girls.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, agreeing that the Act discriminates based on transgender status and is subject to heightened scrutiny. The court held that the Act’s categorical ban on transgender girls from participating in girls' sports is not substantially related to the state’s objectives of ensuring competitive fairness and equal athletic opportunities for female student-athletes. The court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the preliminary injunction. View "DOE V. HORNE" on Justia Law

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Two students receiving special education services filed a class action lawsuit against the Kanawha County Board of Education, alleging that the Board denied them and other similarly situated students a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The lawsuit also claimed violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court certified a class of all Kanawha County Schools students with disabilities who need behavior supports and have experienced disciplinary removals from any classroom.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, reasoning that the plaintiffs had presented expert evidence of disproportionate rates of suspension for students with disabilities and a detailed qualitative analysis of student records. The court found that these factors revealed a cohesive pattern indicating the absence of an effective system for developing and implementing behavioral supports for students with disabilities. The Board appealed, arguing that the certification of the plaintiff class was inconsistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s certification order. The Fourth Circuit held that the certified class failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality prerequisite. The court found that the plaintiffs did not identify a common contention central to the validity of all class members’ claims. The court noted that the claims were highly diverse and individualized, involving different practices at different stages of the special education process. The absence of a common contention foreclosed class treatment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "G.T. v. The Board of Education of the County of Kanawha" on Justia Law

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K.N., an eight-year-old boy with multiple disabilities, lives in a non-wheelchair-accessible apartment in the District of Columbia. His mother, Margda Pierre-Noel, requested that the District and his school, Bridges Public Charter School, provide assistance to move K.N. from their apartment door to the school bus. The District denied the request, citing its policy that staff only retrieve students from the outermost door of their dwelling and do not physically lift or carry students.The Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE) hearing officer ruled that it was beyond his authority to order the requested assistance but required OSSE to offer transportation services to and from the outer door of K.N.'s apartment building. Pierre-Noel then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, which granted summary judgment in favor of the District, ruling that the service requested was not a transportation service under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the IDEA requires the District to provide door-to-door transportation services for K.N., as such services are necessary for him to benefit from his special education. The court found that the term "transportation" under the IDEA includes moving a child from their apartment door to the vehicle that will take them to school. The court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The appeal was dismissed as moot with respect to Bridges Public Charter School, as K.N. was no longer enrolled there. View "Pierre-Noel v. Bridges Public Charter School" on Justia Law