Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Langley was arrested in connection with a Newark drug trafficking operation. Langley agreed to plead guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 28 grams or more of crack-cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, which carries a mandatory five-year minimum sentence, agreeing that he would not argue for a sentence below five years’ imprisonment and that he would enter into an appellate waiver, applicable to any challenges to a sentence of five years or below. During his plea hearing, the district court engaged in a thorough colloquy and ensured that Langley had discussed his plea agreement with his counsel and that he understood the appellate waiver. The court considered his arguments concerning the pandemic, the effect of the crack/powder cocaine disparity on the Guidelines calculation, and the age of his criminal convictions. The court determined that the applicable guideline range was 110-137 months and sentenced Langley to 60 months’ imprisonment.In lieu of filing an appellate brief, Langley’s counsel moved to withdraw, asserting in his Anders brief that he identified “no issue of even arguable merit.” Langley submitted a pro se brief, arguing for a further sentencing reduction. The Third Circuit dismissed. Langley’s court-appointed counsel filed an Anders brief that, on its face, met the standard for a “conscientious investigation" of possible grounds for appeal. Counsel is not required to anticipate or address all possible arguments. There are no non-frivolous issues for Langley to raise on appeal. View "United States v. Langley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the judgments entered upon Defendant's convictions for multiple serious felonies, including first-degree murder, holding that the record did not support the trial court's determination that Defendant's actions were sufficiently obstructive to constitute a forfeiture of his right to counsel.Defendant was indicted on charges of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and other crimes. The trial court decided before trial that Defendant's actions forfeited his opportunity to have assigned counsel, and Defendant proceeded pro se. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all offenses, and Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction. The court of appeals awarded Defendant a new trial, determining that the trial court deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to counsel by concluding that he had forfeited that right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial because he did not engage in the type of egregious misconduct that would permit the trial court to deprive him of his constitutional right to counsel. View "State v. Harvin" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Employer and dismissing all of Employee's claims alleging retaliatory behavior under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 et seq., discrimination and retaliation under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. 4301 et seq., and violations of Puerto Rico Law 115, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.The district court granted Employer's motion for summary judgment, finding that Employee failed to make a prima facie showing of retaliation and, in the alternative, failed to rebut Employer's explanations for why the behavior in question was non-discriminatory in nature. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusion that Employee's statement in opposition to Employer's statement of uncontested material facts was noncompliant with Local Rule 56; (2) the district court properly found that Employee failed to make out a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII; and (3) the dismissal of Employee's antiretaliation law claims was proper. View "Rodriguez-Severino v. UTC Aerospace Systems" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss the criminal case against him based on an alleged violation of his statutory speedy-trial right, holding that the State did not violate Defendant's speedy-trial rights.The day before trial was set to begin, Defendant moved to dismiss the case base on an alleged violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, Defendant entered a plea of no contest to a single felony count. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no violation of Defendant's statutory speedy-trial rights in this case. View "State v. Belville" on Justia Law

Defendant kidnapped Jane Doe, then age 12 years old, and drove her from California to Nevada knowing that she would engage in prostitution. The defendant entered into a written plea agreement pursuant to which, in exchange for the government’s promise to drop five serious criminal charges, he would plead guilty to two lesser crimes (interstate travel in aid of unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1952(a)(3)(A)) and would pay Doe restitution.   The panel granted Jane Doe’s petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3771(d)(3), a provision of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, in a case in which the district court concluded that it lacked statutory authority to order Defendant to pay restitution to Jane Doe. The panel published the opinion to reiterate what this court held in two cases decided three decades ago: 18 U.S.C. Section 3663(a)(3) grants statutory authority to district courts to award restitution whenever a defendant agrees in a plea agreement to pay restitution. The panel instructed the district court to address, in the first instance, Defendant’s evidentiary challenges and other arguments concerning the appropriate amount of restitution View "JANE DOE V. USDC-NVL" on Justia Law

Atkins pleaded guilty to drug crimes in 2014. After unsuccessfully challenging his conviction, he sued, claiming that the district and magistrate judges committed errors, the prosecutor did not identify herself when talking to Atkins during the case and did not respond to his compassionate release motion, the court reporter “invaded” his transcripts, and his court-appointed attorneys were ineffective. Atkins also sued the United States but did not state any allegations against it. The district judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice as frivolous, stating that he would alternatively dismiss all claims under the Supreme Court’s “Heck” decision because Atkins’s criminal conviction is intact.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All the acts that Atkins attributes to the judges and prosecutor occurred in the criminal case, within their roles as judge or prosecutor, so they are absolutely immune from suit. The Supreme Court has not implied a Bivens-style constitutional claim against federal officials for transcription errors and an alternate remedy to cure transcript inaccuracies is available. The federal defense attorneys cannot be defendants in a Bivens suit because they did not act under color of law. The United States is not subject to suit in a Bivens action. The court affirmed that Atkins incurred a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) for filing a frivolous suit and another “strike” for filing this frivolous appeal. View "Atkins v. Gilbert" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court upheld Defendant's convictions and sentences for several drug offenses and other misdemeanors, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress or in denying Defendant's retained attorney's requests to enter limited appearances.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the arresting officer's recollection that Defendant had a driving status of "barred" as of several months before did not amount to a reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while the officer's information about Defendant's driver's license status was several months old, it gave the officer reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Defendant's vehicle; and (2) if a constitutional right to have a retained attorney enter a limited appearance exists, it is subject to reasonable regulation by the district court, and the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's requested limited appearances. View "State v. Sallis" on Justia Law

Lamb was involved in an altercation with a WCI correctional office. Lamb alleges that other correctional officers retaliated by beating him and deploying pepper spray against him while he was handcuffed outside the presence of surveillance cameras. That night, Lamb was transferred to the Lebanon Correctional Institution (LeCI), where he was placed in restrictive housing. Lamb filed an internal informal complaint. WCI responded with a computer entry on the prison’s internal system, stating “[y]ou will be able to give your statement during the use of force investigation.” Lamb asserts that he did not receive this response for two years because he did not have access to the System while in restrictive housing. Lamb also alleges that he filed second and third informal complaints and unsuccessfully asked LeCl officers for forms to escalate his grievance. Lamb was transferred to the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. Lamb allegedly sent an appeal letter to the Chief Inspector of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. There is no record of this letter.Lamb filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Sixth Circuit reversed. While Lamb did not exhaust his administrative remedies properly, there remain material disputes of fact about whether prison officials rendered those administrative remedies unavailable. View "Lamb v. Kendrick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts each of sexual assault in the first degree and unlawful restraint in the first degree and one count of assault in the second degree, holding that Defendant's claims on appeal failed.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights under State v. Walker, 212 A.3d 1244 (Conn. 2019), by admitting certain testimony, but the violation was harmless under State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 832 (Conn. 1989); (2) Defendant failed to prove a violation of his constitutional right to due process; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying either Defendant's supplemental motion for a new trial or his motion for a new trial. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of deliberate homicide and tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, holding that Defendant's assignments of error were without merit.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the State's 391-day delay in bringing his case to trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial under both the state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where the delay was primarily institutional under the conditions presented at the time by the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic and where Defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice, Defendant failed to establish that he was denied his right to a speedy trial; and (2) the district court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to strike the jury panel. View "State v. Hesse" on Justia Law