Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for gross sexual assault but remanded for the court to determine the appropriate length and conditions of supervised release to be imposed, holding that there was otherwise no error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) because a principal and accomplice are not subject to different processes or analyses when a sentencing court applies the Hewey analysis set out in Me. Rev. Stat. 17-A, 1602, the sentencing court did not err when it set the basic sentence at twenty years in compliance with Me. Rev. Stat. 17A-1252(4-E); and (2) remand was required for the district court to determine the length and conditions of supervised release to be imposed and to articulate its analysis and the factors that led to its decision. View "State v. Ringuette" on Justia Law

In this case where Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Massachusetts Constitution protects a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide, thereby immunizing the practice from criminal prosecution, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the proposed right, as defined by Plaintiffs, was not supported in the relevant provisions of the Constitution.Plaintiffs were a licensed physician who wished to provide physician-assisted suicide and a retired physician who had been diagnosed with an incurable cancer. Plaintiffs brought a civil action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that terminally ill patients with six months or less to live have a constitutional right to receive a prescription for lethal medication in order to bring about death in a manner and time of their choosing. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not protect physician-assisted suicide; and (2) the law of manslaughter prohibits physician-assisted suicide without offending constitutional protections. View "Kligler v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The Department of State Hospitals (DSH) serves defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST). Chunn was found incompetent to stand trial. After being ordered admitted to Napa State Hospital, he waited 75 days for admission. Chunn argued that DHS’s failure to promptly commence competency assessment and treatment violated his state and federal due process rights. Other defendants, also found incompetent to stand trial, sought sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 against DSH. The trial court consolidated the cases and ordered DSH to implement specific steps within specific timeframes to meet its obligations to IST defendants in Solano County. DSH appealed. Four months later, another court of appeal (Stiavetti) concluded that the DSH had systematically violated the due process rights of all California IST defendants, holding that 28 days is the maximum constitutional limit for commencing substantive services to restore IST defendants to competency.The court of appeal remanded the Chunn order. The trial court’s ruling did not violate separation of powers principles at the time it was made, nor, for the most part, does it conflict with Stiavetti. The court did not abuse its discretion. The problems created by limited funding, resources, and bed space and the many efforts by DSH do not relieve DSH of its responsibilities. Some aspects of the order must be modified and others may be reconsidered, due to changes in the law. Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 now allows DSH to conduct “reevaluations” of IST defendants after the initial commitment order. View "In re Chunn" on Justia Law

In this case considering whether unprovoked flight in a high-crime area should no longer be considered a factor that gives rise to rebate articulable suspicion for a Terry stop, the Court of Appeals held that, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's rights under either the Fourth Amendment or Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights were not violated.Defendant, who was standing in an high-crime area in Baltimore City, fled when he saw an unmarked vehicle. Ultimately, detectives stopped Defendant and found a gun in his waistband. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him based solely on his unprovoked flight in a high-crime area. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion, holding that, under under the totality of the circumstances analysis, a court may consider whether unprovoked flight is an indication of criminal activity that, together with evidence of a high-crime area and any other relevant factors, establishes reasonable suspicion for a stop, or whether unprovoked flight, under the circumstances of the case, is a factor consistent with innocence that adds little or nothing to the reasonable suspicion analysis. View "Washington v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court complied with the procedure implemented in N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1201(d)(1) by the legislature for the trial court to consent to Defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial for the status offense of habitual felon, holding that the court of appeals did not err.After a colloquy on the record, in which Defendant gave notice in open court of his waiver of a jury trial, the trial court proceeded with a bench trial and found Defendant guilty of multiple drug-related offenses. Before the court proceeded with the phase of the trial addressing the habitual felon status offense, Defendant signed and acknowledged under oath another waiver of jury trial form. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in how it personally addressed him and in determining that he fully understood and appreciated the consequences of his decision to waive the right to trial by jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the court of appeals did not err by concluding that the trial court complied with the procedure set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1201(d)(1) for the court to consent to Defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial for the habitual felon offense. View "State v. Rollinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court determining that Defendant's behavior was sufficiently egregious to warrant the forfeiture of her right to counsel, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial.Defendant was charged with attempting to possess a firearm while subject to an ex parte Domestic Violence Protection Order prohibiting the same. After a trial, at which Defendant proceeded pro se, the jury found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court of appeals erred in holding that Defendant waived her right to counsel or alternatively forfeited her right to counsel. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) the issue of waiver was inapposite because Defendant expressly requested the appointment of counsel; and (2) the trial court erred in its alternate determination that Defendant's behavior was sufficiently egregious to warrant the forfeiture of the right to counsel. View "State v. Atwell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court granting Defendant's motion to suppress two statements to Warwick police detectives in the course of their investigation, holding that the superior court abused its discretion.The trial justice suppress statements based on its findings that Defendant was in custody when he voluntarily accompanied the police detectives in an unmarked vehicle to search for evidence, that Defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, and that Defendant's video-recorded statement was inadmissible in accordance with Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's order, holding (1) one of the statements at issue was admissible in evidence; and (2) remand was required for limited factual determination by the trial justice as to whether the other statement was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. View "State v. Morillo" on Justia Law

Five days after Carter was booked into the Macon County Jail, he died of diabetic ketoacidosis. In the hours preceding his death, Carter exhibited symptoms commonly associated with diabetic ketoacidosis: confusion, lethargy, and labored breathing. He was denied timely medical care because the jail nurse thought he was faking his condition. She assured the corrections officers tasked with transferring Carter out of the medical unit that his vitals were within a normal range. Relying on the nurse’s medical judgment, the officers declined to intervene and proceeded to relocate Carter, believing that his failure to follow orders stemmed from deliberate refusal, not medically induced incapacity.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, including claims against five corrections officers, the district court denied the officers’ summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding there to be a material factual dispute over whether they had reason to know that Carter was receiving inadequate medical care, creating a duty to intervene. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Established circuit precedent entitles a corrections officer to defer to the judgment of medical professionals. That is what the officers did here; they are entitled to qualified immunity. View "McGee v. Parsano" on Justia Law

Dorsey, an Illinois state prisoner, was emptying a bucket in the prison laundry when he felt a pop in his lower back and felt pain shoot down his leg. He asked to see a nurse and was told to “go lay down.” Dorsey took ibuprofen and lay down for two hours, but his pain worsened. He again, unsuccessfully, requested permission to seek medical care. The next morning, Dorsey could barely move. Six days later, a nurse concluded that he was exaggerating his symptoms. Dorsey alleges that instead of being treated for back pain, he was prescribed psychiatric medications without his knowledge or consent and was disciplined for refusing to take those medications.Dorsey sued. The district court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and determined that Dorsey had improperly joined unrelated claims. His complaint asserted three claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against 12 defendants. Two claims alleged Eighth Amendment violations based on the poorly maintained washing machines and deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition, his back injury. The third alleged a due process violation, that Dorsey was prescribed medications without his consent. After deeming three amended complaints unsatisfactory, the district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Dorsey’s claims met both requirements of Rule 20(a)(2), so joinder was legally permissible and the dismissal was an abuse of discretion. The court rejected his other claims. View "Dorsey v. Varga" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of open container and driving under the influence (DUI) and imposing a suspended imposition of sentence, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Based on information obtained during a 911 call made by Defendant's daughter reporting that Defendant may be drinking and driving and providing Defendant's location officers conducted a traffic stop of Defendant's van and then arrested her for DUI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the traffic stop was an unconstitutional search and seizure. The circuit court denied the motion and found Defendant guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court properly concluded that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of the stop. View "State v. Rosa" on Justia Law