Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of fifth-degree marijuana possession against him for lack of probable cause, holding that the evidence was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause.This case arose when law enforcement officers discovered a plant substance in Defendant's car during a traffic stop. While the State did not test the concentration of THC in the substance before charging gate case, a field test of the substance detected the presence of THC. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that chemical testing establishing the THC concentration of substance was not required when there is other sufficient evidence to support a probable cause finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's admission that the material in the vehicle was marijuana was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss the charge of fifth-degree marijuana possession. View "State v. Dixon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress his breath test because no interpreter was available and the advisory was read to him in English, holding that the police officer discharged his duty by making all reasonable efforts to obtain a Tigrinya interpreter before reading the advisory to Defendant in English.Defendant was from Eritrea, and his primary language was Tigrinya. Defendant, who was pulled over for traffic violations, agreed to do a preliminary breath test, which came back over the legal limit. He was then arrested and transported to a law enforcement center. The arresting officer contacted a commercial service known as Language Line to obtain an on-demand Tigrinya interpreter for the implied consent advisory, but not such interpreter was available. The officer then read Defendant the advisory. Defendant was subsequently charged with operating while intoxicated second offense. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of his blood alcohol content from the DataMaster test on the grounds that he did not give consent. The district court sustained the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer complied with Iowa Code 321J.8 by making reasonable efforts and using reasonable methods to convey to Defendant the implied consent advisory. View "State v. Baraki" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Appellant's petitions for postconviction relief challenging his convictions in a rape case and a jail case, holding that there was no error.After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of rape and kidnapping. While he was being held in jail on the rape charges, Appellant and two other inmates attacked one of their cellmates. A jury found Appellant guilty of felonious assault and kidnapping for the attack. Appellant later filed petitions for postconviction relief challenging his convictions in both cases. The trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) postconviction claims alleging a denial of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel are not procedurally barred if they cannot meaningfully be reviewed without resorting to evidence outside the trial record; and (2) all of Appellant's claims were either barred by res judicata or failed to set forth a substantive claim for relief. View "State v. Blanton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Defendant's motion to allow withdrawal of his guilty plea and dismiss the underlying matter on double jeopardy grounds, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss and the criminal endangerment and criminal mischief charges in Jefferson County.Jefferson County charged Defendant with criminal endangerment, fleeing from or eluding a peace officer, and criminal mischief. The next month, Gallatin County charged with him criminal endangerment and fleeing from or eluding a peace officer. Defendant pled guilty to both charges. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea and to dismiss the Jefferson County charges, arguing that they violated constitutional double jeopardy protections. The district court allowed the motion as to the fleeing from or eluding a peace officer charge and otherwise denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea as to the criminal endangerment and criminal mischief charges. View "State v. Dunne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the decision of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the decision of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress his answers to the medical rule-out questions given subsequent to a traffic stop, holding that the ICA erred in affirming the district court's suppression of Defendant's answers to the medical rule-out questions.In granting Defendant's motion to suppress, the district court found that Defendant was subject to custodial interrogation without being given the required warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under this Court's decision in State v. Sagapolutele-Silva, 511 P.3d 782 (Haw. 2022), Defendant was not in custody when he was asked the medical rule-out questions because the circumstances of the stop had not risen to those of a formal arrest. View "State v. Tronson " on Justia Law

After completing a minimum sentence, Pennsylvania inmates are eligible to serve the rest of their sentence on parole. The decision to grant parole is discretionary. Most parolees first rely on halfway houses. Public houses have only 700 spaces, and private contract facilities have 2,100 spaces statewide but each year, about 9,000 Pennsylvania inmates are released on parole. The State Police must notify each resident, school district, day-care center, and college about nearby registered violent sex offenders, making it difficult to place sex offenders into community halfway houses because of community backlash. Sex offenders also tend to linger in halfway houses longer than other parolees because of the difficulties in finding alternate housing. The Department of Corrections considers 13 factors before placing a parolee in a halfway house, including community sensitivity to a criminal offense or specific criminal incident.In a class action challenge, the district court held that paroled sex offenders are similarly situated to other paroled offenders and that there could be no rational basis to delay their placement into halfway houses because of “community sensitivity.” The Third Circuit reversed. A discretionary grant of parole cannot erase the differences between sex crimes and other crimes. DOC’s halfway house policy considering “community sensitivity,” among many other factors, is rationally related to legitimate government interests. View "Stradford v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Officers separately arrested the defendants for DUI and released each with a Notice to Appear. Each signed their respective Notice, agreeing to appear in court on a specified date more than 25 days later. Each Notice included the issuing officer’s declaration alleging the facts of the misdemeanor violation. The specified court dates passed without the filing of charges. The District Attorney filed charges against each defendant just as the one-year statute of limitations for misdemeanor DUIs was about to expire. Both were arraigned about 90 days later, nearly 15 months after arrest. The defendants asserted violations of their speedy trial rights.The trial court determined that the defendants were and remained “accused” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee from the day officers arrested and released them on Notices; the lapse of more than one year from the issuance of the Notices was presumptively prejudicial; and although the delay between arrest and the filing of the complaints was justified by a commensurate delay in analyzing blood specimens, the further delay between the filing of the complaint and arraignment was unjustified. The court of appeal reversed the dismissals. Although the citation was an accusation otherwise sufficient to initiate Sixth Amendment protection against delay, the District Attorney’s election not to file formal charges by the appearance date ceased any legal restraint upon the defendants and had the same effect, for constitutional speedy trial purposes, as a dismissal of charges. View "People v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

Officials switched Flint’s municipal water supply from the Detroit Water Department to the Flint River, reviving a dormant treatment plant. Flint residents immediately complained of water that looked, tasted, and smelled foul. There was evidence of E. coli contamination in the water, a localized outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease, and a dangerously high lead poisoning rate in children. Without proper corrosion-control treatment, lead leached from aging pipes into the water. The plaintiffs, children who suffered lead poisoning, brain damage, and other injuries, sued “governmental defendants” and “engineering defendants.” Criminal charges were prosecuted at the same time.The appellants, Flint Emergency Managers, and the former Flint Director of Public Works sought a protective order in the civil litigation after their initial criminal charges were dismissed, asking the court to delay discovery pertaining to them until the criminal statute of limitations expired or to seal the discovery. The district court denied the motion. Each sat for a deposition; none invoked the Fifth Amendment. All were later indicted.The governmental defendants settled the civil case. The remaining civil defendants served subpoenas on appellants, who moved to quash, contending that they would invoke their privilege against self-incrimination. The court denied the motions, concluding that they had waived the privilege by testifying at their depositions. At trial, after each appellant invoked the Fifth Amendment, the court played videos of the depositions. After a mistrial, the court scheduled a retrial.The Sixth Circuit vacated. Appellants’ deposition waivers did not waive the privilege at trial because the waiver extended only through cross-examination at their depositions. View "Walters v. Snyder" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint asserting that New Hampshire's criminal defamation statute was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and violated the First Amendment by criminalizing defamatory speech, holding that Appellant's allegations did not assert viable constitutional claims.At issue was N.H. Rev. Stat. 644:11(I), which provides that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he "purposely communicates to any person, orally or in writing, any information he knows to be false and knows will tend to expose any other living person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Appellant was twice charged under the statute. Appellant later brought this complaint. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), precluded Appellant's First Amendment attack on section 644:11; and (2) the New Hampshire statute was not unconstitutionally vague. View "Frese v. Formella" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of conviction of attempted murder and other offenses entered by the trial court, holding that multiple acts of prosecutorial error occurred in this case, requiring remand for a new trial.A jury found Defendant guilty of attempted murder, elevated aggravated assault, robbery, and reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, Defendant principally argued that the trial court erred in denying his repeated motions for a mistrial based on allegedly improper comments made during the prosecution's opening statement, closing statement, and rebuttal. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the State committed error in its opening statement and closing argument; and (2) because Defendant's substantial rights were impaired, under Me. Const. art. I, 6 and 6-A and this Court's supervisory power, the appropriate remedy in this case was a new trial. View "State v. White" on Justia Law