Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this petition for an extraordinary writ the Supreme Court held that when probable cause has been found after a preliminary hearing but the case is dismissed without prejudice due to a defect in the prosecution, Haw. R. Pen. P. 12(g) permits a court to hold a defendant in custody or continue bail for a specified time that is reasonable under the circumstances.After the court dismissed charges against Scott Deangelo, it ordered under Rule 12(g) that Deangelo remain in custody for ninety days while the State sought a grand jury indictment. Deangelo brought this challenge to Rule 12(g), arguing that it violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Haw. Rev. Stat. 803-9(5), which requires an arrested person to be taken before a qualified magistrate for examination within forty-eight hours of arrest. The Supreme Court held that Rule 12(g) is constitutional and that the time specified must be reasonable in light of all of the circumstances. View "Deangelo v. Souza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and his corresponding death sentence, as well as Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit murder, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant raised numerous challenges to his convictions and death sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in its entirety, holding (1) there was no merit to Defendant's arguments regarding the guilt phase of his trial; and (2) Defendant's claims regarding the penalty phase of his trial were also without merit. View "Sievers v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that the circuit court did not err on Appellant's seven separate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. Appellant later filed a petition under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37 arguing that the circuit court erred on seven distinct allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Appellant's arguments on appeal had merit and that the circuit court did not err in denying postconviction relief. View "Gentry v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Appellate Division affirming Defendant's conviction for second-degree rape in satisfaction of the indictment against him, holding that the Appellate Division misinterpreted the test in People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 422, (1975), for deciding whether pretrial delays rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.Defendant's convictions stemmed from the sexual assault of a fourteen-year-old girl. The time between the crime and Defendant's indictment was almost eight years. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the delay in prosecution deprived him of his state and federal constitutional right to due process. County Court denied the motion to dismiss, and Defendant pled guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division misinterpreted the Tranovich framework and that remand was required for a factual and legal review made under the proper framework. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Illinois State Police Officer Myers supervised 10 controlled drug purchases by a confidential source (CS) at a Cairo residence. Each purchase was recorded on video. The CS initially said that “Cornelius Dean” was selling crack cocaine at the house. Eventually, the CS found out the dealer’s name was Ed. Ed later told the CS that his surname was “Johnson.” Myers searched for an image of an “Ed or Edward Johnson” in the Illinois Secretary of State database but found no match. Alexander County Sheriff Brown suggested Ed’s last name might be Osborne. Myers again checked the state database and discovered that “Phillip Edward Osborne” resided in Cairo. Myers obtained Osborne’s driver’s license photo and concluded that it matched the dealer in the drug buy videos. Myers reported that the CS, upon seeing the photo, unequivocally, identified Osborne. Myers obtained an arrest warrant. Osborne was arrested and remained incarcerated for seven days before being released on bond. The state eventually dismissed the charges.Osborne sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the claims against the county and granted Myers summary judgment on the false arrest claim, finding no evidence to undermine probable cause to arrest Osborne and that Myers was entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to the warrant and the underlying information, with little more than bare allegations that Myers lied in his warrant application. View "Johnson v. Myers" on Justia Law

In 1995, Range pleaded guilty to making false statements about his income to obtain $2,458 of food stamp assistance in violation of Pennsylvania law, a conviction that was classified as a misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Range was sentenced to three years’ probation, plus restitution, costs, and fines. Three years later, Range attempted to purchase a firearm but was rejected by the instant background check system. Range’s wife subsequently bought him a deer-hunting rifle. Years, later Range learned that he was barred from purchasing and possessing firearms because of his welfare fraud conviction. He sold his rifle to a firearms dealer and sought a declaratory judgment that 18 U.S.C. 922(g) violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. The section prohibits firearm ownership by any person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year—the federal definition of a felony.The district court rejected the suit, holding that the Second Amendment does not protect “unvirtuous citizens.” The Third Circuit affirmed. Based on history and tradition, “the people” constitutionally entitled to bear arms are “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” a category that properly excludes those who have demonstrated disregard for the rule of law through the commission of felony and felony-equivalent offenses, whether or not those crimes are violent. Even if Range fell within “the people,” the government demonstrated that its prohibition is consistent with historical tradition. View "Range v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff moved under state law for an order permitting him to conduct DNA testing and fingerprint analysis on evidence found at the crime scene more than forty years ago. The superior court denied relief in an October 21, 2022 order. Plaintiff sought a review of this order via a special action petition in the Arizona Supreme Court. The state supreme court accepted jurisdiction and affirmed the superior court's ruling. Plaintiff then commenced this federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. He sought a declaratory judgment that the Arizona statutes providing for forensic testing of DNA and other evidence are unconstitutional as applied to him as well as an injunction ordering defendants to permit him to conduct the forensic testing. He moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting his execution until he obtains this relief. The district court denied the injunction, and he appealed.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying the preliminary injunction and remanded with instructions to dismiss. The court concluded that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because this action amounted to an improper appeal of the state court's judgment. View "MURRAY HOOPER V. MARK BRNOVICH, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion to suppress evidence that law enforcement discovered her minor child in Petitioner's home after the child absconded from her grandparents' supervision, holding that there was no error.Petitioner entered a conditional plea to one count of child concealment. At issue on appeal, was the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion to suppress evidence that her child, who had been adjudicated as a status offender for truancy and placed in a temporary guardianship with her grandparents, was discovered in her home after escaping from her grandparents' supervision five months prior. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the officers had a reasonable belief that the child lived with Petitioner at her apartment and was within the residence at the time they entered; and (2) therefore, there was no error in the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's motion to suppress. View "State v. Pennington" on Justia Law

Reho, proceeding pro se, moved for an extension of time to apply for a certificate of appealability and to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, 83 days after the district court entered judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. If Reho’s motion was a notice of appeal, it was three weeks late, 28 U.S.C. 2107(b)(1); Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B)(i).The Sixth Circuit remanded. If Reho’s motion was a notice of appeal, it was time-barred. However, the motion, which repeatedly asks for an extension of time and offered an explanation for his delay, is better construed as a motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, 28 U.S.C. 2107(c); Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5)(A); the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal based on “excusable neglect or good cause” if the petitioner moves for an extension within 30 days of the expiration of the time to file a notice of appeal. On remand, the district court must determine whether Reho has shown excusable neglect or good cause so as to merit an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. View "Reho v. United States" on Justia Law

Bennett contends that Division 10 of Cook County Jail does not satisfy the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act because it lacks grab bars and other fixtures that disabled inmates need in order to use showers and toilets safely. Bennett cited a regulation providing that as of 1988, "construction[] or alteration of buildings” must comply with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS), 28 C.F.R. 42.522(b)(1). UFAS requires accessible toilets with grab bars nearby and accessible showers with mounted seats, Division 10 was constructed in 1992.In 2020, the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of class certification, stating that Bennett “proposes a class that will win if the Standards apply (and were violated, to detainees’ detriment).” On remand, the district court certified a class. More than two years later, the judge decertified the class, reasoning that some class members, although using aids such as wheelchairs, may not be disabled under the statutes.The Seventh Circuit again reversed. The 2020 decision identified an issue relevant to every Division 10 detainee. Class certification under Rule 23(c)(4) resolves the issue, not the whole case. Class members could receive the benefit of a declaratory judgment on the issue but would need to proceed in individual suits to seek damages; if the class loses, every detainee would be bound by issue preclusion. The application of UFAS can be determined class-wide while leaving to the future any particular inmate’s claim to relief. View "Bennett v. Dart" on Justia Law