Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for murder and two counts of attempted murder, holding that the jury permissibly resolved the issues of fact raised on appeal against Defendant.On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence did not support his convictions because the jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter at issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to identify Defendant as the shooter; (2) the doubts Defendant raised about the evidence presented factual disputes that the jury was entitled to resolve; and (3) the jury could reasonably have resolved an inconsistency in the evidence in the State's favor. View "Young v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of second-degree murder after denying his motion to suppress, holding that the district court erred in determining when Defendant's interrogation became custodial, and that error required reversal.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred in ruling that Defendant was not in custody during his police station interview until he was directed to remain in an interview room; (2) it was not harmless error to admit incriminating statements Defendant made after his interrogation became custodial; and (3) the record supported the district court's conclusion that Defendant's confession was voluntary. View "Mills v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate term holding that the evidence was legally insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of harassment in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.At issue on appeal was whether Defendant's statements to the victim that her children "were going to get a bullet in their heads" and that he was going to firebomb her home and kill her and her family were serious and unequivocal threats of physical harm. The appellate term concluded that Defendant's speech did not constitute a violation of the second-degree harassment statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Defendant threatened the victim with physical contact of a serious nature, with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm her. View "People v. Lagano" on Justia Law

Bergman crossed the center line, drove into an oncoming truck, and killed its two occupants. Scientists testified that she had prescription drugs (oxycodone, a muscle relaxer, and Adderal) in her system, along with alcohol, at the time of this crash (and at the time of several prior accidents). The state’s expert opined that these drugs impaired her driving. The state relied on her prior incidents to prove that she knew the risks of getting behind the wheel after taking prescription drugs. Bergman claimed that she should have been provided an expert toxicologist at her trial for driving on a suspended license, operating a vehicle while intoxicated, and second-degree murder. In its 1985 “Ake” decision, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause requires states to provide psychiatric experts to indigent defendants who have a credible insanity defense.A Michigan court held that Ake did not require the state to provide Bergman with a defense toxicologist because she failed to show a sufficient need for one notwithstanding the state’s expert evidence. The Sixth Circuit rejected Bergman’s federal habeas petition as not meeting the stringent standards for relief in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), given the Supreme Court’s lack of clarity over Ake’s scope. View "Bergman v. Howard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court to deny Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the police officer in this case did not have particularized reasonable suspicion that a crime or traffic violation took place before performing the traffic stop at issue.Officer Alexis Meier was told to be on the lookout for a Harley-Davidson motorcycle driving erratically and speeding. Officer Meier spotted a motorcycle that showed to be a Harley-Davidson registered to Defendant. Without seeing any erratic driving, speeding, or other traffic violations, Officer Meier performed a traffic stop. Officer Meier subsequently developed evidence supporting an arrest for Defendant's eighth operating while intoxicated offense. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the traffic stop was unconstitutional because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Meier lacked reasonable suspicion to perform the stop. View "State v. Richey" on Justia Law

In 2007, Jones was convicted of possessing a methamphetamine mixture with intent to distribute it. Because Jones had twice served time, in California and Nevada, for similar narcotics offenses the court sentenced Jones to 360 months in prison, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). In 2016, Jones filed an unsuccessful 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence. In 2021, Jones obtained dismissal of his prior California conviction and filed another section 2255 motion, arguing that dismissal of the California conviction triggered resentencing under the Supreme Court’s 2005 “Johnson” decision.Believing the motion second or successive, the district court transferred it to the Sixth Circuit. That court returned the case to the district court, concluding that the motion is neither second nor successive. When “the events giving rise” to a section 2255 claim have not yet occurred at the time of a prisoner’s first 2255 motion, a later motion predicated on those events is not “second or successive.” The events giving rise” to Jones’s Johnson claim occurred in 2021 when California dismissed and vacated Jones’s prior California conviction. View "In re: Ronald Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant's motion for new trial based on allegations of juror misconduct, holding that the motion was clearly untimely, and therefore, the circuit court did not have authority to act on Appellant's motion when it entered orders in this action.In 2004, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2018, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for new trial alleging juror misconduct. The trial judge dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice and denied the motion for new trial. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant's motion for new trial was untimely, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. View "Herron v. Ark. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court to deny Appellant's petition for postconviction relief, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's petition for postconviction relief.In 2016, Appellant was found guilty of aggravated murder, gross abuse of a corpse, and tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the aggravated murder. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief arguing that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to present evidence about neonaticide, as it is currently understood, as a mitigating factor. The trial court denied the petition, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's decision denying Appellant's postconviction petition was unreasonable and arbitrary and not based on competent and credible evidence. View "State v. Weaver" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals upholding that decision of the trial court to deny Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered after a traffic stop, holding that there was no error.After executing the traffic stop at issue, a law enforcement officer ordered Defendant to step out of the car and opened the door for him to do so. Another officer later looked through the open door and spotted a marijuana cigarette on the floor. A subsequent search of the car led to the discovery of a pistol. Defendant pleaded no contest to firearm-related charges. On appeal, Defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by ordering Defendant to exit the car; (2) opening the door was not a search; (3) the second officer did not conduct a search; and (4) under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the discovery of the marijuana cigarette in plain view allowed the officers to search the car. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of felony murder, with robbery in the third degree as the predicate felony and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the prosecutor committed improprieties during closing argument by arguing facts that were not in evidence and by making inferences that were unsupported by the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of felony murder with the predicate felony of third-degree robbery; and (2) the prosecutor did not engage in improprieties during closing argument that deprived Defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law