Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this case considering whether unprovoked flight in a high-crime area should no longer be considered a factor that gives rise to rebate articulable suspicion for a Terry stop, the Court of Appeals held that, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's rights under either the Fourth Amendment or Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights were not violated.Defendant, who was standing in an high-crime area in Baltimore City, fled when he saw an unmarked vehicle. Ultimately, detectives stopped Defendant and found a gun in his waistband. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him based solely on his unprovoked flight in a high-crime area. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion, holding that, under under the totality of the circumstances analysis, a court may consider whether unprovoked flight is an indication of criminal activity that, together with evidence of a high-crime area and any other relevant factors, establishes reasonable suspicion for a stop, or whether unprovoked flight, under the circumstances of the case, is a factor consistent with innocence that adds little or nothing to the reasonable suspicion analysis. View "Washington v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that the trial court complied with the procedure implemented in N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1201(d)(1) by the legislature for the trial court to consent to Defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial for the status offense of habitual felon, holding that the court of appeals did not err.After a colloquy on the record, in which Defendant gave notice in open court of his waiver of a jury trial, the trial court proceeded with a bench trial and found Defendant guilty of multiple drug-related offenses. Before the court proceeded with the phase of the trial addressing the habitual felon status offense, Defendant signed and acknowledged under oath another waiver of jury trial form. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in how it personally addressed him and in determining that he fully understood and appreciated the consequences of his decision to waive the right to trial by jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the court of appeals did not err by concluding that the trial court complied with the procedure set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1201(d)(1) for the court to consent to Defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial for the habitual felon offense. View "State v. Rollinson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court determining that Defendant's behavior was sufficiently egregious to warrant the forfeiture of her right to counsel, holding that Defendant was entitled to a new trial.Defendant was charged with attempting to possess a firearm while subject to an ex parte Domestic Violence Protection Order prohibiting the same. After a trial, at which Defendant proceeded pro se, the jury found Defendant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the court of appeals erred in holding that Defendant waived her right to counsel or alternatively forfeited her right to counsel. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) the issue of waiver was inapposite because Defendant expressly requested the appointment of counsel; and (2) the trial court erred in its alternate determination that Defendant's behavior was sufficiently egregious to warrant the forfeiture of the right to counsel. View "State v. Atwell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the superior court granting Defendant's motion to suppress two statements to Warwick police detectives in the course of their investigation, holding that the superior court abused its discretion.The trial justice suppress statements based on its findings that Defendant was in custody when he voluntarily accompanied the police detectives in an unmarked vehicle to search for evidence, that Defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights, and that Defendant's video-recorded statement was inadmissible in accordance with Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's order, holding (1) one of the statements at issue was admissible in evidence; and (2) remand was required for limited factual determination by the trial justice as to whether the other statement was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. View "State v. Morillo" on Justia Law

Five days after Carter was booked into the Macon County Jail, he died of diabetic ketoacidosis. In the hours preceding his death, Carter exhibited symptoms commonly associated with diabetic ketoacidosis: confusion, lethargy, and labored breathing. He was denied timely medical care because the jail nurse thought he was faking his condition. She assured the corrections officers tasked with transferring Carter out of the medical unit that his vitals were within a normal range. Relying on the nurse’s medical judgment, the officers declined to intervene and proceeded to relocate Carter, believing that his failure to follow orders stemmed from deliberate refusal, not medically induced incapacity.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, including claims against five corrections officers, the district court denied the officers’ summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding there to be a material factual dispute over whether they had reason to know that Carter was receiving inadequate medical care, creating a duty to intervene. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Established circuit precedent entitles a corrections officer to defer to the judgment of medical professionals. That is what the officers did here; they are entitled to qualified immunity. View "McGee v. Parsano" on Justia Law

Dorsey, an Illinois state prisoner, was emptying a bucket in the prison laundry when he felt a pop in his lower back and felt pain shoot down his leg. He asked to see a nurse and was told to “go lay down.” Dorsey took ibuprofen and lay down for two hours, but his pain worsened. He again, unsuccessfully, requested permission to seek medical care. The next morning, Dorsey could barely move. Six days later, a nurse concluded that he was exaggerating his symptoms. Dorsey alleges that instead of being treated for back pain, he was prescribed psychiatric medications without his knowledge or consent and was disciplined for refusing to take those medications.Dorsey sued. The district court screened his complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and determined that Dorsey had improperly joined unrelated claims. His complaint asserted three claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against 12 defendants. Two claims alleged Eighth Amendment violations based on the poorly maintained washing machines and deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition, his back injury. The third alleged a due process violation, that Dorsey was prescribed medications without his consent. After deeming three amended complaints unsatisfactory, the district court dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Dorsey’s claims met both requirements of Rule 20(a)(2), so joinder was legally permissible and the dismissal was an abuse of discretion. The court rejected his other claims. View "Dorsey v. Varga" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of open container and driving under the influence (DUI) and imposing a suspended imposition of sentence, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Based on information obtained during a 911 call made by Defendant's daughter reporting that Defendant may be drinking and driving and providing Defendant's location officers conducted a traffic stop of Defendant's van and then arrested her for DUI. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the traffic stop was an unconstitutional search and seizure. The circuit court denied the motion and found Defendant guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court properly concluded that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol at the time of the stop. View "State v. Rosa" on Justia Law

Wallace and Santos, inmates at Menard Correctional Center in Illinois filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Menard’s “double-ceiling” policy of housing two inmates in single-person cells violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Where a plaintiff is able to point to some evidence that administrative remedies were not “available” to him under the PLRA, as described by the Supreme Court in its 2016 Ross v. Blake decision, the district court must decide whether remedies were “available” before granting summary judgment on exhaustion. The plaintiffs claimed to have submitted grievances, offered some evidence that other inmates complained of the same issue with no response, and cited a mechanism by which prison officials can allegedly use state law to reject their grievances without any consideration of their merits. The court remanded for consideration of the exhaustion question as it applies to double-celling at Menard. If the district court finds that double-celling remedies were “available,” then the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies. The court affirmed a factual determination that Santos did not file a grievance regarding Menard’s double-celling policy. View "Wallace v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting and sentencing Defendant for robbery, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.On appeal, Defendant argued that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel during his criminal trial. Defendant also argued, for the first time, that the district court compromised his right to a unanimous jury verdict by not giving a specific unanimity instruction requiring the jury to agree that either or both victims were in fear of immediate bodily injury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel; and (2) this Court declines to exercise plain error review to address Defendant's second argument on appeal. View "State v. Winzenburg" on Justia Law

Warren, Ohio, police officers responded to a call about an unknown disturbance at a gas station in the early morning hours. They found Jones playing loud music from his SUV in the parking lot. Jones turned off the music. While the officers drove around the building to investigate, Jones drove away. Officers followed Jones, pulled him over, and told him that they had stopped him for a noise ordinance violation. The officers then smelled marijuana and searched the car, finding hidden compartments containing two firearms, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. The district court denied Jones’s motion to suppress. Jones was convicted on four gun-and-drug-related counts.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The stop of Jones’s car was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits officers to warrantlessly arrest—to seize—a person if the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a misdemeanor in his presence. The search of Jones’s SUV revealed loaded firearms in close proximity to drugs, plastic baggies, and a digital scale; sufficient evidence supports the conviction for possessing the firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking. The court rejected an argument that nine comments made by the prosecutor in his closing argument amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law