Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Detective Kopchak, investigating drug trafficking, observed Rivers leaving a house, driving a red Nissan Ultima to sell drugs to an informant, and returning to the same house. After days of surveillance, investigators determined that Rivers lived at the house, and executed a search warrant. Kopchak again observed the Nissan, looked through its window, and allegedly observed a cigar wrapper, a piece of paper in the center console, and a small plastic bag that he identified as “a bag of dope.” Lieutenant DiPenti verbally indicated that he also saw the “bag of dope.” Officers found Loines and others in Rivers’ residence and read them their Miranda rights. Loines volunteered that car keys, belonging to the Nissan, were his. The car was towed for an inventory search. Officers took a picture of the car’s center console, showing a small plastic bag underneath a cigar wrapper, with a lottery ticket beside it. Officers searched the vehicle and found a firearm, two bags of suspected narcotics, and a scale. Police did not obtain a warrant to search the automobile.Loines, charged with drug crimes under 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and a firearm offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle. The Sixth Circuit reversed; the “bag of dope” was not in plain view, there was no probable cause to search the vehicle, and the government did not satisfy the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. View "United States v. Loines" on Justia Law

Around 11:14 a.m., Deanna called 911, claiming that she feared for her life because her husband was “threatening [her] with guns,” was on “new medication from the doctor,” and had “tremendous guns” in their house. Deputy Swick arrived knowing that Puskas had weapons and observed stuff scattered across the lawn and Puskas holding a rifle. Puskas put the rifle down. Swick told Puskas multiple times to get on the ground. Puskas walked toward the house instead. He stopped, picked up a bag, and pulled out a shotgun, and told Swick to “run.” From his vehicle, Swick reported that Puskas had a shotgun. Puskas dropped the shotgun. Sunbury Police Officers arrived, tried to verbally engage Puskas, and requested a negotiator. Deputy Gibson arrived, with a canine, Cash. Puskas ignored the officers and continued meandering around the yard, tossing a shirt at the officers. Gibson released Cash. Puskas ran toward the house. Cash initially targeted the shirt. Gibson refocused Cash. The officers followed Cash with their guns drawn. Puskas darted behind a tree and picked up a pistol case. Someone yelled, “he’s got a pistol.” Puskas pulled out a revolver. The officers shot him at 11:38 a.m. Puskas died at the hospital.Deanna sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force in deploying Cash and shooting Puskas. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. Body camera footage confirms that their actions were reasonable under the circumstances. View "Puskas v. Delaware County., Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision of the juvenile court judge denying Juvenile's motion to suppress evidence of a seized firearm on the grounds that police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop her, holding that the juvenile court did not err.As a result of a report about kids displaying a firearm outside a housing complex four police officers were dispatched to the complex. One officer noticed Juvenile walking along the street who kept adjusting the waistband of her pants. The officers stopped her, conducted a patfrisk, and discovered a loaded firearm in Juvenile's waistband. After her motion to suppress was denied Juvenile entered a conditional guilty plea to four firearms-related offenses. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Juvenile was carrying an illegal firearm in her waistband, and therefore, the stop and pat frisk of Juvenile comported with constitutional requirements. View "Commonwealth v. Karen K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for the first-degree premediated murder of her estranged husband, holding that Defendant was not entitled to reversal on her claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate Defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment by placing limits on cross-examination; (2) the district court did not err by denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's evidence because the State presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of first-degree premeditated murder against Defendant; and (3) sufficient evidence supported Defendant's conviction for first-degree premeditated murder. View "State v. Frantz " on Justia Law

Indicted in Florida and Connecticut, Villa cooperated with prosecutors. Meanwhile, Villa was indicted in Kentucky. Villa was unaware of those charges when he pled guilty (represented by Perez) in the other cases. Those courts sentenced him to concurrent terms of 140 and 98 months. The Kentucky prosecutor, Judd, emailed Meier (Villa’s attorney) a proposed plea agreement, which assumed no further cooperation but stated that if Villa were willing to cooperate further, Judd would consider recommending a concurrent sentence. Later, Villa spoke to Meier and Perez in a three-way phone call. Meier allegedly did not mention Judd’s offer. Villa met with Judd, an FBI agent, and an investigator. Judd told Villa that the government wanted him to testify against a co-defendant but did not mention the possibility of a cooperation agreement. Villa pled guilty without an agreement and was sentenced to 77 months, consecutive to his other sentences.Villa moved to set aside his sentence, citing ineffective assistance of counsel. When Meier provided the case file, Villa allegedly discovered that Judd had mentioned a cooperation agreement and a concurrent sentence. Villa moved to amend his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, attaching an affidavit in which he said that Meier never told him about Judd’s offer and that he would have accepted it, plus an affidavit from Perez. The government submitted an affidavit from Meier, asserting that he told Villa about Judd’s offer.The district court denied Villa's motion, reasoning that Judd’s wanting Villa to testify against Rodriguez-Hernandez should have put Villa on notice of a potential agreement. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The district court expected too much of an uncounseled defendant conversing in his second language with a federal prosecutor. Nothing about Villa’s meeting with Judd resolved the factual dispute presented by the affidavits. View "Villa v. United States" on Justia Law

O’Connor is the parent of John. When John was 14 years old, O’Connor allegedly “supplied excessive amounts of alcohol to her son and his minor friends to the point where minors would vomit, be unable to stand, and fall unconscious. When these minors were extremely intoxicated from the alcohol, she encouraged them to engage in sexual activity with each other, facilitated sexual encounters, and watched some of these sexual encounters.” O’Connor also helped the minors leave their homes at night without their parents’ knowledge, communicating with them via Snapchat or text message and picking them up down the street from their homes.O’Connor is currently held in pretrial custody on charges of 39 offenses involving 15 minor victims. The trial court denied release on bail due to the seriousness of the charged offenses, which include 12 counts of felony child endangerment (Penal Code 273a(a)), along with evidence showing that less restrictive conditions of release on bail would not protect the public or the minor victims. O’Connor filed a habeas petition, contending that she was entitled to bail as a matter of law. On remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal again denied the petition, concluding that O’Connor was charged with qualifying felony offenses involving an act of violence on another person within the meaning of California Constitution, article I, section 12(b). View "In re O'Connor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer's act of shining a spotlight for illumination does not ipso facto constitute a detention under the Fourth Amendment, but rather, the proper inquiry requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, including the use of the spotlight.Defendant was charged with drug offenses after a law enforcement officer conducted a search of the car he was driving. At issue was whether the officer engaged in a consensual encounter when he pulled behind Defendant's car and turned on his spotlight. The court of appeal concluded that spotlight illumination and approach on foot did not "manifest a sufficient show of police authority to constitute a detention." The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant was not detained by the officer's use of a spotlight; and (2) remand was appropriate for a new factual finding as to whether the officer's detention of the vehicle's female passenger effectuated a detention of Defendant. View "People v. Tacardon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that In re T.H., 913 N.W.2d 578 (Iowa 2018) applies only to juvenile sex offenders whose cases are prosecuted and resolved in juvenile court and declined Defendant's invitation to apply its holding to a juvenile offender who is prosecuted and convicted in district court.At age seventeen, Defendant confessed to sexually abusing three children. Defendant was convicted on four class B felony counts and, at age twenty, was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The court suspended the prison sentences, placed Defendant on probation, and imposed the special sentence of lifetime parole applicable to class B felonies under Iowa Code section 903B.1. The court further required Defendant to register as a sex offender under Iowa Code 692A.103(1). Defendant appealed, arguing that it is unconstitutional under In re T.H. to require a juvenile to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) In re T.H. does not apply to juvenile sex offenders prosecuted in district court; (2) registration under chapter 692A is not part of the "sentence" that can be suspended under section 901.5(13); and (3) Iowa Code 901.5(13) allowsed the district court to suspend Defendant's Iowa Code 903B.1 special sentence in whole or in part. View "State v. Hess" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress the fentanyl discovered in his waistband during a pat-frisk conducted after an anonymous tip alerted the police department of two men passed out in a vehicle, holding that there was no error.In denying Defendant's motion to suppress, the district court concluded that the investigatory stop did not violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Defendant could have been armed with a weapon to justify a Terry frisk. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion for the initial encounter, for extending the stop, and to believe Defendant was armed and dangerous. View "United States v. Harrington" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence collected during the investigation that led to his arrest, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered after agents executed a warrant to search his residence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the warrant's affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the criminal activity and the places to be searched; (2) the district court reasonably found that no search of Defendant's person occurred; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Defendant's statements to law enforcement agents. View "United States v. Corleto" on Justia Law