Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's challenge to his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden of showing that his counsel's performance during the underlying criminal trial was deficient.Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to distribute a substance containing cocaine base and one count of malicious damage or destruction of property by fire. At sentencing, the trial court determined that Appellant was a career offender in part because his prior Maine state court conviction for unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs qualified as a "controlled substance offense" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. In this collateral challenge to his sentence, Appellant argued that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel during his sentencing hearing based on his counsel's failure to object to the use of the Maine drug conviction as a predicate offense for the career offender enhancement. The First Circuit denied relief, holding that Appellant's ineffective assistance claim failed. View "Thompson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of employing a minor in an obscene performance in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-196a, sexual assault in the first degree, and other offenses, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to sever the sexual offenses with the nonsexual offenses and in joining the informations for trial; (2) the obscene performance statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant's conduct, and the First Amendment did not require the Court to undertake an independent appellate review of that conviction; (3) the trial court's potentially incorrect rulings, including those relating to the excludion from evidence video recordings of forensic interviews of the victim, were harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions of assault in the third degree, criminal violation of a protective order, and stalking in the first degree. View "State v. Michael R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question of law concerning the applicability of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-37 to this case, concluding that section 53-37 did not apply because Plaintiff's complaint did not allege any speech constituting an "advertisement."Plaintiff brought this reenforcement action challenging 53-37, which provides that "[a]ny person who, by his advertisement, ridicules or holds up to contempt any person or class of persons, on account of the creed, religion, color, denomination, nationality or race of such person or class of persons, shall be guilty of a class D misdemeanor." Plaintiff alleged that the statue violated his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and sought declaratory and injunctive relief seeking permanently to enjoin the enforcement of the statute. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action because he had failed to allege an injury in fact. The Supreme Court answered a certified question regarding the issue by answering that the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that section 53-37 was not intended to encompass the type of personal, noncommercial speech alleged in Plaintiff's complaint. View "Cerame v. Lamont" on Justia Law

Gilbert, on parole for a state conviction, was arrested for printing false identifications and credit cards and was returned to the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Federal authorities charged Gilbert with identity theft crimes. Wolf was Gilbert's appointed counsel. Gilbert consented to federal detention pending trial. Gilbert pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(4) and 1028A(a)(1). After reviewing Gilbert’s PSR, Wolf realized that he had mistakenly led Gilbert to believe that the time Gilbert had spent in federal detention would be credited against his federal sentence. Wolf acknowledged the error. The court offered Gilbert the opportunity to withdraw his plea but Gilbert decided to continue with sentencing. The court sentenced Gilbert to 15 months on Count 1, concurrent to the undischarged Michigan term, and 24 months on Count 2, “consecutive to Count 1 and all other terms of imprisonment.”Gilbert filed a habeas motion. Wolf admitted that he gave Gilbert erroneous advice and that because of his incorrect understanding of the law he did not expedite Gilbert’s guilty plea and sentence; did not seek a downward adjustment under USSG 5G1.3; and did not object when the court ruled that the aggravated identity theft sentence had to run consecutive to all other undischarged sentences. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even if Gilbert could demonstrate that counsel’s performance—initial error followed by correction—was deficient, he failed to present evidence of prejudice. Sentences imposed under the aggravated identity theft statute must run consecutive to all other (including state) sentences and are not subject to USSG 5G1.3 adjustments. View "Gilbert v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying Defendants' motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3210 and his subsequent motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1507 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and involuntariness when he entered the plea, holding that the district court did not err.On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that Defendant did not preserve any issue on appeal as it related to his section 60-1507 motion and that Defendant made new arguments that were inappropriately raised for the first time on appeal. As to the denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea under Kan. Stat. Ann. 22-3210(d)(2), the Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw plea. View "Shelton-Jenkins v. State" on Justia Law

Several defendants were charged by indictment in separate cases with various offenses arising from their alleged participation in the Capitol riot on January 6, 2021. Among other charges, the government also charged each Defendant with one count of Obstruction of an Official Proceeding under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The district court granted each Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The government filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. At issue on consolidated appeal is whether individuals who allegedly assaulted law enforcement officers while participating in the Capitol riot can be charged with corruptly obstructing, influencing, or impeding an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The DC Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the counts under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The court wrote that Defendants’ alleged conduct falls comfortably within the plain meaning of “corruptly . . . obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] [an] official proceeding, or attempt[ing] to do so.” The alternative interpretations of Section 1512(c)(2) proffered by the district court and Defendants failed to convince the court to depart from the natural reading of the statute’s unambiguous text. View "USA v. Joseph Fischer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and two counts of failure to possess a tax stamp, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Officers entered Defendant's apartment without a warrant over the objections of the occupants. They then obtained a search warrant, finding evidence resulting in criminal charges. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the initial warrantless entry was unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the search was justified under the emergency aid doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the emergency aid doctrine permitted the police officers' entry into the residents to render emergency aid to a possible shooting victim hidden inside. View "State v. Youm" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court concluding that Defendants discriminated against prospective tenants in violation of municipal law by steering prospective tenants of a protected religion or national origin away from their rental properties, holding that there was insufficient evidence against Defendants under the proper jury instruction.The Des Moines Civil and Human Rights Commission brought this action alleging that Defendants, a husband and wife who owned rental properties together, engaged in housing discrimination. The jury found the husband was liable for steering and imposed a civil penalty of $50,000 against him. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for dismissal of the steering charge against the husband, holding that the district court's instructions misled the jury to the husband's detriment. View "Des Moines Civil & Human Rights Comm'n v. Knueven" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, harassment of a public official, and interference with official acts, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress.Defendant was out drinking when his wife called him. When Defendant arrived home, his wife had been arrested for child endangerment and was handcuffed in a squad car. Knowing Defendant was agitated, the followed him inside his home where a social worker was interviewing three children in her investigation of child endangerment. At issue was whether the police needed a warrant to enter the home to protect the social worker. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officers' warrantless entry under these exigent circumstances did not violate Defendant's rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment or Iowa Const. I, 8. View "State v. Torres" on Justia Law

Around midnight, Woolridge walked through an Akron neighborhood where police were searching for a fugitive. Officer Collins approached him and asked for his name. Woolridge turned and ran, tossing several items. Officers caught Woolridge, who immediately said, “I got a warrant” and “I got a parole violation.” Collins moved Woolridge to a containment van while, Woolridge tried to speak with Collins, who brushed him off. Eventually, Collins asked Woolridge about the items he threw during the chase. Woolridge ultimately explained that his brother had been murdered and “I had a firearm.” Officers found the gun only after asking Woolridge to specify where he threw the gun. As Collins began reading the Miranda warnings, Woolridge said “I know my rights.” Collins proceeded to give them. Woolridge again explained that he had carried the gun due to his brother’s murder.Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). Woolridge moved to suppress the statements he made before receiving the Miranda warnings. The district court suppressed the unwarned statements and permitted the admission of the post-Miranda statements. Woolridge pleaded guilty. The court varied upward by 13 months, imposing a 46-month sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Woolridge knew he had a choice and decided to speak anyway. The court explained its reasons for the sentence: Woolridge’s numerous offenses, his pattern of illegally possessing firearms, and many prison rule infractions. View "United States v. Woolridge" on Justia Law