Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Evans was charged with murder. While awaiting trial, Evans asked his cellmate to kill two witnesses. The cellmate secretly recorded those conversations for the authorities. State charges followed for soliciting murder. In 1999 two separate juries convicted Evans of both murder and solicitation. After Illinois courts affirmed both convictions on direct appeal, Evans filed a petition for postconviction relief in state court in 2003. His petition is still pending. In 2019, frustrated with the delay, Evans invoked 28 U.S.C. 2254 and turned to federal court for relief. He claimed that Illinois’s postconviction relief process had proven “ineffective,” allowing him to seek federal habeas relief without waiting further for relief in the Illinois courts.The Seventh Circuit agreed with Evans and vacated the denial of relief. “The delay Evans has experienced of twenty years and counting is beyond the pale and indefensible.” The exhaustion requirement is neither ironclad nor unyielding. A state-law remedy can become ineffective or unavailable by virtue of delay if the delay is both inordinate and attributable to the state. In this case, the “extraordinary delay has stemmed in no small part from the state’s own conduct, both in its capacity as a respondent to the litigation and as the state trial court itself.” View "Evans v. Wills" on Justia Law

White. convicted of four counts of aggravated murder, two counts of attempted murder, two counts of felonious assault, one count of aggravated burglary, three counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of having a weapon while under disability, was sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, White argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney, Armengau, was under indictment in Franklin County, Ohio, for serious criminal offenses and “would have been conflicted over whether to devote time to preparing his own defense or that of his client”; “would have been reluctant to vigorously represent White" for fear of angering the prosecutor; and might have failed to engage in plea-bargaining in White’s case out of a desire to gain a victory over the prosecutor. The Ohio Court of Appeals declined to consider White’s claim because the record lacked necessary facts.In White's federal habeas proceedings, the district court found that Armengau had told White about Armengau’s indictment but White had decided to retain Armengau anyway. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Because White’s claim depends on facts outside the state court record, the Supreme Court’s 2022 "Shinn" decision likely precludes relief. Even considering the new facts introduced in federal habeas court, White’s claim fails. White failed to show that the alleged conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. White and Armengau’s cases were handled by different judges and were prosecuted by different authorities. View "White v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) requires sex offenders who study, work, or reside in Indiana to register with the state. Indiana residents who committed sex offenses either before the Indiana General Assembly enacted SORA or before the Assembly amended SORA to cover their specific offense challenged, under the Equal Protection Clause, SORA’s “other-jurisdiction” provision. That provision requires them to register under SORA because they have a duty to register in another jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit previously rejected arguments that SORA violated the constitutional right to travel and the Ex Post Facto Clause and concluded that the district court incorrectly applied strict scrutiny to the equal protection claim, remanding for a determination of whether the other-jurisdiction provision survives rational basis review. On remand, the district court concluded that requiring the registration of pre-SORA sex offenders who have a registration obligation in another jurisdiction is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest and granted the plaintiffs summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Indiana has a legitimate interest in seeking to register as many sex offenders as the state constitution permits; SORA’s other-jurisdiction provision is rationally related to advancing that interest. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that when an offender is already obligated to register elsewhere, requiring registration in Indiana merely extends that existing duty, which is not punitive and does not offend Indiana’s Ex Post Facto Clause. View "Hope v. Commissioner of Indiana Department of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained after law enforcement forced open a lacked box during an inventory search of Defendant's vehicle, holding that the district court did not err.During an inventory search of Defendant's vehicle, the police forced open a locked box and discovered suspected illegal drugs. The State charged Defendant with felony possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of heroin. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the box, arguing that opening the box exceeded the scope of a permissible inventory search in violation of the Wyoming Highway Patrol's (WHP) inventory policy, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, after which Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's argument that the inventory search violated WHP policy was unavailing. View "Beckwith v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendant's motion for remand under rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure after a jury convicted him of aggravated robbery, holding that the court of appeals did not err.On appeal of his conviction, Defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by not supporting his mistaken identity defense with evidence that Defendant had prominent tattoos on his hands that were not visible in surveillance images of the robber. Defendant moved under rule 23B to supplement the record with facts concerning his trial counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. The court of appeals denied Defendant's rule 23B motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's rule 23B motion did not allege that the arresting officers would provide favorable testimony; and (2) therefore, Defendant failed to offer nonspeculative facts that, if true, would have established that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to question the officers about Defendant's tattoos or comment on that evidence in closing argument. View "State v. Samora" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for one count of first-degree rape and four counts of first-degree sexual abuse but vacated the trial court's judgment sentencing Defendant to an aggregate sentence of life plus twenty years, holding that Defendant's sentence was unlawful.During sentencing, the jury recommended a sentence of life on the rape conviction and five years on each of the sexual abuse charge running consecutively. The trial court sentenced Defendant in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) there was no error in the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting other bad acts evidence pursuant to Ky. R. Evid. 404(b); and (3) the sentence of life plus twenty years was unlawful under this Court's holding in Bedell v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1993). View "Hernandez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of one count each of murder, receiving stolen property - firearm, and tampering with physical evidence, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on her claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony that Appellant did not act consistently with someone who truly acted in self-defense; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motions for a directed verdict on the murder and tampering with physical evidence charges; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony that Appellant was potentially affiliated with a gang; (4) the Commonwealth's attorney did not commit prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) there was no cumulative error. View "Leavell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, holding that the district court did not err in determining that all of Defendant's claims were either insufficiently pled or affirmatively refuted by the record.Defendant, in inmate who was serving consecutive sentences for three convictions, including a life sentence for first degree murder, brought this motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel both at trial and on direct appeal. The district court denied the motion after determining that all of Defendant's claims were either insufficiently pled or affirmatively refuted by the record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Defendant's claims warranted an evidentiary hearing and that the district court properly overruled Defendant's motions to add exhibits and to appoint counsel. View "State v. Cox" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a Florida death-row prisoner who is scheduled to be executed on May 3, 2023, at 6:00 p.m. Barwick brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, arguing that the Governor of Florida and several other state officials violated his constitutional right to due process because they did not adequately consider his candidacy for executive clemency. He also moved for an emergency stay of execution. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a stay. Plaintiff then moved in this Court for a stay of execution pending appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion for a stay. The court explained that here Plaintiff argued that the State violated his due-process rights because it did not provide any standards that would govern the clemency decision. But under the Eleventh Circuit’s binding precedent, the court wrote it cannot agree that the Due Process Clause requires the State to provide any such standards. An initial problem with Plaintiff’s argument about the State’s lack of standards is that it runs counter to Supreme Court authority. Further, the court held that it cannot agree with Plaintiff’s argument that his clemency proceeding was arbitrary because the Commission allegedly “provided false guidance” when it said it was not concerned with his guilt but then “myopically focused on [his] crime.” Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiff’s due-process claim does not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. View "Darryl Barwick v. Governor of Florida, et al" on Justia Law

Diaz was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine and was sentenced to 33 months’ incarceration followed by 36 months’ supervised release. During that period of supervised release, Scranton Police Officers responded to a report of a physical, domestic incident involving Diaz’s then-girlfriend, Fernandez. Other violations of supervised release included possessing and using marijuana. During a probable cause and detention hearing, Magistrate Saporito heard testimony from Fernandez that she was not scared of Diaz. Saporito imposed a no-contact condition. Fernandez's testimony in the detention hearing was proven false. Diaz had called Fernandez and persuaded her to recant her statements to the police. Saporito ordered Diaz to be detained until his final revocation hearing.At the final supervised release violation hearing, Judge Mannion sentenced Diaz to the statutory maximum of 24 months’ incarceration followed by another two years’ supervised release. Mannion reimposed the no-contact order to apply during Diaz’s incarceration and his new term of supervised release. The Third Circuit vacated in part. The district court lacked either statutory or inherent authority to impose the custodial no-contact order. The court upheld the condition of Diaz’s second period of supervised release as narrowly tailored and sufficiently connected to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Santos Diaz" on Justia Law