Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Keller and others broke into a Shelby County house occupied by Morrow and Jones and two minor children. Keller threatened the occupants with a gun while demanding money. One assailant repeatedly struck Morrow in the head. All the assailants ransacked the house. One child hid and called 911. After his conviction Keller sought a new trial, raising several challenges to his convictions and sentence; he did not raise a double-jeopardy claim. For the first time, on appeal to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, Keller argued his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, in that his convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery and aggravated assault of Morrow were for the same offense, and that all of his convictions should have merged into a single conviction for aggravated robbery of Morrow. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal found that Keller waived his double-jeopardy claim by not raising it in his motion for a new trial as required by Tennessee’s procedural rules. Keller had acknowledged the waiver. Considering Keller’s double-jeopardy claim under plain-error review, the court held that the double-jeopardy claim failed.After unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction relief in state court, Keller filed a federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition on the double jeopardy claim. Keller, by his own concession, procedurally defaulted his double-jeopardy claim. View "Keller v. Genovese" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for misdemeanor interference with a peace officer stemming from his act of resisting when police officers entered his home without a warrant to arrest him for a misdemeanor crime, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Defendant's conviction could not stand.On appeal, Defendant argued that the officers' warrantless entry into his home was unlawful, and therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the officers in this case were not "engaged in the lawful performance" of their official duties when they entered Defendant's home without a warrant, as required to convict him under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-5-204(a); and (2) because the officers' warrantless entry into Defendant's home was per se unreasonable, the warrantless entry into Defendant's home to execute a warrantless arrest violated Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment. View "Woods v. State" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop, Houston Police Officer fatally shot a man. Plaintiffs, including the parents and estate of the victim, brought multiple claims against the officer who fatally shot the man, two other police officers, and the city. The individual defendants claimed qualified immunity. The district court, in ruling on a motion to dismiss in response to Plaintiffs’ complaint, dismissed Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal and requested reassignment to a different district judge. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Plaintiffs that the dismissal of the Section 1983 claims against Defendant for excessive force, denial of medical care, and unlawful arrest was an error. The court reversed and remanded those claims. The court explained that taking as true that Defendant had no reason to believe the man was armed and that the shooting officer knew the man was seriously injured and likely could not move, a police officer would know, under these precedents, that to handcuff the man was an arrest without probable cause under clearly established law. The court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims is affirmed. The court denied, as moot, Plaintiffs’ request for reassignment to a new judge. View "Allen v. Hays" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of possessing firearms by a felon and one count of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute but reversed his conviction of one count of driving with a suspended license, holding that the evidence did not support the suspended license conviction.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in finding that Defendant's statements during an interrogation were voluntary and admissible at trial; (2) the district court's failure to obtain a jury trial waiver before an elemental stipulation was not structural, and the error did not affect the trial's outcome; (3) the lower courts did not err in holding that trial counsel was not ineffective in pursuing a guilt-based defense; (4) there was no clear error in the jury instructions; and (5) the State failed to present evidence of a necessary element of the crime of driving while Defendant's license was suspended. View "State v. Bentley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence on one count of assault in the second degree and one count of negligent child abuse, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were unavailing; (2) Defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his argument that the trial court erred by excepting from its sequestration order an eyewitness to the crimes who was the wife of one victim and mother of the other; (3) the trial court did not err by refusing to give a self-defense instruction; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Defendant was not a suitable candidate for probation. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Williams was a key facilitator in a years-long cocaine trafficking scheme. In 2001, he was convicted of federal drug and conspiracy charges, 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846 and given life sentences. Williams appealed the denial of his 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for a reduced sentence, arguing that the district court erred in holding that it was not permitted to consider whether Williams’s unconstitutionally imposed mandatory life sentence contributed to “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for the reduction of his sentence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to reconsider its 2021 "Thacker" decision, stating it would make no difference to Williams’s case. The district court held in the alternative that even if Williams was eligible for a reduction in his sentence, this relief was not warranted in light of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)'s factors. The court acknowledged different approaches among the circuits regarding the bounds of court discretion to find extraordinary and compelling reasons for early release— specifically, whether the two-step process employed by the Seventh Circuit is correct or if a more holistic approach is called for. The court noted that the U.S. Sentencing Commission is in the process of studying the issue, and recently has proposed defining “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to include circumstances in which “[t]he defendant is serving a sentence that is inequitable in light of changes in the law.” View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his claims of error.Defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder. After a penalty-phase trial, the court concluded that the aggravating circumstances far outweighed the mitigating circumstances, warranting a sentence of death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant Defendant's motion to continue; (2) the trial court did not err in rejecting two statutory mitigating circumstances; (3) Defendant failed to establish a constitutional defect with Florida's death-penalty statute; (4) Defendant's guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given; and (5) Defendant's remaining arguments were without merit. View "Wells v. State" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's challenge to his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden of showing that his counsel's performance during the underlying criminal trial was deficient.Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to distribute a substance containing cocaine base and one count of malicious damage or destruction of property by fire. At sentencing, the trial court determined that Appellant was a career offender in part because his prior Maine state court conviction for unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs qualified as a "controlled substance offense" under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. In this collateral challenge to his sentence, Appellant argued that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel during his sentencing hearing based on his counsel's failure to object to the use of the Maine drug conviction as a predicate offense for the career offender enhancement. The First Circuit denied relief, holding that Appellant's ineffective assistance claim failed. View "Thompson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of employing a minor in an obscene performance in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-196a, sexual assault in the first degree, and other offenses, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to sever the sexual offenses with the nonsexual offenses and in joining the informations for trial; (2) the obscene performance statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Defendant's conduct, and the First Amendment did not require the Court to undertake an independent appellate review of that conviction; (3) the trial court's potentially incorrect rulings, including those relating to the excludion from evidence video recordings of forensic interviews of the victim, were harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions of assault in the third degree, criminal violation of a protective order, and stalking in the first degree. View "State v. Michael R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question of law concerning the applicability of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53-37 to this case, concluding that section 53-37 did not apply because Plaintiff's complaint did not allege any speech constituting an "advertisement."Plaintiff brought this reenforcement action challenging 53-37, which provides that "[a]ny person who, by his advertisement, ridicules or holds up to contempt any person or class of persons, on account of the creed, religion, color, denomination, nationality or race of such person or class of persons, shall be guilty of a class D misdemeanor." Plaintiff alleged that the statue violated his right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and sought declaratory and injunctive relief seeking permanently to enjoin the enforcement of the statute. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action because he had failed to allege an injury in fact. The Supreme Court answered a certified question regarding the issue by answering that the uncontroverted evidence demonstrated that section 53-37 was not intended to encompass the type of personal, noncommercial speech alleged in Plaintiff's complaint. View "Cerame v. Lamont" on Justia Law