Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) forwarded to the Knoxville Police a CyberTip from Facebook reporting that a 43-year-old male appeared to be using Facebook private messages to entice a 15-year-old female (M.D.) to produce and send child-exploitation images and engage in sexual activity. The CyberTip suggested that they had already engaged in sexual activity and included information matching Tywan Sykes.Charged with enticing a minor to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, section 2251; committing felony offenses involving a minor while required by Tennessee law to register as a sex offender, section 2260A; and knowingly possessing child pornography section 2252A, Sykes filed unsuccessful motions to suppress evidence retrieved from his Facebook account and cell phone. He argued that NCMEC is a government entity and that Facebook had become NCMEC's agent by searching his account and forwarding messages to NCMEC and that the month-and-a-half delay between the seizure of his phone and the execution of the search warrant was unreasonable. The court also partially denied a motion to exclude evidence of his prior sex offenses.The Sixth Circuit affirmed Sykes’s convictions and 45-year sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and erroneously admitted evidence of a past sex-offense conviction; that there was insufficient evidence to convict on all charges; and that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable. View "United States v. Sykes" on Justia Law

Police discovered a loaded firearm, cocaine, and more than 800 methamphetamine pills on Jones’s person and in his car during a traffic stop. Federal charges followed. Counsel declined to make frivolous challenges to the court’s jurisdiction at Jones’s request. Jones sought to represent himself. Magistrate Long conducted an extensive Faretta colloquy, covering Jones’s education, mental health, and prior legal experiences. Jones confirmed his understanding of the charges and agreed to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal Procedure. He claimed that he understood the perils of self-representation, which Long explained in detail. The court allowed Jones to represent himself and appointed his public defender as standby counsel. Jones spent months before trial challenging the court’s jurisdiction in frivolous filings, advancing “sovereign-citizen” arguments.Concerned with the incoherence of the filings, the government requested a second Faretta colloquy. District Judge Mihm conducted the colloquy. Jones insisted he did not “consent” to jurisdiction and would not participate in his trial. While he acknowledged understanding the “letter” of the charges against him, he also expressed confusion about whether the proceedings were criminal, civil, administrative, or even “statutory maritime.” Mihm concluded that Jones’s waiver of counsel remained valid. Jones did not deliver opening or closing statements, cross-examine witnesses, or lodge any objections. His testimony had no bearing on the charges against him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and 138-month sentence. Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of sexual abuse in the third degree, holding that Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his convictions on his allegations of error.The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions but concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a nunc pro tunc order attempting to correct Defendant's sentence and remanding the case for the district court to correct the sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Defendant was previously convicted of an act of sexual abuse for purposes of the sentencing enhancement; (2) the district court did not err in overruling Defendant's challenge brought under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); and (3) any error in the court's decision to excuse a juror for cause did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Booker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, Rhode Island College and related individuals, on the grounds of qualified immunity, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Plaintiff brought this action seeking equitable relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 on the grounds that Defendants' conduct toward him during his Master of Social Work program violated his First and Fourteenth Rights. The superior court concluded that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's arguments on appeal were unavailing. View "Felkner v. R.I. College" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of capital murder and sentence of life imprisonment without parole, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury with the model verdict form on dispute accomplice status was reversible error under the third and fourth exceptions enumerated in Wicks v. State, 606 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1980). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his property; and (2) neither Wicks exception to the objection requirement applied under the circumstances of this case. View "Nowell v. State" on Justia Law

Addison was convicted, in absentia, of unlawful possession of a motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a converted motor vehicle, forgery, and two counts of theft, arising out of his alleged use of counterfeit money to purchase a motorcycle, and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Having failed to appear for trial, he was subsequently arrested.Addison’s appellate counsel did not file a brief and determined that there are no meritorious issues, except concerning credit that should be applied toward the prison sentences. Addison filed a postconviction petition, contending that trial and appellate counsel were deficient. Appointed postconviction counsel filed an amended petition, alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress based on improper Miranda warnings, for failing to object to expert testimony regarding counterfeit currency when no expert was disclosed, and for failing to argue sufficiency of the evidence where there were discrepancies; and that the court erred in giving an accountability instruction. The petition did not assert ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition.Addison appealed, arguing that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance in failing to argue ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Addison did not forfeit collateral review of his conviction by failing to appear at trial. While any postconviction claims that could have been raised on direct appeal are generally forfeited that forfeiture could have been overcome by framing the issues as ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issues on direct appeal. The appellate court properly remanded for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) without considering the merits. View "People v. Addison" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress drug evidence.Defendant was a passenger in a single-vehicle car accident on the Maine Turnpike. Suspicion that the vehicle and/or its occupants were transporting drugs Maine police officers searched Defendant's bag and discovered narcotics. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the evidence was obtain in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, after which Defendant conditionally pleaded guilty. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant's arguments for suppression failed. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

Convicted of the 1996 strangulation murder of Stites, Reed was sentenced to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Reed’s state and federal habeas petitions were unsuccessful. In 2014, Reed sought DNA testing of the evidence. The prosecutor refused to test most of the evidence. The court denied Reed’s motion; the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, citing chain of custody issues.Reed filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that Texas’s stringent chain-of-custody requirement was unconstitutional and effectively foreclosed DNA testing for individuals convicted before the promulgation of rules governing the handling and storage of evidence. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, finding that the two-year statute of limitations began to run when the Texas trial court denied Reed’s motion, not when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied rehearing.The Supreme Court reversed. The statute of limitations began to run at the end of the state-court litigation. Establishing a procedural due process violation requires proof of deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and inadequate state process. The claim is not complete when the deprivation occurs but only when the state fails to provide due process. Texas’s alleged failure to provide Reed with a fundamentally fair process was complete when the state litigation ended and deprived Reed of his asserted liberty interest in DNA testing. If the statute of limitations began to run after a state trial court’s denial of the motion, the prisoner would likely continue to pursue state court relief while filing a federal section 1983 suit. That parallel litigation would run counter to principles of federalism, comity, consistency, and judicial economy. If any due process flaws lurk in the DNA testing law, the state appellate process may cure those flaws, rendering a federal suit unnecessary. View "Reed v. Goertz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of being an accessory before the fact to kidnapping and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.Defendant, a police officer, provided several specific items to James Feeney, his drug supplier, at Feeney's request, including information about the victim as well as Defendant's police badge, gun holster, and handcuffs. Feeney provided the information and items to Scott Morrison and Alfred Ricci, who convinced the victim they were at his house to complete a mandatory drug test. The pair kidnapped him, and Feeney murdered him. Defendant was convicted of being an accessory before the fact to kidnapping. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and the denial of Defendant's postconviction motion, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant shared Feeney's intent that the kidnapping take place; (2) the trial judge's instructions to the jury were without error; and (3) there was no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings. View "Commonwealth v. Schoener" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of gross sexual assault and two counts of unlawful sexual contact, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a continuance; (2) there was no constitutional error in the trial court's ruling requiring that participants in Defendant's trial be masked; (3) there was no prosecutorial error in either the State's opening or closing argument or in the State's rebuttal argument; and (4) Defendant's claims of evidentiary error were unavailing. View "State v. Hunt" on Justia Law