Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained after law enforcement forced open a lacked box during an inventory search of Defendant's vehicle, holding that the district court did not err.During an inventory search of Defendant's vehicle, the police forced open a locked box and discovered suspected illegal drugs. The State charged Defendant with felony possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor possession of heroin. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the box, arguing that opening the box exceeded the scope of a permissible inventory search in violation of the Wyoming Highway Patrol's (WHP) inventory policy, thus violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, after which Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's argument that the inventory search violated WHP policy was unavailing. View "Beckwith v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendant's motion for remand under rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure after a jury convicted him of aggravated robbery, holding that the court of appeals did not err.On appeal of his conviction, Defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by not supporting his mistaken identity defense with evidence that Defendant had prominent tattoos on his hands that were not visible in surveillance images of the robber. Defendant moved under rule 23B to supplement the record with facts concerning his trial counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. The court of appeals denied Defendant's rule 23B motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's rule 23B motion did not allege that the arresting officers would provide favorable testimony; and (2) therefore, Defendant failed to offer nonspeculative facts that, if true, would have established that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to question the officers about Defendant's tattoos or comment on that evidence in closing argument. View "State v. Samora" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for one count of first-degree rape and four counts of first-degree sexual abuse but vacated the trial court's judgment sentencing Defendant to an aggregate sentence of life plus twenty years, holding that Defendant's sentence was unlawful.During sentencing, the jury recommended a sentence of life on the rape conviction and five years on each of the sexual abuse charge running consecutively. The trial court sentenced Defendant in accordance with the jury's recommendation. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) there was no error in the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting other bad acts evidence pursuant to Ky. R. Evid. 404(b); and (3) the sentence of life plus twenty years was unlawful under this Court's holding in Bedell v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1993). View "Hernandez v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of one count each of murder, receiving stolen property - firearm, and tampering with physical evidence, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief on her claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony that Appellant did not act consistently with someone who truly acted in self-defense; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motions for a directed verdict on the murder and tampering with physical evidence charges; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony that Appellant was potentially affiliated with a gang; (4) the Commonwealth's attorney did not commit prosecutorial misconduct; and (5) there was no cumulative error. View "Leavell v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing, holding that the district court did not err in determining that all of Defendant's claims were either insufficiently pled or affirmatively refuted by the record.Defendant, in inmate who was serving consecutive sentences for three convictions, including a life sentence for first degree murder, brought this motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel both at trial and on direct appeal. The district court denied the motion after determining that all of Defendant's claims were either insufficiently pled or affirmatively refuted by the record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Defendant's claims warranted an evidentiary hearing and that the district court properly overruled Defendant's motions to add exhibits and to appoint counsel. View "State v. Cox" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a Florida death-row prisoner who is scheduled to be executed on May 3, 2023, at 6:00 p.m. Barwick brought an action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, arguing that the Governor of Florida and several other state officials violated his constitutional right to due process because they did not adequately consider his candidacy for executive clemency. He also moved for an emergency stay of execution. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a stay. Plaintiff then moved in this Court for a stay of execution pending appeal.   The Eleventh Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion for a stay. The court explained that here Plaintiff argued that the State violated his due-process rights because it did not provide any standards that would govern the clemency decision. But under the Eleventh Circuit’s binding precedent, the court wrote it cannot agree that the Due Process Clause requires the State to provide any such standards. An initial problem with Plaintiff’s argument about the State’s lack of standards is that it runs counter to Supreme Court authority. Further, the court held that it cannot agree with Plaintiff’s argument that his clemency proceeding was arbitrary because the Commission allegedly “provided false guidance” when it said it was not concerned with his guilt but then “myopically focused on [his] crime.” Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiff’s due-process claim does not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. View "Darryl Barwick v. Governor of Florida, et al" on Justia Law

Diaz was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine and was sentenced to 33 months’ incarceration followed by 36 months’ supervised release. During that period of supervised release, Scranton Police Officers responded to a report of a physical, domestic incident involving Diaz’s then-girlfriend, Fernandez. Other violations of supervised release included possessing and using marijuana. During a probable cause and detention hearing, Magistrate Saporito heard testimony from Fernandez that she was not scared of Diaz. Saporito imposed a no-contact condition. Fernandez's testimony in the detention hearing was proven false. Diaz had called Fernandez and persuaded her to recant her statements to the police. Saporito ordered Diaz to be detained until his final revocation hearing.At the final supervised release violation hearing, Judge Mannion sentenced Diaz to the statutory maximum of 24 months’ incarceration followed by another two years’ supervised release. Mannion reimposed the no-contact order to apply during Diaz’s incarceration and his new term of supervised release. The Third Circuit vacated in part. The district court lacked either statutory or inherent authority to impose the custodial no-contact order. The court upheld the condition of Diaz’s second period of supervised release as narrowly tailored and sufficiently connected to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Santos Diaz" on Justia Law

Police released the footage of a bank robbery to the media. Several tipsters identified Garcia as the robber. Garcia was arrested without a warrant. Two days later Detective Spano submitted a “Probable Cause Statement and Judicial Determination” (CR-215) form to a court commissioner (essentially a magistrate) to establish a basis for Garcia’s continued detention. The form references the Fourth Amendment and Wisconsin Statute 970.01, “Initial Appearance Before a Judge.” Spano indicated that he had “probable cause to believe that [Garcia] committed” bank robbery and violated his parole," citing a description of the surveillance footage and the tips. The commissioner checked a box stating: “I find probable cause to believe that the arrested person committed the offense(s),” and set bail at $50,000. Garcia, in jail, was not present for the CR-215 determination.Hours after the probable cause finding—without counsel for Garcia—the police conducted an in-person lineup with two tellers. Three days later, Wisconsin prosecutors charged Garcia with bank robbery. Garcia appeared in court that day represented by a public defender; 10 days later Garcia appeared at a preliminary hearing; the court ordered him detained pending trial.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed Garcia’s conviction, determining that the right to counsel had not attached at the time of the lineup. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a grant of habeas corpus relief (28 U.S.C. 2254). The state court's resolution of Garcia’s Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel claim was objectively unreasonable, even applying "vast deference" under 2254(d)(1). The court cited the “Supreme Court’s long line of cases on the attachment of the right to counsel.” The judicial machinery of the state’s adversarial process necessarily began to turn against Garcia after the commissioner executed the CR-215 form. View "Garcia v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Under the Gun Control Act “it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun,” 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1). The Act incorporates the definition from the National Firearms Act: “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b).The ATF, which administers both statutes, previously maintained that a bump stock, which drastically increases a gun’s rate of fire, is not a machinegun part. In 2018, after a Las Vegas gunman used bump stocks attached to semiautomatic rifles to kill 58 people and injure roughly 500 in approximately 10 minutes, the ATF reversed its position by promulgating the Rule, giving possessors of bump stocks 90 days to destroy or abandon their bump stocks.Hardin challenged the Rule as exceeding the ATF’s statutory authority. The Sixth Circuit reversed a judgment upholding the Rule, noting the rule of lenity in criminal cases and that Congress could resolve the ambiguity. View "Hardin v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives" on Justia Law

In 2013, Sergeant Robert Motyka, a Denver police officer, shot Michael Valdez, who was lying unarmed on the ground and surrendering. In the ensuing lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a jury awarded Valdez $131,000 from Sergeant Motyka for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment1 and $2,400,000 from the City and County of Denver (“Denver”) for failure to train its officers. The district court awarded $1,132,327.40 in attorney fees and $18,199.60 in costs to Valdez’s lawyers. The Tenth Circuit addressed three appeals arising from this litigation. Denver challenged the district court's: (1) denial of its motion for summary judgment; (2) reversal of a discovery order and permission for Valdez to present additional municipal liability theories; and (3) jury instructions on municipal liability. Valdez cross-appealed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Lieutenant John Macdonald, another Denver police officer who shot at him. And Sergeant Motyka and Denver contend that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs. The Tenth Circuit: (1) affirmed the judgment against Denver; (2) affirmed qualified immunity because Valdez did not show the court erred in this respect; and (3) affirmed the attorney fee award but reversed costs, finding the district court did not explain its award after finding Valdez had not substantiated them. The case was remanded for the district court to reexamine whether costs should be awarded. View "Valdez v. City and County of Denver" on Justia Law