Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Victor Raul Tellez was charged with three counts of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child and faced a maximum prison term of 12 years. On the advice of his attorney, he accepted a plea deal, pleading guilty to one count and receiving a three-year prison sentence. Tellez was not informed that his conviction would make him eligible for civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). After completing his prison term, the District Attorney initiated SVPA proceedings for his involuntary commitment to a state hospital.Tellez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not being advised of the SVPA consequences. The superior court denied his petition, and the Court of Appeal also denied it, stating that prevailing norms did not require such advisement and that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. Tellez then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.The California Supreme Court held that Tellez did not sufficiently demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to advise him of the SVPA consequences. The court noted that Tellez provided insufficient evidence that he would not have accepted the plea deal had he been informed of the SVPA consequences. Therefore, the court did not address whether his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. However, recognizing the significant liberty deprivation involved in SVPA commitments, the court exercised its supervisory powers to require trial courts to inform defendants of potential SVPA consequences when pleading guilty or no contest to a qualifying offense. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed on the ground that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. View "In re Tellez" on Justia Law

Christopher Lockhart, a licensed Arkansas bail bondsman and private investigator, was stopped by Siloam Springs police officer Zachary Ware around 3:30 AM on March 11, 2019, for alleged traffic violations. Lockhart was arrested and charged with DWI, careless driving, and driving left of center. After refusing a plea deal, Lockhart was tried for DWI but was found not guilty. Subsequently, Lockhart filed a § 1983 action against multiple defendants, including claims of unreasonable stop, unlawful arrest, and malicious prosecution.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas granted summary judgment to the defendants on most claims but allowed Lockhart’s illegal stop and false arrest claims against Officer Ware and the malicious prosecution claim against Siloam Springs to proceed. The court found genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Officer Ware had probable cause to stop Lockhart, as the dashcam video did not conclusively support Ware’s testimony. The court also denied summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, finding a material fact dispute about whether the prosecutor had probable cause to try Lockhart for DWI.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that Officer Ware had probable cause to stop Lockhart for careless driving, as Lockhart’s tires touched the centerline, which under Arkansas law constitutes a traffic violation. The court reversed the district court’s decision regarding the initial stop and remanded the case for further proceedings on the remaining issues. The court also affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, agreeing that Arkansas statutory immunity does not apply to intentional torts like malicious prosecution. View "Lockhart v. Siloam Springs, Arkansas" on Justia Law

In 2001, the Commonwealth charged Robert Gene Rega with first-degree murder and other crimes for shooting a security guard, Christopher Lauth, during a robbery at the Gateway Lodge in Jefferson County, Pennsylvania. Rega, along with Shawn Bair, Raymond Fishel, and Stanford Jones, planned the robbery, while Jones’s wife, Susan, stayed at Rega’s home. During the robbery, Lauth was killed. The prosecution's case relied heavily on the testimonies of Bair, Fishel, and the Joneses, who identified Rega as the shooter. Additional evidence included a video of Rega purchasing ammunition and testimony from a friend that Rega asked for a false alibi.The Pennsylvania state court convicted Rega of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Rega's conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal and in a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) proceeding. Rega then filed a federal habeas petition. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied his guilt-phase claims but granted relief from his death sentence, ordering a new sentencing hearing or life imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. Rega raised claims that the prosecutor withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and presented false testimony in violation of Giglio v. United States and Napue v. Illinois. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief on these claims, concluding that the evidence and testimony in question were not material to Rega’s murder conviction. The court found that the prosecutor’s noncommittal statements to witnesses about considering their cooperation in future plea deals did not significantly undermine their credibility, as the jury was already aware of their potential motives. Additionally, evidence of Susan Jones’s memory problems was deemed not material, as it did not sufficiently undermine her testimony or the overall case against Rega. View "Rega v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Eddie Sorto was sentenced to over 100 years in prison for crimes committed at age 15, including first-degree murder, second-degree murder, assault, and shooting at an occupied vehicle. The jury found multiple special-circumstance allegations and enhancements true. After serving 15 years, Sorto petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and thus entitled him to relief under equal protection principles.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Sorto’s petition, stating that he was not eligible for relief under section 1170(d) because he had not been sentenced to an explicit LWOP term. The court did not address Sorto’s equal protection argument directly but noted that he was eligible for parole after 25 years under section 3051, which it found sufficient to deny the petition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that juvenile offenders sentenced to functionally equivalent LWOP terms are entitled to relief under section 1170(d) based on equal protection guarantees. The court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the case People v. Heard was wrongly decided and contrary to California Supreme Court precedent. The court also held that parole eligibility under section 3051 does not render offenders ineligible for relief under section 1170(d).The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of Sorto’s petition and remanded the case for the lower court to consider whether Sorto meets the other requirements for relief under section 1170(d). View "People v. Sorto" on Justia Law

In 2016, John O. Kalu, an inmate at FCI Allenwood, alleged that he was sexually assaulted on three separate occasions by Lieutenant K. Middernatch. Kalu reported the first two incidents to Warden Spaulding, who responded that he would investigate but took no further action. Following his report, Kalu was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and later returned to the general population, where he was assaulted a third time. Kalu also claimed that he was subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement, including being forced to sleep on a cold metal bunk in freezing temperatures without adequate clothing.Kalu filed a pro se complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Warden Spaulding and Lt. Middernatch, seeking damages under Bivens for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed Kalu’s claims against Warden Spaulding for lack of personal involvement but allowed the sexual assault claim against Lt. Middernatch to proceed. Kalu later amended his complaint, but the District Court ultimately dismissed all claims, determining that they presented new Bivens contexts and that special factors counseled against extending Bivens remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that Kalu’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault and conditions-of-confinement claims presented new Bivens contexts. It found that special factors, including the availability of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program, Congress’s omission of a standalone damages remedy in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), and separation of powers principles, counseled against extending Bivens liability. The court also agreed that Kalu’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim against Warden Spaulding for deliberate indifference or failure to protect. View "Kalu v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

In 2000, Karl Roberts was convicted and sentenced to death in Arkansas state court for the rape and murder of his twelve-year-old niece. Roberts waived his right to challenge his conviction on direct appeal, in state postconviction proceedings, and in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Both the Arkansas state trial court and the Arkansas Supreme Court found the waiver to be knowing and voluntary. On the day of his scheduled execution in 2004, Roberts moved for a stay of execution, which was granted, and subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, initiating two decades of litigation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied Roberts’s nineteen habeas corpus claims but granted a certificate of appealability (CoA) on three claims: whether Roberts was intellectually disabled, competent to be tried, and competent to waive his direct appeal. The Eighth Circuit expanded the CoA to include two ineffective assistance of counsel claims: failure to investigate and challenge Roberts’s competency to be tried and failure to investigate and present evidence of Roberts’s mental health as mitigating evidence at sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of Roberts’s habeas petition. The court held that the Arkansas courts’ findings that Roberts was not intellectually disabled, was competent to stand trial, and was competent to waive his direct appeal were reasonable and supported by the record. The court also found that Roberts’s trial counsel was not ineffective, as the counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there was no prejudice to Roberts. The court concluded that Roberts failed to show that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the alleged errors by his counsel. View "Roberts v. Payne" on Justia Law

Sha Kendrick Smith was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) for enticing a minor to engage in prostitution. The minor victim (MV) was a thirteen-year-old runaway who was a ward of the state. Smith provided MV with a cell phone and took her to various locations where she engaged in commercial sex with multiple men, with Smith keeping the money. MV initially told Smith she was eighteen, but he later learned she was underage. MV described Smith as always carrying a gun and being feared by those who knew him. Smith was eventually arrested after MV reported her situation to the police.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas sentenced Smith to 235 months of imprisonment and ten years of supervised release. The court applied two sentencing enhancements: one under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) for undue influence over the minor and another under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) for MV’s status as a vulnerable victim. Smith objected to these enhancements, but the district court overruled his objections, adopting the presentence investigation report (PSR) and the government’s arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s application of both sentencing enhancements. It found that the district court’s determination that Smith unduly influenced MV was plausible given the evidence of Smith’s control over MV, including his age, size, possession of a gun, and the fear he instilled in others. The court also upheld the vulnerable-victim enhancement, noting that MV’s age, status as a ward of the state, and economic desperation made her unusually vulnerable, and Smith knew or should have known of her vulnerabilities. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in its findings and affirmed Smith’s sentence. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Detective Frias of the Richmond Police Department observed an Instagram video showing known gang member J.S. and others brandishing firearms at the Belt Atlantic apartment complex. The video, posted shortly before the incident, depicted two men later identified as Anthony Cornelius Brown, Jr., and Dequane Aquil McCullers. Detectives accessed live surveillance footage showing individuals matching the video’s description at the same location. Upon arrival, the officers approached the men, who attempted to walk away. Brown and McCullers were detained and frisked, leading to the discovery of firearms.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Brown and McCullers' motions to suppress the evidence of the firearms. The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the defendants based on the video and their behavior. Brown and McCullers entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown and McCullers based on the Instagram video and their actions upon the officers' arrival. The court also found that the frisk of McCullers was justified as the officers reasonably believed he was armed. Additionally, the court ruled that the length of Brown’s detention was reasonable given the circumstances and the need to ensure officer safety. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motions to suppress. View "US v. Brown" on Justia Law

Patrick Neiss was convicted in Montana state court of deliberate homicide and evidence tampering, based on circumstantial evidence. He filed a pro se federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Neiss argued that his trial counsel failed to challenge the particularity of a search warrant, which led to the discovery of silencer-related internet searches on his computer, and that his appellate counsel failed to raise this issue on appeal.The United States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed Neiss’s habeas petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, which allows for preliminary screening of habeas petitions. The district court adjudicated the petition on the merits, concluding that Neiss’s trial counsel was not deficient because they had made multiple attempts to suppress the evidence, albeit not on the particularity grounds. The court did not find the petition procedurally defective or frivolous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court misapplied the Rule 4 standard, which is intended to screen out only those petitions that are procedurally defective or frivolous. The court emphasized that Rule 4 does not permit summary dismissal on the merits. The Ninth Circuit found that Neiss’s petition alleged a cognizable, non-frivolous claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which should not have been dismissed summarily. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "NEISS V. BLUDWORTH" on Justia Law

In January 2019, Ashley Franklin, an inmate at the Franklin County Regional Jail, was transported to a hospital by Jail Sergeant Brandon Price due to illness. During the transport, Price sexually assaulted Franklin. Franklin filed a lawsuit against Price, Franklin County, and two other Jail employees, asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state law claims. She alleged that Price and his superior, Captain Wes Culbertson, were deliberately indifferent to her safety and that Franklin County had inadequate policies and training to prevent such assaults.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted Franklin’s motion for summary judgment on her Eighth Amendment claim against Price but denied her other claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the other defendants, finding no evidence that Culbertson or Franklin County were deliberately indifferent or that the County’s policies were inadequate. The court also found that the County’s previous incidents of misconduct did not establish a pattern of unconstitutional behavior. Franklin’s negligence claims against Culbertson and Jailer Rick Rogers were dismissed, with the court ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity under Kentucky law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Franklin County was not liable under § 1983 because Franklin failed to show a direct causal link between the County’s policies and her assault. The court also found that Culbertson and Rogers were entitled to qualified immunity, as their actions were discretionary and performed in good faith. Franklin’s claims of gross negligence were deemed forfeited due to lack of development in her arguments. The court concluded that Franklin had not established that the County’s policies or training were constitutionally inadequate or that there was a pattern of similar constitutional violations. View "Franklin v. Franklin County" on Justia Law