Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of second degree murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm, and two counts of use of a weapon to commit a felony, holding that there was no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his character, specifically that he conducted drug deals after the murder, he was the victim of a robbery, and he owned firearms. Defendant also challenged cellular telephone information obtained from a "tower dump." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the admission of the challenged evidence; and (2) even if the cell phone tower dump was not a search and subject to Fourth Amendment protections, the order under 18 U.S.C. 86-2,106 allowing the dump was executed in good faith. View "State v. Elias" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's convictions for five counts of trafficking a person for sexual servitude and a second and subsequent offense of possession of a class A substance with intent to distribute, holding that the conflict of interest inherent in counsel's bigotry against persons of Defendant's faith and race deprived Defendant of his right to effective assistance of counsel.Defendant, a Black man of the Muslim faith, was appointed counsel who openly shared his hatred of and bigotry against people of the Muslim faith and his racism against Black persons. Counsel advised Defendant to accept a plea deal, which Defendant did. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and for a new trial, arguing that his counsel had an actual conflict of interest. The motion judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that Defendant met his burden to establish that counsel's representation of him was impaired by an actual conflict of interest. View "Commonwealth v. Dew" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence showing that Defendant was carrying heroin with the intent to distribute it, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found during the underlying traffic stop.Defendant was stopped for unsafe operation of a vehicle. The stop resulted in more than an hour of questioning and in Defendant relinquishing thirty-seven grams of heroin that he was carrying on his person. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the traffic stop was illegal and that the ensuing questioning violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, after which Defendant pleaded guilty. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error in the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Fagan" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's conclusion that the application of the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) to Petitioner violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal Constitution when applied to offenders whose crimes predated the 2005 amendments to the Act, holding that the effect of SARA's school grounds condition, as codified in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), was not punitive.In 1986, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree and other crimes. Petitioner was unable to locate SARA-compliant housing before his open release date and therefore remained in custody until he could locate suitable housing under SARA's school grounds condition prohibiting him from living within 1,000 feet of a school. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that SARA's residency restriction violated ex post facto principles. Supreme Court granted Petitioner's application and ordered his release. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the condition does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "People ex rel. Rivera v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the conclusion of the appellate division that the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) court acted within its discretion by upwardly departing to level three in determining Defendant's risk level classification, holding that the SORA court deprived Defendant of basic due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard.Defendant's convictions required him to register under SORA. At the SORA hearing, the court noted that Defendant would normally be required to register as a level two sex offender but upwardly departed to level three due to Defendant's "extensive prior disciplinary history." The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the proceeding failed to comport with due process because Defendant was provided no notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard in response to the District Attorney's request for an upward departure. View "People v. Worley" on Justia Law

Smith was indicted in the Northern District of Florida for theft of trade secrets from StrikeLines’ website. Smith moved to dismiss the indictment, citing the Constitution’s Venue Clause and the Vicinage Clause. Smith argued that he had accessed the website from his Alabama home and that the servers storing StrikeLines’ data were in Orlando, Florida. The Eleventh Circuit determined that venue was improper and vacated Smith’s conviction, but held that a trial in an improper venue did not bar reprosecution.The Supreme Court affirmed. The Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district. Except as prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause, when a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may be retried. Nothing in the Venue Clause suggests that a new trial in the proper venue is not an adequate remedy for its violation. The Vicinage Clause—which guarantees the right to “an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,” concerns jury composition, not the place where a trial may be held, and concerns the district where the crime was committed, rather than the state. The vicinage right is one aspect of the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial rights and retrials are the appropriate remedy for violations of other jury-trial rights.The Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated by retrial in a proper venue. A judicial decision on venue is fundamentally different from a jury’s verdict of acquittal. Culpability is the touchstone; when a trial terminates with a finding that the defendant’s criminal culpability had not been established, retrial is prohibited. Retrial is permissible when a trial terminates on a basis unrelated to factual guilt. The reversal of a conviction based on a violation of the Venue or Vicinage Clauses, even when called a “judgment of acquittal,” does not resolve the question of criminal culpability. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of twelve counts of possession of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor and other sex-related offenses and his total sentence of seventy years in prison, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the seizure of his cellphone and password because Defendant voluntary consented to the search; and (2) the trial court did not erroneously instruct the jury as to the effect of Ky. Rev. Stat. 532.110(1)(d) on the jury's discretion to recommend consecutive and concurrent sentences. View "Payne v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction for possession of heroin, holding that the court of appeals erred by affirming the trial court's admission of certain evidence and by affirming the trial court's decision allowing a certain witness to testify.Here, the Supreme Court adopted the reasonable test for determining whether the warrantless search of a parolee's vehicle is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment, as announced in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and overruled its decision in Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2014) to the extent it held that the conditions of parole imposed by state law are immaterial to the Fourth Amendment analysis. The Court also held that the court of appeals (1) did not err in affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his truck; (2) erred by affirming the trial court's admission of evidence of methamphetamine for which Defendant had been acquitted and evidence of marijuana for which he had been found guilty; and (3) erred in affirming the trial court's decision to allow a witness to testify regarding events he did not perceive in real-time. View "Gasaway v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, second or greater offense and its sentence of twenty-seven years in prison, holding that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him by permitting three witnesses to testify via Zoom and erred by permitting the Commonwealth to join three indictments for trial. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err when it joined the three indictments for trial; and (2) erred when it permitted three witnesses to testify remotely, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Spalding v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court reversing the decision of the circuit court finding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prevented the State from compelling Defendant to provide the passcode for his cell phone, holding that the foregone conclusion doctrine applied as an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege in this case.Defendant was charged with two counts of forgery stemming from the discovery of two false paychecks made payable to him. The police applied for and obtained a warrant to search Defendant's cell phone but could not execute the warrant because the phone was passcode protected. The State then filed a motion to compel production of the passcode. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that compelling Defendant to provide the passcode would constitute compelling incriminating testimonial communication and that the foregone conclusion did not apply as an exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the foregone conclusion applied in this case. View "People v. Sneed" on Justia Law