Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was arrested for murder and held for almost four years before the charges against him were dismissed, months after another person confessed to the crime. Years later, Plaintiff then sued the County of Riverside and various County officials under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming that they had violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by suppressing the separate confession. The district court denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the Brady claim.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, without prejudice to Parker, asserting a different due process claim. A Brady violation requires that the withheld evidence have a reasonable probability of affecting a judicial proceeding, and no such proceeding was affected here. The panel held that Plaintiff could not show prejudice from the nondisclosure of the confession. A Brady violation requires that the withheld evidence have a reasonable probability of affecting a judicial proceeding. Plaintiff did not state a Brady claim because he did not assert the nondisclosure would have changed the result of any proceeding in his criminal case. The panel rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the prejudice inquiry should be whether the withheld evidence had a reasonable probability of affecting counsel’s strategy. The panel noted that no court has adopted Plaintiff’s proposed rule, and most other courts require a conviction to establish prejudice. Moreover, here, the cause of Plaintiff’s continued detention was not the suppression of the confession, but the District Attorney’s continued prosecution even after receiving the confession. View "ROGER PARKER V. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction on twenty-one counts related to his sexual abuse of his daughter AF, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting a sexually explicit photograph of AF's mother, Mrs. Freer, and a pornographic father-daughter incest video under Wyo. R. Evid. 404(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the sexually explicit photograph of Mrs. Freer and the pornographic incest video; (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate that alleged prosecutorial misconduct denied him his right to a fair trial. View "Freer v. Wyoming" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction on charges of domestic violence aggravated assault and domestic violence assault and the trial court's finding of guilty on a charge of violating a condition of release, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a representative jury by using the absolute disparity test to determine the racial makeup of the jury venire. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) appropriately determined the 1.01% absolute disparity in Defendant's jury venire was insufficient to show underrepresentation; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to subpoena the grand jurors. View "State v. Footman" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief challenging the restraint procedures used by the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) under the Eighth Amendment and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), holding that the district court did not err in denying relief.Plaintiff, an inmate who suffered from severe arthritis in his shoulder joints, challenged the restraint procedures used on him by the DOC, including "rear cuffing" with a single standard handcuff, then later rear cuffing using "double cuffs," and still later using custom modified handcuffs. In this action, Plaintiff argued that the unnecessary pain caused by these restraint procedures violated his constitutional and statutory rights and sought an order requiring the DOC to adopt his own proposed restraint procedure. The district court denied Plaintiff's request for preliminary relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined that DOC did not respondent with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs and that Plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on the merits of his ADA claim. View "Sosa v. Mass. Dep't of Correction" on Justia Law

Defendant asserts that he is required by his religious faith to abstain from psychiatric medication. Because he is not competent to stand trial, though, the government requested to involuntarily medicate him, and the district court granted the motion.   The Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not err in concluding that the government had satisfied the conditions for involuntary medication set out in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003). However, the court wrote that the district court should also have analyzed whether any statutory religious-freedom protections apply to Defendant. The court vacated and remanded for the district court to consider that issue. The court held that the government psychiatrist’s medical opinion is sufficient evidence that involuntary medication will “significantly further” the government’s interest. And “whatever the strength of that evidence,” Defendant “provides no reason to question its accuracy.” Thus, the court agreed with the district court that the government has provided enough evidence to satisfy the second prong. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

Gunter and Grommet participated in a conspiracy to deliver methamphetamine, including a controlled purchase of actual methamphetamine from Gunter by law enforcement agents. A September 17, 2019 indictment charged Gunter and Grommet of conspiring to distribute and possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. Gunter was arrested on July 2, 2020. The court set an initial trial date of August 31, 2020. Over the next 23 months, the trial was repeatedly rescheduled. Gunter first requested continuances; later continuances were at the request of Grommet, who was evaluated for competency and whose lawyer subsequently died. When Gunter eventually (unsuccessfully) sought severance, he did not cite Speedy Trial Grounds.Days before trial, Gunter unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment alleging a violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Gunter’s conviction after considering the length of and reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and any prejudice the defendant suffered. Although Gunter first moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis of his right to a speedy trial immediately before trial, he opposed motions for continuances and asserted his desire for a speedy trial numerous times. The delays could not be attributed to the government. Gunter made no argument that he experienced any prejudice from the delay, and no strong showing of prejudice is obvious in the record. View "United States v. Gunter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, holding that portions of the victim's then-girlfriend's grand jury testimony were properly admitted in accordance with the hearsay exemption for prior inconsistent statements.Prior to trial, the victim's then-girlfriend Shyla Bizarro identified Defendant as the victim's attacker from surveillance video footage and testified to her identification before the grand jury. Prior to her testimony, however, Bizarro revealed that she wished to recant her statements to police and her grand jury testimony. The trial judge admitted substantively the recanted portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony, including her prior statements of identification. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding (1) the portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony were properly admitted as prior inconsistent statements; (2) portions of Bizarro's grand jury testimony identifying Defendant in the video independently satisfied the hearsay exemption for statements of identification; and (3) there was no merit to Defendant's remaining arguments. View "Commonwealth v. Brum" on Justia Law

Burroughs went to the Niles Municipal Court to pay a traffic fine. The electronic docketing system alerted court officials that there was an active warrant for Burroughs’s arrest, relating to a recent domestic violence incident. Zickefoose, a probation officer, followed Burroughs outside, commanded him to stop, and told him to put his hands behind his back. When Zickefoose tried to grab Burroughs’s forearm, he pulled away and ran toward the parking lot. Zickefoose, injured as Burroughs drove away, reported the incident to the police. Four officers responded separately to Burroughs’s apartment complex, where they boxed in Burroughs’s car and yelled for Burroughs to “[s]hut the car off” and “[g]et out of the vehicle.” Officer Mannella fired three rounds into the windshield, which hit Burroughs in the chest, killing him. Officer Reppy fired an additional five shots that penetrated the car but did not hit Burroughs.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court determined that a reasonable jury could find that when Mannella opened fire, Burroughs was moving slowly or was stationary; Burroughs was complying with Mannella’s commands and was standing to the side of the car, not in the vehicle’s path. The court noted testimony and unrebutted forensic analysis. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Mannella. View "Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio" on Justia Law

Gonzales had an altercation at a bar, then got into a car with Pedro (driving) and fired several shots from the car’s window toward the men, hitting one in the leg. Charged under state law with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, with a 40-year maximum sentence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, Gonzales was offered an opportunity to plead guilty to recklessly endangering safety and unlawful possession of a firearm for a recommended ten-year sentence. After conferring with his attorney, Frost, Gonzales rejected the plea deal and requested a speedy trial. Frost predicted that the state would have trouble with its witnesses. One had absconded from probation; all had lengthy felony records, had been drunk, and gave inconsistent accounts.All the state’s witnesses were located for trial and testified that Gonzales was the shooter. Frost continued to pursue acquittal rather than focusing on the reckless-endangerment count. The jury convicted Gonzales of the more serious crime. Gonzales received a 25-year sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, Frost testified that it “never even crossed [her] mind” to argue for the lesser-included offense. The Wisconsin appellate court affirmed that Frost’s performance did not fall below the “constitutional line,” without reaching the issue of prejudice.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, stating that it was “deeply troubled by the performance of defense counsel” but could not “say that the state appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland or relied on unreasonable determinations of fact.” View "Gonzales v. Eplett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court granting Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the habeas court erred when it determined that trial counsel for Petitioner rendered deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to sixty-years' imprisonment. Petitioner later brought his habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The habeas court determined that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to recommend that Petitioner accept the court's pretrial offer of a forty-five-year sentence of incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, counsel's representation of Petitioner did not amount to ineffective representation. View "Maia v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law