Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Ohlinger, booked into the jail (SEORJ) as a pretrial detainee for burglary, reported a history of bipolar disorder and depression and that she used intravenous heroin daily. She indicated no history of seizures and reported no signs of physical trauma or illness. In the following days, Ohlinger did not report any medical problems. On June 25, at 6:57 a.m., Ohlinger, walking in the common area, appeared to become disoriented and fell off a bench. Officers Lowery and Jarvis responded. Nurse Gray found no evidence to support inmates’ statements that Ohlinger had a seizure and hit her head. She was returned to her cell. At 7:07 a.m., Lowery and Jarvis responded to a call and, seeing Ohlinger had urinated on herself, escorted Ohlinger to the medical unit. Gray again examined Ohlinger. Lowery and Jarvis returned Ohlinger to her cell to await a blood test. At 9:12 a.m., an inmate discovered Ohlinger, unresponsive. Gray used a portable defibrillator and began CPR. At 9:28 a.m., paramedics transported Ohlinger to the hospital, where she died. An autopsy identified the cause of death as seizure activity due to a subarachnoid hemorrhage and subdural hematoma of undetermined etiology. There was no evidence of skull fracture or contusions.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment to Gray, Lowery, and Jarvis. The Sixth Circuit reversed as to Gray and otherwise affirmed. A reasonable jury could find that Gray acted recklessly, not negligently, in the face of unjustifiably high risk to Ohlinger’s health. Gray’s observations of Ohlinger, information provided by other jail officials and inmates, and SEORJ’s policies should have led Gray to seek care from a doctor or hospital. View "Mercer v. Athens County, Ohio" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of first-degree murder but set aside and his sentences of death for each murder, holding that Defendant was deprived of his right to "have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense" when the trial court put him to an improper choice at the beginning of the penalty phase proceedings.After the jury returned guilty verdicts for both first-degree murder charges the matter proceeded to the penalty phase. The jury unanimously recommended sentences of death. After a series of Spencer hearings, the trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each murder. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case for a new penalty phase, holding (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error in its evidentiary rulings during Defendant's guilt phase proceedings; (2) Defendant's convictions were supported by competent, substantial evidence; but (3) Defendant's waiver of his right to counsel during the penalty phase was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and Defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on the trial court's fundamental error in forcing him to abandon counsel during that phase. View "Figueroa-Sanabria v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the case against him with prejudice after a mistrial was declared, holding that retrial would not violate Defendant's right against double jeopardy.Defendant was tried on one count of trafficking of a child. During trial, the trial court declared a mistrial on the basis that certain evidence was improperly admitted. Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that retrial would violate his right under the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free against double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court exercised sound discretion in ordering a mistrial based on manifest necessity and that retrial will not violate Defendant's Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this interlocutory appeal of the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress calls made by Defendant on the Salt Lake County Jail's telephones and recorded by the jail, holding that Defendant impliedly consented to the conditions the jail had placed on the use of its phones.Defendant was charged with kidnapping and assaulting his wife and made hundreds of calls to his wife from the jail. The State moved to admit recording of several of those phone calls and filed new charges based on the recordings. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the recordings in both cases. The Supreme Court denied the motions, concluding that Defendant impliedly consented to the interception of the phone calls and that the calls were exempt under the law enforcement exception to Utah's Interception of Communications Act, Utah Code 77-23a-1 to -16. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant impliedly consented to the jail's recording of his phone calls, and therefore, the interception of Defendant's calls was authorized under the Interception Act's consent exception. View "State v. Wood" on Justia Law

Spectrum contracts with Michigan to house children who are ordered to be detained in facilities “similar to a prison setting.” The children are completely restricted in their movements. The state requires Spectrum to monitor them on a 24/7 basis. A court ordered the detention of 15-year-old Quintana at Spectrum’s facility on August 24, 2018. Quintana struggled with depression, anxiety, and difficulty sleeping, among other things. On September 11, 2018, Quintana took his life while alone in his bedroom. No one checked his room in the 45 minutes between the last time he was seen alive and when his body was found, violating a contractual requirement that Spectrum conduct “eye-on checks” every 15 minutes when the children are “outside of the direct supervision of staff.” Spectrum had a policy or custom of skipping many eye-on checks and falsifying supervision logs to reflect that the checks had been performed.Quintana’s estate sued Spectrum under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Spectrum functioned as a state actor and violated Quintana’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissed the dismissal of the suit. The complaint contains adequate facts to establish that Spectrum is a state actor. Spectrum was allegedly engaged in a public function similar to a correctional institution, a traditionally exclusive state function. View "Nugent v. Spectrum Juvenile Justice Services" on Justia Law

Jenkins purchased a 1987 Oldsmobile and a 2001 Chevrolet and transferred the titles to his mother, Buchanan, retaining exclusive use of both vehicles. The DEA, investigating Jenkins for drug conspiracy crimes, seized the vehicles, which were towed to an impound lot. The DEA obtained a search warrant, which was executed in October 2012. In April 2013, Jenkins pled guilty and was sentenced to 252 months of imprisonment. In October, the impound lot sent letters to the address on file for Buchanan notifying her that the vehicles could be reclaimed upon payment of towing and storage charges. Buchanan did not receive the letters, having moved. No letter was addressed to Jenkins. Jenkins acknowledged that he “was informed" to pick up the vehicles. In February 2014, the impound lot sent final notices to Buchanan, who was incarcerated, then sold the vehicles, retaining the proceeds.In 2017, Jenkins moved in his criminal case for the return of the cars (FRCP 41(g)). The government responded that the cars “are available for return.” The court dismissed the motion. In 2019, Jenkins unsuccessfully sought monetary compensation in excess of $10,000, then filed a civil action under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), alleging a physical taking of his vehicles. The Sixth Circuit vacated summary judgment. While the government’s police power may preclude liability for an initial seizure, there is no police power exception that precludes takings liability for the period after the property is not needed for criminal proceedings. The court noted a factual issue of abandonment and affirmed the dismissal of the due process clause for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice. View "Jenkins v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the circuit court sustaining Defendant's motions to suppress evidence obtained after his warrantless arrest for a felony, holding that to the extent the decision was based on Defendant's claim that the Fourth Amendment is violated when an arresting officer was outside of the officer's jurisdiction unless the officer personally observed the crime, the decision was clearly erroneous.Defendant was charged in two separate cases for his involvement in two robberies. Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained after a warrantless arrest, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the officer was outside of his jurisdiction. The circuit court sustained the motions to suppress. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's decision, holding that while Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822 (Mo. banc 2015), requires both probable cause and that the crime be committed in the officer's presence for an arrest to satisfy the Fourth Amendment, when a warrantless arrest is for a felony, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the arresting officer has probable cause for the arrest, even when the felony was not committed in the arresting officer's presence. View "State v. Barton" on Justia Law

Snowden, staying at a hotel, received a call asking him to visit the lobby to pay for the room. When Snowden arrived, DEA Agent Henning pushed him into a door and onto the ground. Snowden did not resist. Henning punched him several times. Snowden suffered two black eyes and a fractured left eye socket.Snowden sued Henning, alleging a Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. The court construed the complaint to allege a “Bivens” claim (an implied damages remedy against federal officers for certain constitutional violations), then dismissed that claim, noting factual distinctions between Snowden’s case and Bivens–the location of the arrest, the presence of a warrant, and the number of officers involved. Bivens involved allegations concerning the rights of privacy implicated in an unlawful warrantless home entry, arrest, and search, the court reasoned, while Snowden alleged excessive force incident to a lawful arrest, and special factors weighed against recognizing a new Bivens context, including the availability of an alternative remedy.The Seventh Circuit reversed. While the Supreme Court has declined to extend the Bivens remedy beyond specific Fifth and Eighth Amendment contexts, Snowden’s claim does not present a new context. Agent Henning operated under the same legal mandate as the Bivens officers and is the same kind of line-level federal narcotics officer. Like Bivens, Snowden seeks damages for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The legal landscape of excessive-force claims is well-settled. Nor does allowing a Bivens claim here risk a “disruptive intrusion” into the “functioning of other branches.” View "Snowden v. Henning" on Justia Law

McCormick pled guilty without a plea agreement to offenses involving drugs or guns. He received a below-Guidelines sentence and did not appeal. Ten months later, he moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his attorney performed ineffectively by failing to file a notice of appeal.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Review of an attorney's conduct is “highly deferential.” The district court’s finding that McCormick did not instruct counsel to file an appeal is “plausible on the record as a whole.” McCormick acknowledged telling his counsel that he wanted to appeal only if he lost at trial, or if he “didn’t feel like [he] was treated fairly” at sentencing. Neither condition was met. Counsel testified that McCormick expressed frustration with his sentence but never told him to file an appeal. The district court had to decide between two plausible stories, so its choice could not have been clearly erroneous. The court rejected McCormick’s claim that counsel was ineffective for consulting him before sentencing rather than after and was required to repeat his advice after sentencing. The Constitution does not impose any such obligation. The court’s colloquy ensured that the defendant understood his rights. McCormick may have expected an appeal, but the government did not promise that and did not breach its agreement. View "McCormick v. United States" on Justia Law

From 2014-2016, Counterman sent hundreds of Facebook messages to C.W., a local musician. Each time C.W. tried to block him, Counterman created a new Facebook account and resumed contacting C.W. Several of his messages envisaged violent harm. C.W. stopped walking alone, declined social engagements, canceled performances, and eventually contacted the authorities. Counterman was charged under a Colorado statute making it unlawful to repeatedly make any form of communication with another person in a manner that would cause a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress, that does cause that person to suffer serious emotional distress. Colorado courts rejected Counterman’s First Amendment argument.The Supreme Court vacated. In true-threat cases, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of his statements’ threatening nature.The First Amendment permits restrictions upon the content of speech in a few areas, including true threats--serious expressions conveying that a speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence. The existence of a threat depends on what the statement conveys to the person receiving it but the First Amendment may demand a subjective mental-state requirement shielding some true threats because bans on speech have the potential to deter speech outside their boundaries. In this context, a recklessness standard, a showing that a person consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will cause harm to another, is the appropriate mental state. Requiring purpose or knowledge would make it harder for states to counter true threats, with diminished returns for protected expression. View "Counterman v. Colorado" on Justia Law