Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Jones was convicted on two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed Jones’ convictions and sentence. Jones’ subsequent 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion resulted in the vacatur of one of his concurrent sentences. Years later, the Supreme Court held (Rehaif) that a defendant’s knowledge of the status that disqualifies him from owning a firearm is an element of a 922(g) conviction, abrogating contrary Eighth Circuit precedent. Jones filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 motion in the district of his imprisonment.The Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition. Section 2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) restrictions on second or successive 2255 motions by filing a 2241 habeas petition.Under section 2255, federal prisoners can collaterally attack their sentences in the sentencing court, rather than by a 2241 habeas corpus petition in the district of confinement. The purpose of 2255 was to address problems created by district courts collaterally reviewing one another’s proceedings and by the concentration of federal prisoners in certain districts. Congress generally barred federal prisoners “authorized” to file a 2255 motion from filing a 2241 petition but preserved access to 2241 in cases where “the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality" of the detention (Saving Clause). AEDPA subsequently barred second or successive 2255 motions unless based on either newly discovered evidence or “a new rule of constitutional law.” The inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy section 2255(h) does not mean that the prisoner may bring a 2241 petition. Section 2255 is not necessarily “inadequate or ineffective” if the 2255 court fails to apply the correct substantive law. The Saving Clause is concerned with the adequacy or effectiveness of the remedial vehicle, not asserted errors of law. Due process does not guarantee the opportunity to have legal issues redetermined in successive collateral attacks. AEDPA embodies a balance between finality and error correction; there is nothing incongruous about a system in which the application of a since-rejected statutory interpretation cannot be remedied after final judgment. View "Jones v. Hendrix" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s criminal history included a 1998 guilty plea to felony mail fraud. After maintaining an otherwise clean record for 24 years, he decided he wanted a gun. But 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1) bars gun possession for anyone who, like Plaintiff, has a conviction for “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” So he brought this suit under 18 U.S.C. Section 925A to challenge the constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) as the law applied to him. Relying on pre-Bruen framework, The district court granted a motion from the government and dismissed the case.   The Seventh Circuit remanded to allow the district court to undertake the Bruen analysis. The court explained the parties may be unable altogether to find answers to certain questions, may find incomplete information in response to others, and perhaps in some instances, may identify substantial historical information pertinent to one or another dimension of the required inquiry. In the end, the district court will have to give the best answer available to whether the government has carried its burden of “affirmatively proving that its firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” View "Patrick Atkinson v Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the superior court convicting Defendant following a jury trial for larceny of an automobile and adjudicating him a probation violator, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence collected as a result of a warrantless search of his real-time cell-site location information (CSLI). The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) the acquisition of real-time CSLI qualifies as a search under the Fourth Amendment for which a warrant is required; (2) any error in the trial justice's determination that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied to the facts of this case was harmless; (3) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying Defendant's motion to exclude certain testimony, and any error in allowing other testimony to be admitted at trial was harmless; and (4) Defendant waived his last argument for appeal. View "State v. Sinapi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court to suppress the results of a search of Defendant, holding that the law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant, and therefore, the underlying search was a lawful search incident to arrest.A police officer executed a traffic stop of Defendant for speeding and, during her initial contact with Defendant, "detected an odor of raw marijuana." The officer called for back-up, and two officers escorted Defendant out of the vehicle. The officers proceeded to search Defendant based on the odor of marijuana and found two baggies containing cocaine and fentanyl. Defendant filed a motion to suppress on the grounds that the State lacked probable cause to arrest and search him. The circuit court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant on the belief that he was committing or had committed a crime, and therefore, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

Believing that two men were about to engage in the armed robbery of a gas station, defendant police officers ("Defendants") approached the Plaintiff's’ vehicle with guns pointed and forcibly removed him. The district court denied the Defendants' claim to qualified immunity, and the Defendants appealed.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, it was not clearly established that the officers lacked an objectively reasonable belief that criminal activity was about to occur. Second, clearly established law did not prevent the officers from suspecting Plaintiff might be armed. Here, Defendants believed Plaintiff was about to commit and armed robbery, which is a crime typically involving the use of a weapon. Nothing gave the panel any reason to second guess the officer's "on the ground" determination.The court also rejected Plainitff's claim that it was a violation of a clearly established right to point a firearm at the Plaintiff and demand he exits his vehicle without first identifying themselves as law enforcement. View "DEJUAN HOPSON V. JACOB ALEXANDER, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of drugs and entering judgment on Defendant's plea of guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Defendant was pulled over by a New Hampshire police officer, Stephen DiChiara, following a suspected drug buy. DiChiara was asked to conduct the stop by a United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) task force officer, DiChiara stoped and seized the car Defendant was driving. A subsequent search of the car revealed uncovered roughly one kilogram of cocaine. Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the drugs, arguing that DiChiara could not act solely on the DEA officer's probable cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the directive given to DiChiara was sufficient to attribute the DEA officer's probable cause to DiChiara. View "United States v. Balser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of second degree murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm, and two counts of use of a weapon to commit a felony, holding that there was no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting evidence of his character, specifically that he conducted drug deals after the murder, he was the victim of a robbery, and he owned firearms. Defendant also challenged cellular telephone information obtained from a "tower dump." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the admission of the challenged evidence; and (2) even if the cell phone tower dump was not a search and subject to Fourth Amendment protections, the order under 18 U.S.C. 86-2,106 allowing the dump was executed in good faith. View "State v. Elias" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated Defendant's convictions for five counts of trafficking a person for sexual servitude and a second and subsequent offense of possession of a class A substance with intent to distribute, holding that the conflict of interest inherent in counsel's bigotry against persons of Defendant's faith and race deprived Defendant of his right to effective assistance of counsel.Defendant, a Black man of the Muslim faith, was appointed counsel who openly shared his hatred of and bigotry against people of the Muslim faith and his racism against Black persons. Counsel advised Defendant to accept a plea deal, which Defendant did. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and for a new trial, arguing that his counsel had an actual conflict of interest. The motion judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that Defendant met his burden to establish that counsel's representation of him was impaired by an actual conflict of interest. View "Commonwealth v. Dew" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence showing that Defendant was carrying heroin with the intent to distribute it, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found during the underlying traffic stop.Defendant was stopped for unsafe operation of a vehicle. The stop resulted in more than an hour of questioning and in Defendant relinquishing thirty-seven grams of heroin that he was carrying on his person. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the traffic stop was illegal and that the ensuing questioning violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, after which Defendant pleaded guilty. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error in the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Fagan" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's conclusion that the application of the Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA) to Petitioner violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal Constitution when applied to offenders whose crimes predated the 2005 amendments to the Act, holding that the effect of SARA's school grounds condition, as codified in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), was not punitive.In 1986, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder in the second degree and other crimes. Petitioner was unable to locate SARA-compliant housing before his open release date and therefore remained in custody until he could locate suitable housing under SARA's school grounds condition prohibiting him from living within 1,000 feet of a school. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that SARA's residency restriction violated ex post facto principles. Supreme Court granted Petitioner's application and ordered his release. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the condition does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "People ex rel. Rivera v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility" on Justia Law