Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of aggravated kidnapping, sexual intercourse without consent, and partner or family member assault, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on any of his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-303(2) is not facially unconstitutional because it permits a judge, rather than a jury, to apply factors that reduce the maximum penalty; (2) Defendant's level three offender designation was objectionable, not illegal, and Defendant did not properly reserve his objection to the designation during sentencing; and (3) Defendant's counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that the maximum sentence for kidnapping was ten years based on mitigating factors and failing to object to Defendant's level-three sex offender designation. View "State v. Pine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court finding Defendant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, criminal possession of a firearm, and possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of possessing a weapon in a motor vehicle.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) any claimed error on the part of the trial court in violating Defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment by allowing the chief medical examiner to testify about the results of the victim's autopsy, which the chief medical examiner had not performed himself, was harmless; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's conviction of possessing a weapon in a vehicle in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 29-38(a). View "State v. Robles" on Justia Law

Durham, a prisoner with lumbar stenosis, received epidural steroid injections for pain and was prescribed a walking cane. In 2020, Durham was sent to a quarantine unit without his cane. For 10 days, Durham repeatedly, unsuccessfully requested his cane because he was in severe pain. His requests to see a doctor and to use a shower chair were ignored. Durham fell in the shower. Durham filed suit, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA).The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Durham’s claims for money damages against the defendants in their capacity as state officials barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; Durham failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim, having failed to plausibly allege that the prison officials were “subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm”; and Durham failed to state ADA and RA claims, having failed to show that he is a qualifying individual with a disability. The Third Circuit vacated. Durham is a “qualified individual” and the provision of showers in prison is an activity that must be made accessible to people with disabilities. Durham sufficiently pleaded that the defendants had knowledge that his federally protected ADA right was substantially likely to be violated. A state program that accepts federal funds waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity to RA claims. Durham adequately alleged deliberate indifference. View "Durham v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's plea in bar alleging that a trial on the pending charges for violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act would subject him to Double Jeopardy, holding that forfeiture under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-431, as amended in 2016, is civil in nature, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying the plea in bar.In his plea in bar, Appellant argued that he was already criminally punished for the same crime in a separate forfeiture action brought pursuant to section 28-431. In denying the plea in bar, the district court concluded that Appellant had failed to demonstrate he was punished by the forfeiture. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sanction imposed by forfeiture under section 28-431 is civil and not criminal for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis. View "State v. Dolinar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his vehicle, holding that the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle, alone, is insufficient to create the requisite probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.After a traffic stop and subsequent search of his vehicle Defendant was convicting of possession of methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a minor and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the odor of marijuana, alone, is insufficient to create the requisite probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that evidence of medium-strength odor of marijuana, on its own, is insufficient to establish a fair probability that the search would yield evidence of criminally-illegal conduct or drug-related contraband. View "State v. Torgerson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered in the vehicle that Defendant was driving, holding that the totality of the circumstances supported probable cause to search the vehicle.Law enforcement initiated a traffic stop after receiving a tip from an informant that a male in possession of a firearm was in the vehicle Defendant was driving. The district court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the firearm on the grounds that the officers lacked probable cause to search the vehicle. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State met its burden and established probable cause to search the vehicle that Defendant was driving. View "State v. Mosley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge against him for violation of his due process rights, holding that Defendant's due process rights were violated, but the district court abused its discretion in granting the extreme remedy of dismissal under the facts of this case.After Defendant was charged with sexual assault the district court found him to be incompetent to stand trial and ordered him remanded to a psychiatric hospital for competency restoration treatment. After a delay of over 160 days during which he remained in jail, Defendant was transferred to the hospital. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that his continued detention in jail violated his due process rights. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court's precedent did not support the district court's conclusion that aggravated circumstances warranted dismissing the complaint against Defendant with prejudice; and (2) the district court neglected to balance the deterrent objectives of dismissal against society's interest in prosecuting criminal acts. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of one count of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in admitting certain testimony pursuant to the constancy of accusation doctrine; (2) the trial court did not err in excluding impeachment evidence of pending criminal charges against the State's key witness; and (3) the first degree of sexual assault charge was not ambiguous and therefore did not violate Defendant's right to jury unanimity under the Sixth Amendment. View "State v. Velasquez-Mattos" on Justia Law

Conner was convicted in Indiana state court for three counts of felony drug dealing and maintaining a common nuisance. Conner qualified as a habitual offender and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 72 years in prison. He had remained in custody pre-trial, but there was a delay of 1,029 days from the charging date (1,034 days from his arrest). Conner’s attorney never made a Sixth Amendment objection to the pretrial delays and Conner’s own objections were rejected because he was represented by counsel. State courts rejected his post-trial Sixth Amendment and ineffective assistance claims. Conner was advised by his postconviction counsel to postpone filing his federal habeas petition until the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the petition for a writ of certiorari filed after his state postconviction proceedings. Conner relied on that advice, to his detriment. The one-year period in which to file the habeas petition continued to run while the certiorari petition was pending.The district court dismissed his subsequent habeas petition as untimely, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A) & (d)(2). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging that the postconviction lawyer’s mistake was particularly grave but holding that Supreme Court and circuit precedent j foreclose equitably tolling the deadline. View "Conner v. Reagle" on Justia Law

Three men joined in a shootout, but only Rogers was convicted of murdering a bystander caught in their crossfire. At his trial, Rogers’s attorney did not object while the trial judge admonished a trial witness (Singleton) about perjury after that witness gave testimony favorable to Rogers. The attorney offered no arguments when Singleton changed his testimony and did not cross-examine Singleton about the change. The Third Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief. Counsel’s failure to object to the trial judge’s admonishment, conduct he “did not think” was problematic, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under “Strickland” as did counsel’s later failure to cross-examine Singleton regarding his changed testimony. Counsel characterized Singleton as “a liar, trying to help his buddy out,” whose testimony would not be “determinative of the outcome of this case,” but Singleton was the only witness to ever claim Rogers shot first—the ultimate issue in the case. Had Rogers’s counsel objected to the trial judge’s admonishment of Singleton and cross-examined Singleton about his changed testimony, “a reasonable probability” exists that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Without Singleton’s testimony against Rogers, the prosecution’s remaining evidence was negligible. View "Rogers v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law