Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Burroughs went to the Niles Municipal Court to pay a traffic fine. The electronic docketing system alerted court officials that there was an active warrant for Burroughs’s arrest, relating to a recent domestic violence incident. Zickefoose, a probation officer, followed Burroughs outside, commanded him to stop, and told him to put his hands behind his back. When Zickefoose tried to grab Burroughs’s forearm, he pulled away and ran toward the parking lot. Zickefoose, injured as Burroughs drove away, reported the incident to the police. Four officers responded separately to Burroughs’s apartment complex, where they boxed in Burroughs’s car and yelled for Burroughs to “[s]hut the car off” and “[g]et out of the vehicle.” Officer Mannella fired three rounds into the windshield, which hit Burroughs in the chest, killing him. Officer Reppy fired an additional five shots that penetrated the car but did not hit Burroughs.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court determined that a reasonable jury could find that when Mannella opened fire, Burroughs was moving slowly or was stationary; Burroughs was complying with Mannella’s commands and was standing to the side of the car, not in the vehicle’s path. The court noted testimony and unrebutted forensic analysis. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Mannella. View "Raimey v. City of Niles, Ohio" on Justia Law

Gonzales had an altercation at a bar, then got into a car with Pedro (driving) and fired several shots from the car’s window toward the men, hitting one in the leg. Charged under state law with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, with a 40-year maximum sentence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, Gonzales was offered an opportunity to plead guilty to recklessly endangering safety and unlawful possession of a firearm for a recommended ten-year sentence. After conferring with his attorney, Frost, Gonzales rejected the plea deal and requested a speedy trial. Frost predicted that the state would have trouble with its witnesses. One had absconded from probation; all had lengthy felony records, had been drunk, and gave inconsistent accounts.All the state’s witnesses were located for trial and testified that Gonzales was the shooter. Frost continued to pursue acquittal rather than focusing on the reckless-endangerment count. The jury convicted Gonzales of the more serious crime. Gonzales received a 25-year sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, Frost testified that it “never even crossed [her] mind” to argue for the lesser-included offense. The Wisconsin appellate court affirmed that Frost’s performance did not fall below the “constitutional line,” without reaching the issue of prejudice.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, stating that it was “deeply troubled by the performance of defense counsel” but could not “say that the state appellate court unreasonably applied Strickland or relied on unreasonable determinations of fact.” View "Gonzales v. Eplett" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court granting Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the habeas court erred when it determined that trial counsel for Petitioner rendered deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to sixty-years' imprisonment. Petitioner later brought his habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The habeas court determined that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to recommend that Petitioner accept the court's pretrial offer of a forty-five-year sentence of incarceration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, counsel's representation of Petitioner did not amount to ineffective representation. View "Maia v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

In 2015, Indiana charged Crowell with 13 felony counts: four counts of Class A felony child molesting, four counts of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor, two counts of Level 5 felony incest, and one count each of Class C felony incest, Class C felony child molesting, and Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor. Unbeknownst to Crowell, the statute of limitations had run on the four counts of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor, Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and Class C felony child molesting. Crowell’s appointed attorney failed to inform him or the prosecution that Crowell had a statute-of-limitations defense. Crowell pled guilty to three charges (including one that was time-barred) under a binding plea agreement.Crowell sought federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The Indiana Court of Appeals had rejected Crowell’s claim because he had not shown that if he had been properly advised, he would have rejected the plea bargain and insisted on going to trial on the timely charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. View "Crowell, v. Sevier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court determining that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that a routine clothed body search did not violate Appellant's Eighth Amendment rights, holding that there was no error.Appellant, an inmate, filed an amended complaint alleging that Sergeant Larry Pasha's performance of a routine clothed body search of Appellant violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to Appellees on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that Sergeant Pasha's search of Appellant was routine and did not violate Appellant's Eighth Amendment rights. View "Lawrence v. Pasha" on Justia Law

In 2012, Kares was convicted of raping a 16-year-old girl. The judge found five “Offense Variables” that increased Kares’ sentencing range. While Kares’ case was on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held (Alleyne) that the Constitution requires any fact that increases the mandatory minimum penalty for a crime to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Kares’ counsel failed to raise an Alleyne claim on appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed Kares’ conviction and sentence. Kares then began collateral review proceedings in Michigan state court. Seeking leave to appeal the denial of his motion for relief from judgment, Kares first cited Alleyne. Michigan courts rejected his arguments. In 2018, Kares unsuccessfully sought additional DNA testing under MCL 770.16.Kares filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition in December 2018. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Kares’ application for leave to appeal the denial of his motion for biological testing in April 2019. The district court permitted Kares to amend his petition to include claims related to that request; he filed his amended petition in May 2019.The Sixth Circuit reversed an order denying as untimely Kares’s motion to vacate his sentence. Kares’ petition for DNA testing under MCL 770.16 tolls the limitations period; it was properly filed and calls for “postconviction or other collateral review” under 2244(d)(2). The court denied Kares’ motion to expand the certificate of appealability to include his merits “Alleyne” claim, which was procedurally defaulted. View "Kares v. Morrison" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's petition for habeas review on the grounds that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, holding that, although this Court's reasoning differs from that of the district court, there was no error in the denial of the habeas petition.Petitioner pled guilty to transporting a minor with the intent to engage in criminal sexual activity. On appeal, Petitioner argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance based on a claim centered on the applicable statute of limitations, which had changed from the time when Petitioner committed the offense of conviction to the time that he was indicted. The district court denied relief. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioner's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to move to dismiss the charges against him on limitations grounds. View "Miller v. United States" on Justia Law

Nichols, charged with sex trafficking, faced a life sentence. Two attorneys with extensive experience were appointed as defense counsel. Months later, Nichols filed a pro se motion, challenging their representation. The judge warned Nichols about the perils of self-representation and stated: I am not giving you another lawyer. After an extended conversation, the attorneys were appointed standby counsel. Nichols objected, stating: “Courts are forcing me to go pro se.” At Nichols's request, the court ordered a competency evaluation. Dr. Goldstein spent 14 hours with Nichols and found Nichols competent to stand trial and to proceed pro se, indicating that his disorders are behavioral, not mental. Nichols twice refused to appear. The court repeatedly reviewed why Nichols should not represent himself but held that Nichols had constructively waived the right to counsel. A second expert, Dr. Fields, was unable to complete any test because of Nichols’s obstreperous behavior and relied on an interview with Nichols to conclude that Nichols’s competency was “not diminished by a severe emotional disorder.” It was Fields’s “clinical sense” that Nichols’s “lack of willingness to work” with counsel rendered him incompetent. At a competency hearing, the government introduced recorded jail calls in which Nichols indicated that he was delaying the proceedings. The court found Nichols competent. Nichols stated, “I’m not working with anybody.”Nichols was convicted and accepted the assistance of counsel before sentencing. A third competency evaluation concluded that Nichols was competent. The court imposed a within-Guidelines life sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating: “District courts are not permitted to foist counsel upon competent defendants.” View "United States v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Whitfield was scheduled for discharge from Menard Correctional Center in January 2010, to begin a term of mandatory supervised release. On that day, prison officials handed Whitfield only the signature page of a document called the “Electronic Detention Program Agreement.” That page stated that “the following conditions of the Program apply only to sex offender cases.” Whitfield was not a sex offender and objected to signing the Agreement without an explanation from a prison official clarifying why he, a non-sex offender, had to sign a form designed exclusively for sex offenders. Whitfield’s objections were rejected. Four times, clinical services supervisor Spiller directed Whitfield to sign the form. After his continued refusal, she issued a disciplinary ticket for failure to follow a direct order. Whitfield was transferred to disciplinary segregation; the Illinois Prisoner Review Board held a hearing and found he had violated the terms of his supervised release. His eligibility for supervised release was revoked. Whitfield remained in custody for another 18 months.Whitfield sued Spiller, other Menard officials, and Board members, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The case has narrowed to Whitfield’s claims against Spiller and then-warden Gaetz for First and Eighth Amendment violations. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court correctly granted the defendants summary judgment on some claims, but that Whitfield has sufficient evidence that Spiller’s conduct violated his First Amendment rights. View "Whitfield v. Cowan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree premeditated murder and his sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it admitted the victim's dying declarations into evidence during the jury trial, and this Court reaffirms that dying declarations are an exception to the Confrontation Clause; (2) the district court did not violate Defendant's Fifth Amendment right to counsel by denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statements to police officers because Defendant validly waived his invoked right to counsel; and (3) there was no reasonable possibility that the admission of Spreigl evidence related to a prior assault charge into evidence significantly affected the verdict. View "State v. Buchan" on Justia Law