Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Pacheco was convicted of aggravated assault and other offenses after he tried to hit a Joliet police officer with his car. During the incident, the officer shot and injured Pacheco. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court violated Pacheco’s right to confrontation by prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining the officer who shot Pacheco as to whether the officer believed he could lose his job if the shooting was found to be unjustified and finding the trial court erred in granting the prosecution’s motion in limine to bar defense counsel from asking the officer and his partner why they did not write police reports regarding the incident.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded. The limitation imposed on the officer’s cross-examination was necessary to avoid a highly prejudicial outcome to Pacheco–the admission of testimony that a review panel had found the shooting to be justified. Cross-examination was not otherwise limited. Because of department policy, the officers had no choice about writing reports and their failure to do so was irrelevant to any question of bias or credibility. The question would have distracted the jury from the question of determining the guilt or innocence of Pacheco. View "People v. Pacheco" on Justia Law

The DEA placed a tracking device on Tousis’s car. On June 2, agents believed that Tousis would go to Turner’s Aurora home to procure drugs. They watched Tousis enter Turner’s garage carrying a bag, and then leave carrying the bag, which had changed in appearance, suggesting a drug transaction. The Sheriff’s Department attempted a traffic stop. Tousis fled; the tracking device showed 115.2 miles per hour on I-88. Agent Billiot, driving an unmarked car, followed Tousis off the highway. Tousis was then driving at normal speeds, but taking evasive actions. At a red light, Billiot activated his emergency lights and siren, and pulled in front of Tousis’s car, 10-25 feet away. Billiot grabbed his firearm, exited his car wearing a DEA vest, and ran toward Tousis’s car, shouting commands.As Tousis moved the car forward, with nothing between Billiot and Tousis’s car, Billiot fired a single shot. The bullet struck the steering wheel; a fragment hit Tousis in the neck as he was maneuvering his vehicle away from Billiot. Tousis’s car then accelerated and struck a light pole. Tousis died. Officers recovered 300 grams of cocaine from Tousis’s car.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Billiot qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The material undisputed facts demonstrate that Billiot fired the fatal shot fearing for his own safety and for that of the public if Tousis resumed his reckless flight. There was no precedent warning Billiot that his actions amounted to excessive force. View "Tousis v. Billiot" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree intentional felony murder while committing burglary, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's conviction.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of three counts, including first-degree intentional felony murder while committing burglary. The trial court imposed a life sentence with eligibility for release after thirty years. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove his intent to kill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circumstantial evidence presented by the State was sufficient to support Defendant's conviction for first-degree intentional felony murder. View "State v. Colgrove" on Justia Law

Defendant asserts that he is required by his religious faith to abstain from psychiatric medication. Defendant raised a religious objection to being involuntarily medicated without identifying a particular source of law. The district court denied the objection, concluding that: (1) the Government had a compelling interest in prosecuting Defendant’s crime, which was not outweighed by Defendant’s religious liberty interests; and (2) the Government satisfied the four Sell factors. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court explained that Defendant faces a pending civil-confinement hearing in North Carolina. Moreover, he asserts that his religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness prevents him from taking medication. He further asserts that forcible medication would violate his “constitutionally protected liberty.” The Government does not dispute that Defendant’s religious faith can qualify as a “special factor” under Sell. See Red Br. at 13–15; cf. Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 426 (2022). Defendant’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor. The court emphasized that it holds only that religious liberty can constitute a “special circumstance” under Sell and that Defendant properly raised a religious objection to forcible medication here. That well-taken special circumstance, combined with other factors identified above, necessitates the district court’s reevaluation of the Government’s efforts to forcibly medicate him. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a probation home visit, holding that the district court did not err in denying the suppression motion.Defendant was convicted of bail jumping and received a deferred sentence of four years. After a probation home visit resulted in the discovery of a "significant amount of methamphetamine" by a probation officer the State petitioned to revoke Defendant's deferred sentence. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the discovery of the drugs found in her home was the result of an unlawful search. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the officer did not violate the reasonable protocols for a probation home visit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that what began as a home visit turned into a search pursuant to the officer's plain view observation of drug paraphernalia, which provided probable cause for the search. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Storme faced multiple charges of cyberstalking and unauthorized intrusion into a cell phone. He was ordered released on bond into the custody of his mother subject to conditions. He immediately attempted suicide. Months later, Pretrial Services reported that Storme had violated his curfew over 30 times and had been arrested for allegedly stalking a fourth woman. Storme was abusing alcohol and expressing suicidal ideation. The court did not his revoke release. Storme's mother moved to Virginia. The court did not appoint a new custodian. Months later, the court received a report from Storme’s therapist, expressing concern that Storme would kill himself if he thought the court might deny his motion to dismiss. Storme then began transferring assets to his mother and appeared multiple times in court to watch unrelated proceedings before his assigned judge.The district court heard arguments, then, without advance notice, revoked Storme’s pretrial release and ordered him detained, without making supporting findings. Storme began slamming his head to the floor and urging the marshals to kill him. In a holding cell, he tried to hang himself. After review by the Seventh Circuit, the government filed a motion to revoke. The district court granted its motion, finding probable cause to believe that, while on release, Storme committed crimes and otherwise violated his release conditions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the court reached the correct conclusion, based on the ongoing threat to the community, despite procedural irregularities under the Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C. 3142(d)). View "United States v. Storme" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court plainly erred by finding a factual basis for Defendant's no contest plea.Defendant was charged in an indictment with possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state, a felony. Defendant pled nolo contendere to attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and was sentenced to one to three years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court erred when it found that a factual basis existed for a plea to attempt to commit possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state where the only evidence was Defendant's possession of completed methamphetamine. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition ordering the trial court to vacate his criminal sentence, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus or prohibition.Appellant was convicted of escape, retaliation, and other offenses and sentenced to 26.5 years in prison. Appellant later brought the current action seeking writs of prohibition and mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate his sentencing entries and to grant any other relief to which he was "entitled." The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through direct appeal to raise his claim that the Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant be expressly informed of his right to counsel at each critical stage of the proceeding and that the trial court's failure to do so in his case rendered his sentence void. View "State ex rel. Rarden v. Butler County Common Pleas Court" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant on federal drug- and gun-related charges, holding that the district court erred by failing to suppress incriminating statements Defendant made to law enforcement because the government failed to satisfy its burden to show that Defendant validly waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).Defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine, cocaine base, and fentanyl; possession with intent to distribute those drugs; and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement immediately following his arrest, arguing that the statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant understood his Miranda rights and knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived them. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the government failed to show that Defendant validly waived his Miranda rights, and this error was not harmless. View "United States v. Donald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and remanded this case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court plainly erred by finding a factual basis for Defendant's no contest plea.Defendant was charged in an indictment with possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state, a felony. Defendant pled nolo contendere to attempt to possess pseudoephedrine in an altered state and was sentenced to one to three years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that the circuit court erred when it found that a factual basis existed for a plea to attempt to commit possession of pseudoephedrine in an altered state where the only evidence was Defendant's possession of completed methamphetamine. View "State v. Finley" on Justia Law