Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit granted in part Petitioner's petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of Petitioner's application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and vacated the BIA's order denying Petitioner CAT relief as to Ecuador, holding that remand was required for further proceedings.Petitioner was charged with removability for entering the country without admission or parole. Petitioner conceded removability and sought deferral of removal under CAT. An immigration judge (IJ) denied relief. The BIA affirmed. Petitioner petitioned for review and was subsequently removed to Ecuador. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's decision insofar as it denied Petitioner's CAT claim linked to the vernal violence in Ecuadorian prisons, holding that the BIA and IJ failed to apply the proper legal test in assessing whether the Ecuadorian government would consent or acquiesce to acts of torture by private actors in Ecuadorian prisons. View "Murillo Morocho v. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2006, Soto’s wife reported the death of their two-year-old son. Soto admitted that the child’s death was his fault but described it as an accident: he said he had been driving an ATV around his property and had run over the toddler by mistake. Soto agreed to plead guilty to child endangerment in exchange for the dismissal of a manslaughter charge. Soto served his five-year sentence and left prison in 2011. In 2016, Soto went to the Putnam County Sheriff’s Office and confessed that he had actually beaten his son to death and had staged the ATV accident to cover up his crime. Soto was charged with aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, kidnapping, and tampering with evidence.Soto claimed double jeopardy in a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Jeopardy attaches to an “offence” under the Double Jeopardy Clause, only when a court or jury has the power to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence as to that “offence.” During Soto’s 2006 plea hearing, jeopardy attached to the child-endangerment charge once the court accepted Soto’s guilty plea for that charge; the court lacked power to determine Soto’s guilt or innocence of the manslaughter charge. Jeopardy never attached to that charge. View "Soto v. Siefker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal affirming Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder, holding that when the record contains substantial evidence of imperfect self defense, the trial court's failure to instruct on that theory amounts to constitutional error and is subject to review under the federal Chapman standard. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court committed harmful error in denying his request for an instruction on imperfect self-defense. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court erred but that the error was subject to the "reasonable probability" standard for evaluating prejudice set forth in People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818 (1956) and that Defendant suffered no prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the form of misconstruction in this case precluded the jury from making a finding on a factual issue necessary to establish the element of malice, thus qualifying as a federal error; and (2) the court of appeal's harmless error analysis did not comport with the standards for evaluating prejudice under Chapman. View "People v. Schuller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of aggravated arson, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Defendant's counsel did not render ineffective assistance.On appeal, Defendant argued that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a directed verdict and by failing to object to the testimony of an expert who opined that the structure Defendant had set fire to was habitable. A divided court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) reasonable counsel could have decided to forgot a motion for directed verdict; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that Defendant was not deprived of the Sixth Amendment guarantees. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

While serving a short sentence for domestic violence, Johnson caused a disturbance in a jail’s intake area. Officers were taking Johnson to his cell when he disobeyed orders to slow down. Another officer, Deputy Sootsman, stopped him. After a brief exchange, Johnson stepped in Sootsman’s general direction. Sootsman testified that he viewed this conduct as a threat. In response, he immediately grabbed Johnson’s neck, pushed him against the wall, and took him to the ground to be handcuffed. This force lasted about seven seconds. Investigators found that Sootsman’s actions violated jail policies. Sootsman pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor battery.Johnson sued Sootsman, citing the Eighth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the claim. Johnson failed to meet the demanding standard of proving that Sootsman used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of” inflicting pain. Johnson’s claim fails if Sootsman used force out of a belief—even an unreasonable belief—that the force was necessary to control Johnson. The states may impose stricter limits on officers than the Constitution demands, so Johnson may try to seek relief under state tort law. View "Johnson v. Sootsman" on Justia Law

Based on a 1983 murder, a three-judge panel convicted Von Clark Davis of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, Davis’s sentence was vacated, but on remand, the same three-judge panel again sentenced him to death. The Sixth Circuit subsequently vacated Davis’s death sentence on appeal of his first federal habeas petition. A different three-judge panel again sentenced Davis to death. Davis again petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition.The Sixth Circuit reversed in part and granted conditional relief on claims that the state violated Davis’s constitutional rights by enforcing his 1984 jury waiver against him at his third sentencing hearing in 2009 and that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at Davis’s 2009 sentencing hearing by failing to move to recuse a judge for bias and in failing to reasonably prepare and present mitigation evidence. The court rejected claims that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing adequately to advise him of the collateral consequences of a jury waiver and that Davis’s trial attorneys were constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence about the circumstances of Davis’s prior conviction, which provided the aggravating circumstance that made him eligible for the death penalty View "Davis v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied to the trial court in March 2022 to change his name. On the ground that Petitioner has “outstanding warrant(s),” the trial court denied Harris’s petition.   The Second Appellate District affirmed because there was no abuse of discretion. The court explained that by statute, it was proper for the trial court to check law enforcement records when considering Petitioner’s petition to change his name. The California Legislature has directed courts to use the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to determine whether a name change applicant must register as a sex offender. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

In 2008, Paris, a small, rural Kenosha County, Wisconsin community, enacted its “Sex Offender Residency Restrictions” ordinance, limiting where certain designated sex offenders could live within the town. The ordinance prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of certain protected locations where children are known to congregate and prohibits designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of any other designated offender Nelson, a former Paris resident and designated offender, was cited for violating the ordinance’s designated offenders restriction. His suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, argued that the ordinance—both facially and as applied—violated his constitutional right to substantive due process and Article I’s prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, in part, summary judgment in favor of Paris, noting that Nelson conceded that the “protected locations” ordinance is rationally related to Paris’s legitimate interest in protecting children. Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of protected locations does not violate the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause because it is not “so punitive either in purpose or effect” as to negate Paris’s nonpunitive intent for the restriction. The court remanded the question of Paris’s restriction prohibiting designated offenders from living within 6,500 feet of each other. View "Nelson v. Town of Paris" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court convicting Caitlyn Williams and Tamara LaRue (together, Parents) of failing to cause their children to attend school on a regular basis in violation of Missouri's compulsory attendance law, holding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.031.1 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied in this case.On appeal, Parents argued, among other things, that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both that their conduct was a purposeful or knowing violation of Mo. Rev. Stat. 167.031.1 and that the children's attendance was not sufficiently "regular" to constitute a statutory violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 167.031.1 was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of this case; and (2) there sufficient evidence to find that Parents knowingly failed to cause their children to attend school on a regular basis after their children were enrolled. View "State v. LaRue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress and dismiss, holding that Defendant's warrantless arrest was unlawful, and therefore, it was error for the district court not to suppress and exclude the evidence discovered as a result of the unlawful search.Defendant pled guilty to criminal possession of dangerous drugs, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress and dismiss. On appeal, Defendant argued that the underlying arrest was illegal and led directly to the discovery of the incriminating evidence. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that the district court erred by not suppressing and excluding the evidence at issue. View "State v. Price" on Justia Law